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1. INTRODUCTION
A traditional dichotomy exists in the theory of international trade between, 
on the one hand, the monetary theory and its associated problems which arise because 
different money circulates in different countries, because each country has its own cen­
tral bank and controls its own monetary policy, and because money is treated as a commo­
dity with a direct utility of its own and, on the other hand, the pure theory which is 
concerned with the real factors underlying the monetary problems. This thesis is con­
cerned solely with the latter. More precisely, our interest centres upon the applica­
tion of the neo-Walrasian analysis of value and welfare to some of the traditional ques­
tions posed in trade theory.
The pure theory of international trade itself can be subdivided broadly between 
'positive' contributions, intended for purposes of explanation and prediction, and norm­
ative contributions relating international trade to economic welfare. In the positive 
field, and it is with problems arising here that we are primarily concerned, there has 
been a recent trend towards the empirical verification of different hypotheses. How­
ever, though this trend is quite marked in the theory of comparative costs [107] and in 
connection with the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem that a country's exports use intensively the 
country's abundant factor of production [108; 109]> id is scarcely noticeable among the 
great bulk of pure theory writings which are concerned with the formulation of ' logically 
true' propositions which, in the nature of things, cannot be refuted empirically. The 
majority of these have been developed within the context of the familiar two-good, two- 
factor model with its additional assumptions of linear and homogeneous production func­
tions with diminishing return*along isoquants, full employment, profit maximisation and
perfect competition.
It is the purpose of this thesis to rework several of these propositions within
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the framework of a more general model;so as to provide theorems which not only give a 
more realistic interpretation of the problems,hut which also are verifiable, if only un­
der ideal conditions. The two chief innovations in our model are the introduction of 
commodities which, by reason of transport costs, tariffs or tastes, are excluded from in­
ternational trade and the formulation of our results in terms of parameters which are 
readily recognisable, independent of the problem studied, and at least measurable con­
ceivably.
The reader will soon note the similarity between our own model and that deve­
loped by Professor James Meade in the mathematical appendices of his celebrated treatise 
upon international trade problems [87,’ 62] . Commenting upon his decision to reduce his 
four-commodity model to a traditional two-commodity one, however, Meade states:
If we are to use our model to illustrate any propositions in 
the theoretical analysis of international economic relation­
ships we must further simplify the model, unless we are pre­
pared to be content with the contemplation of a string of 
clumsy determinants without any very obvious conclusions to 
be drawn from them[87, 46].1 ’
Contrary to Meade's dictum underlined above we shall demonstrate that when full use is 
made of the basic results of micro economic theory, general equilibrium theory in inter­
national trade is not too complex to handle. Much more important, it will become clear 
that modifications to basic formulae are essential if numerical estimates of elasticities 
are to be used to support qualitative results.
Broadly speaking, and apart from the inclusion of two additional commodities, 
our analysis differs from that of Meade in two important respects. 
x * The underlining is my own.
First, no attempt is made to suggest different policy combinations which might 
achieve a desired result. Rather, we shall confine ourselves to providing (within the 
framework of our assumptions) unique solutions in terms of relative prices concerning the 
effect of a shift in one of the underlying equilibrium conditions of the model upon some 
dependent variable. From our model, which is of a comparative static type, we are ill- 
equipped to specify the best policies by which a necessary or desired adjustment is to be 
obtained. For instance, if a given transfer of purchasing power is to be effected bet­
ween one country and another, our subsequent analysis (again, within the context of our 
assumptions) may allow us to say that expenditure must alter by a certain amount in each 
country and that certain adjustments to the relative prices both in the paying and in the 
receiving country are necessary. It will not enable us to specify precisely how these 
changes might best be effected.
Secondly, and quite unlike the comprehensive coverage given by Meade to inter­
national trade problems, our model concentrates on a mere handful of current (and not so 
current)issues. This restricted selection of topics, which is necessitated from both 
the point of view of space and the complexity of the analysis, nevertheless does provide 
an adequate insight into the additional problems arising from the inclusion of non-traded 
commodities.
There are three broad subdivisions of the logically true proposition. First, 
there is the static proposition which defines the properties of equilibrium in a given 
situation. Examples from this category are the classic formulation of the necessary con­
ditions for equilibrium in a multi-commodity, international market by Pareto [20], and 
Samuelson's elegant theorem stating the sufficient conditions for the equality of inter­
national factor prices under free trade [110]. Secondly, there is the dynamic proposition
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where time enters explicitly into the model. Instances of such propositions are rare in 
the pure theory of international trade.2 Finally, we have those hypotheses which are 
concerned with the differences between two equilibrium, situations. Theorems in this sec­
tion, which are by far the most numerous, can be subdivided further into those which con­
cern the effects of autonomous changes in production functions, factor endowments, tastes 
or the distribution of factor ownership upon equilibrium prices and quantities and those 
which, taking the above parameters as given, study the effects of a change in the trade 
situation induced by a tariff, subsidy, export, consumption or production tax. Problems 
selected for study below are from both groups.
The next two chapters are introductory. Chapter Two provides a cursory and 
critical survey of different methods of analysis in the pure theory of international trade, 
emphasis being accorded generally to the work of those theorists using general equilibrium 
techniques. This leads, in the next chapter, to the development of a four-commodity, 
international, free-trade system which is obtained by coupling together two closed, three- 
commodity models. The assumptions of the model are carefully stated and their more im­
portant implications discussed. Additionally, the static (Hicksian) and dynamic stabi­
lity of the system is examined. Finally, the chapter introduces a new parameter, ana­
logous to an elasticity, which is called a coefficient of sensitivity. It is suggested 
that this parameter could have a wide and important range of application in international 
trade theory.
In Chapter Four the model is applied to that once controversial issue, the 
transfer problem. Apart from shedding new light upon the argument concerning the direc­
tion of the shift in the terns of trade, this application of the model serves also to
For exceptions see [106,72-73.? footnote 5j 25,266-68].
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emphasise the important role of non-traded commodities in the process of adjustment to 
equilibrium.
The next four chapters are concerned with the theory of tariffs. Chapter 
Five re-examines Metzler’s contention that it is quite conceivable that a tariff would 
fail to protect the import-competing industries of a tariff-imposing country [l6]. His 
argument is examined both for the two- and four-commodity cases and is rejected on a 
priori and empirical grounds.
Chapters Six, Seven and Eight deal with the effect of a tariff on the terms of 
trade when the assumptions of the classical, international trade theory model are relaxed. 
The analysis of Chapter Six, which examines the effect of a tariff on the terms of trade 
when non-traded commodities are explicitly allowed for, concludes in favour of the ortho­
dox hypothesis that the terns of trade of the taxing country must improve; a finding 
which is contrary to the assertion of Graaf that:
In a multi-commodity world ... it does not seem possible to 
generalise about the direction of the movement in the terms 
of trade [<S/ ,5 4-j •
Next, in Chapter Seven, the traditional assumption that the government and private sec­
tors of the taxing economy have identical tastes or that the government redistributes its 
tariff revenue as subsidies to the private sector in a manner which is random with res­
pect to tastes, is relaxed. Two cases are examined: first, where the demand of the
private sector is independent of the amount and type of government expenditure; and 
secondly, where private consumption is influenced by these factors. Finally, in Chap­
ter Eight, the assumption of a single representative consumer and producer (or identical 
consumers and producers) is relaxed and the effect of a tariff on the terns of trade is 
analysed when there exists a disaggregated private sector.
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Our incursion into the theory of tariffs concludes -with an analysis of the 
problem of an optimum tariff. In particular, we concern ourselves with the question of 
its probable size. New two- and four-commodity optimum tariff criteria are offered in 
place of the traditional Bickerdike-Edgeworth-Kahn-Graaf result which, it is suggested, 
is of extremely limited value when its parameters are interpreted meaningfully. Our 
conclusion is that Kahn [11] overstated considerably the case for a large optimum tariff.
Our attention turns, in Chapter Ten, to the question of the effect of consump­
tion and production taxes upon the terms of trade, a subject which, as far as I am aware, 
has not been treated thoroughly in the literature. Criteria are established both for 
the two- and four-commodity cases: first, for the effect of a consumption tax on im­
portables upon both the terms of trade and the domestic traded goods price ratio of the 
taxing country; and secondly, for the effect of a production tax on importables upon the 
terms of trade and the traded goods factor price ratio of the taxing country. These re­
sults are then compared with the corresponding effects of a tariff.
Finally, in Chapter Eleven, we study the effect of an increase in output upon 
the terms of trade and upon the relative prices of both the expanding country and the 
rest of the world (the foreign country). A considerable literature exists concerning 
this problem which is founded upon two- and quasi^four-commodity models. It is suggested 
that our own model is sufficiently general to include most of these, while at the same 
time, additional and important qualifications to the existing analysis are made.
We turn now to a brief review of analytic methods in the pure theory of inter­
national trade.
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2. ANALYTIC METHODS IN THE PURE THEORY OF 
____________INTERNATIONAL TRADE__________
A. INTRODUCTION
Theoreticians in international trade are faced with problems which, if not pe­
culiar to their own section of the discipline of economics, are perhaps more formidable 
than those encountered elsewhere. On the one hand, they may choose a model in which the 
number of variables is reduced sufficiently to allow for a simple exposition but in which, 
because of its simplicity, the complex reality of the world is ignored. This problem is 
aggravated particularly by the large number of important variables that must be considered 
in international trade and, further, because the nature of the international economy does 
not lend itself readily to an aggregative, macro-economic approach. On the other hand, 
attempts to construct a more general theory in terms of individual economic units, have 
resulted usually in answers of great complexity from which qualitative conclusions are 
extracted only with difficulty. Faced with this dilemma, the only justification for a 
new model or variation of an old one, is that it should enable us either to derive accept­
ed theorems more readily, or to qualify or refute them. It appears that the best policy 
is to adopt a 'middle of the road' attitude. In due course, therefore, a model is deve­
loped in which the abstractions from reality are neither so severe that all connection 
between the real world and the model is sacrificed, nor so few, as to preclude the deri­
vation of useful qualitative conclusions or to prohibit the possibility of empirical veri­
fication .
In this chapter we shall state criteria with which to assess different analytic 
methods in the pure theory of international trade and briefly review some of these to 
conclude that a general equilibrium type of analysis offers the greatest potential for
the derivation of useful results.
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What follows does not purport to he a general criticism of international trade 
methodology. As pointed out in the preceding chapter the scope of the present investi­
gation is strictly limited and it may he that an analytic method which is inappropriate 
for the study of one problem could suffice for the study of another.
B. GENERAL CRITERIA FOR THE EVALUATION OF A HYPOTHESIS
There follows, a brief analysis of criteria that might he used to assess dif­
ferent hypotheses. In a well-known work [9;97-105] are listed several basic conditions 
which a good hypothesis should fulfil.
Whether a hypothesis he trivial or true, insignificant or significant, is re­
latively unimportant compared with the necessary condition that it he verifiable, even if 
only under ideal conditions. The question of verification introduces several subordinate 
considerations.
A theorem need not in itself he directly verifiable and, indeed, many of the 
most valuable hypotheses are not. However, it should be clearly stated so that its im­
plications may be deduced and subjected to empirical confirmation. Thus, in economics, 
the hypothesis which states that a consumer will maximise his satisfactions from a given 
income is not directly verifiable, though many of its consequences are.
If a hypothesis is to be verifiable, it must be stated in terns of determinate 
operations, i.e. it must be expressed in terns of parameters which are not only unambi­
guously defined, but also readily recognisable in practice, conceivably measurable and 
independent of the problem studied.
A hypothesis should provide an answer to the problem under review. It would 
be a serious error, however, to contend that false hypotheses (the logical consequences 
of which have been refuted) are of no use. A false theorem may direct attention towards
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formerly unsuspected explanatory relations. Moreover, any newcomer to a field of research 
is, at least, aware of those theorems that do not explain the facts. It should he borne 
in mind, that no hypothesis exists by itself alone but is associated with or founded upon 
other theorems. Therefore, when a hypothesis is tested, it is not only the fate of a 
single hypothesis that is involved but also the relevant body of knowledge to which it is 
attached. It is always possible that the subordinate hypothesis is a good one and that 
its failure to meet the facts is due to unsound hypotheses on which it is based.
A hypothesis still has merit even where the existing state of knowledge is in­
adequate to ensure empirical testing. In the absence of the possibility of immediate 
testing, however, it would be of immense value if, as a result of qualitative restric­
tions imposed by assumption on our basic relationships, we could derive qualitative con­
clusions concerning the response of our system to changes in the underlying data. It is 
an unfortunate fact that many of the general equilibrium results in the theory of inter­
national trade fail to yield such qualitative conclusions. The reader is referred, in 
particular, to the work of Yntema and Mosak [23;24]. At the same time, given the exist­
ing state of econometrics, their general results cannot be tested. The remedy, at the 
expense of a loss in generality, is the imposition of increasingly severe restrictions 
upon each model.
Finally, it is important that a hypothesis should be as simple as possible. 
Simplicity in this sense does not mean the more familiar theorem, nor does it mean the 
selection of the one which contains the least number of variables. In deciding which is 
the more simple of two hypotheses one should choose whichever is related the more system­
atically to other theories not only in international trade but, if possible, throughout 
and beyond the discipline of economics. In this way many apparently unrelated incidents 
may find their explanation within the context of one general theory.
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Let us summarize the criteria outlined above.
1. A hypothesis, or the consequences deduced from it, must be verifiable, even if
only under ideal conditions. This implies that the parameters in which it is 
expressed must be readily identifiable, conceivably measurable, unambiguously 
defined and independent of the problem under review.
2. The hypothesis should explain the problem which prompted the enquiry.
3- Where the practicability of immediate testing is in doubt, the theorem will be
of greater value if qualitative conclusions are possible.
4. The greater the simplicity of the hypothesis, the greater will be its general­
ity, and the greater the extent of its integration within a given body of 
knowledge.
C. PSEUDO-GENERAL AND PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS 
This section is concerned with a brief description and criticism of a number of 
approaches used to avoid more complex, full, general equilibrium analysis. The theorems 
in which we are interested study the rate of change in certain variables induced by some 
explicit change in the given data. Solutions are obtained normally from a set of assumed 
basic relationships which hold only within a given environment. To detail this environ­
ment completely would involve the specification of the entire universe. Economists have 
included as data, therefore, only those items which they consider to lie within the con­
fines of their discipline. Furthermore, depending on the problem, certain economic re­
lationships are excluded from consideration by the use of ceteris paribus assumptions 
which thus restrict the generality of the model. Logically, there is no difference bet­
ween the method of general and partial equilibrium analysis, save that the former tends
to exhaust usually the full content of the discipline of economics whereas the latter, by
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a more extensive use of the ceteris paribus clause, takes as given many of the variables 
of the general approach.
Any economic system contains a very large number of variables and, if worth­
while analysis is to take place, some reduction in the number of these by the introduc­
tion of restrictive assumptions is essential. At the same time as these restrictive 
assumptions make the analysis more manageable, however, they limit the area of applica­
bility of the theory. It is important, therefore, that the full implications of the 
assumptions be recalled when interpreting the results.
There are a number of devices an economist may use to reduce to manageable pro­
portions the number of variables involved in a problem. Broadly speaking, these may be 
classified into three groups: first, where even within a specified environment certain
economic variables are treated as constants, we have the method of partial equilibrium 
analysis; secondly, where all specified variables are included 'totally' in the aggre­
gate concept by the use of certain aggregated magnitudes such as Alfred Marshall's 'bales
of output', we have a pseudo-general approach, typified in the pure theory of international
the equivalent
trade by the use of offer curves,/algebraic models or the typical text-book arithmetic 
examples of comparative costs; finally, there is the traditional two-country, two-com­
modity approach to international trade problems within which environment all reactions 
among the variables are allowed for explicitly. Frequently, the difference between the 
first and last categories is one of degree only; the latter sometimes shading into the 
former in the case of complete specialisation in production in each of the two countries.
Consider first, the method of partial equilibrium analysis. Except where a 
single market is under consideration the partial approach is also partly aggregative for
it deals in terms of aggregated exports, imports, consumption, etc. It remains distinct
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from the offer curve type of analysis, however, because it ignores the mutual interdepend­
ence of these aggregated variables. Normally, one variable is related functionally to 
one other and the only justification for neglecting this fact is that the unexplained re­
sidual shift in the dependent variable is small. For example, the demand for imports is 
defined often as a function of the price of imports and nothing else. This implies that 
any shift in the demand for imports not explained by a change in their price is negligi­
ble. Unfortunately, this is not so, as a country's demand for imports is influenced sig­
nificantly by changes in the price of exportable or non-traded goods or by changes in in­
come, etc. Where such important components of a country's national income as imports 
and exports are concerned, partial equilibrium techniques can be employed only at the risk 
of serious distortion. While of considerable use for studying the direct impact of com­
mercial policy on international trade, this type of analysis does not provide a full re­
sult. Valuable as a first step, it has failed to facilitate the development of hypothe­
ses which can provide an adequate answer to the problem studied and, thereby, to form a 
basis for useful prediction. A particular example of this technique that is examined 
thoroughly in a later chapter is the well-known optimum tariff theorem enunciated by 
R.F. Kahn [11]. It is contended that this result is inapplicable in the real world, and 
that accordingly any policy recommendations that might be made on the basis of it need be 
scrutinised carefully in the light of the assumptions made.
The second and more ingenious method of reducing the number of variables to 
manageable proportions involves a combination of the use of the concept of a representa­
tive firm or individual, which acts similarly to all other units in its group, with aggre­
gate composite magnitudes such as the Marshallian bale of output, which represents aggre­
gate uniform investments of a country's labour (of various qualities) and her capital
JO-
[12,157]• Such assumptions have given us the familiar offer curve technique introduced 
by Marshall [12] and later, ingeniously combined -with indifference curves by Edgeworth.
In recent years, this method of analysis has been subjected to increasingly heavy criti­
cism [13j369-388; 14,150-159]• It is not our purpose to review such criticism in
detail. We shall confine ourselves, apart from a few remarks of a general nature, to 
whether or not hypotheses derived from such analysis fulfil the conditions established 
above.
It might be claimed validly that the offer curve technique is a form of general 
equilibrium analysis, as the shape and position of the curves is determined by the mutual 
interaction of all specified variables. Thus, a shift in one of the curves, let us say 
as the result of a tariff, would reflect all of the changes occurring in the system. 
Unfortunately, the apparent simplicity of these curves is deceptive. The shift in one 
of them has been likened, in a well-known passage, to the way in which the hands of a 
clock shift in response to the movements of unseen machinery [15,32]. In other words, 
the shape of such curves and their position is determined by unseen variables and without 
a knowledge of these components the shape and the position of the curves must remain un­
known. Haberler put it succinctly:
Guessing the shape of these curves and then reading off the 
result means simply jumping to the outcome of a complicated 
process without analysing it. By assuming Marshall’s cur­
ves as given we really assume the result [14,159]•
Some economists, with a form of algebraic analysis derived directly from offer 
curves,have established precise formulae for the effects of different disturbances in 
equilibrium conditions upon international and domestic price ratios. Two of these theo­
rems are examined in detail later [16,1-29; 17,56-6l]. The basic objection to both
is that they cannot be tested because their consequences are not expressed in terms of
parameters that can he measured independently of the problem studied. In both cases, 
the resulting formulae are given in terms of 'total' elasticities which embody all poss­
ible influences upon the demand for and supply of a commodity as the result of a change 
in the given data. Such elasticities are vulnerable to the same criticism as the offer 
curves from which they derive: that without a knowledge of their component parts we can,
from complete ignorance, only guess at their magnitude. It is true that we might compute 
under ideal conditions a total elasticity of demand, for say imports, which would measure 
the proportionate change in the volume of imports due to a proportionate change in the 
terms of trade induced by, say, a tariff. This estimate, however, would be of histor­
ical value only, as it would not be independent of the problem studied, i.e. the effect of 
a tariff on the terns of trade. A similar proportionate change in the terms of trade 
caused this time by a devaluation might have an entirely different effect upon the demand 
for imports. To compare the two elasticities would involve the comparison of incompar­
ables. Results expressed in terms of these concepts never could be falsified. Further­
more, prediction on the basis of such theorems is impossible. For instance, we may know 
the total elasticity applicable to a past devaluation. Should we intend now to devalue 
by the same amount we cannot ascertain the value of the present elasticity until the de­
valuation has been put into operation. The values of the component elasticities could 
have altered, perhaps, as a result of the structural changes that would have accompanied 
the past devaluation.1
1 ’ For an interesting attempt to derive the shape of a country's foreign offer curve and 
to formulate policy predictions on the basis of it, the reader is referred to the work of 
R.L. Marris [102] and to the subsequent controversy which it aroused [103^101f]405]•
Marris calculates the simple regression of United Kingdom exports on United Kingdom terms 
of trade for the period 1920-38* These results are transformed into a foreign offer 
curve whose predictive value is examined in the light of post-war data. The inescapable 
conclusion which emerges from this ingenious attempt of Marris is that his foreign offer 
curve cannot be regarded as a satisfactory explanation of the effect of relative price
Finally, it remains to consider those models which allow explicitly for full 
general reactions among the variables within a specified environment comprising normally 
two countries and two commodities with a representative individual living in each country 
We shall have occasion to examine a variety of these models, ranging from the simple 
Ricardian type, characterised by constant costs and the specialisation of each country 
in the production of its exportable good, to the more complex Heckscher-Ohlin model in 
which production of each commodity is variable, though the factors of production remain 
in inelastic supply.
An outstanding example of the application of such a model to problems of eco­
nomic policy is contained in the celebrated two-volume study of Meade [86;5^]. In the 
text of his first volume Meade confines himself, for the most part, to a two-country 
world in which each country produces only one good, thereby earning Johnson’s stricture 
that he had simplified "... his problems to the point at which his results cannot be 
applied at all easily to practical problems." [88^827]. Though Johnson’s criticism was 
directed specifically at the Ricardian form of Meade's analysis, which was not continued 
in his mathematical appendix [87], it is contended here that this criticism is mitigated 
only slightly in the case of the more complex Heckscher-Ohlin type model with its empha­
sis on increasing costs and some domestic production of the importable commodity for, 
while it is true that no country in the real world specialises completely in the produc­
tion of one commodity, it is equally true that no single country in the real world is
changes upon the volume of United Kingdom exports and imports. Instead, it compounds
the influence of other autonomous explanatory variables such as the fluctuations in bu­
siness activity which occurred in the inter-war period, shifts in technology, tastes, 
etc., as well as price reactions. In other words, the value of such an estimate is 
historical rather than predictive and, even so, it is difficult to see how one might 
explain even the historical pattern of events unless some further knowledge is avail­
able concerning the subsidiary influences.
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concerned solely with the production of importable and exportable commodities. In prac­
tice there will always be a composite class of goods which do not enter into international 
trade because of transport costs or artificial impediments.
Further,Johnson pointed out that
... the problems in which most theorists are interested require 
the specification of the direction of the net outcome of influ­
ences operating in opposite directions, and this in turn re­
quires a specification of the magnitudes as well as the signs 
of the influences ... To determine the outcome of any particu­
lar case ... it is necessary to measure the quantity ... it 
follows immediately that the role of economic theory in the 
solution of practical problems is extremely limited: the im­
portant (and more difficult) part of the task becomes the prob­
lem of measurement [88,827]-
This quotation raises two interesting questions. Supposedly, it is the role of the theo­
retician to provide answers which, even if they do not permit the drawing of unambiguous 
qualitative conclusions, are expressed at least in terns of parameters that are conceiv­
ably measurable and independent of the problem studied, thus permitting their theory to 
be tested empirically. If this is so, it may be asked what statistical meaning can be 
attached to a marginal propensity to consume importables or exportables in a world which 
includes non-traded commodities. As far as the author is aware, no such statistical es­
timate has ever been computed. At what stage, for instance, does an exportable become 
an importable or vice versa? To compare such concepts with marginal propensities to con­
sume imports or exports is to compare incomparables - a charge to which Johnson himself 
must plead guilty [89,2157 footnote 8]. Similar difficulties would be encountered when 
computing elasticities of demand for, or supply of, importables and exportables, for 
again the almost insuperable problem would arise of interpreting the parameters of a 
two-commodity model in a world which includes, in each country, an aggregate class of 
non-traded goods. The remedy would appear to be a model which includes non-traded com-
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modities and takes account of their relationships with the internationally traded goods 
sectors. We shall return to this suggestion after a brief examination of those attempts 
which have been made to construct a full general equilibrium model in international trade 
theory.
One point, however, should be made concerning the pseudo-general equilibrium 
model of the Heckscher-Ohlin variety. An apparent fault with several applications of 
this type of model is that they do not express their results in a form which is conducive 
to empirical testing. All too frequently, supply, demand and income reactions are aggre­
gated into a form of total elasticity which obscures important relationships such as the 
relative size of the different markets. Moreover, nothing is known concerning the size 
of these total parameters and their magnitude must remain unknown until an assessment is 
made of the size of their components.
D. GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELS
The most notable attempts to increase the rigour and generality of international 
trade theory are those of Pareto, Pietri-Tonelli, Yntema, Ohlin and, particularly, Mosak. 
Far ahead of its time, Pareto's pretentious mathematical analysis of the pure theory of 
international trade was to remain practically unknown to the English speaking world until 
the early nineteen thirties. Even today, his most comprehensive treatment of the sub­
ject is available only in Italian [19,1^2-73; 20,^76-98]. As his theory of international
trade follows naturally upon his description of equilibrium conditions in a single country, 
it anticipates, to a considerable extent, that of Mosak. The domestic economy is des­
cribed by a Walrasian exchange equilibrium in which all markets are cleared and, since he 
assumes perfect competition, commodity prices for all individuals are proportional to mar­
ginal utilities. It follows, from the perfectly competitive assumption, that on the pro-
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duction side marginal productivities are proportional to factor prices and that all fac­
tor markets must he cleared. International trade is introduced to two similar closed 
economies by the addition of n plus 1 unknowns; the exchange rate between the curren­
cies of the two countries and the quantities of the n commodities traded. n of the equa­
tions required for a solution derive from the fact that the price of a commodity must be 
the same in a now single international market. The final equation is obtained by assum­
ing that the value of imports must equal the value of exports in either country when ex­
pressed in terms of international prices, which is similar to assuming that the excess 
demand for a commodity in one country is equal to the excess supply of it in another.
The apparent simplicity of the method is dependent upon the fact that gold is included 
among the commodities traded. In equilibrium, the demand for and supply of gold are e- 
qual for the two countries combined. The equilibrating process that follows a disturb­
ance in the equilibrium conditions consists of a shift in both domestic and international 
price levels due to a change in the utility and cost of production of gold and to a fur­
ther shift in the prices of traded goods as a result of a change in the quantities bought 
and soldC<23; f H  “
The work of Pietri-Tonelli [21,522-29, 522-75] and of Ohlin [22,555-70] is si­
milar to that of Pareto. In fact, the former’s contribution may be dealt with .summarily 
as it is no more than a clear restatement of Pareto's analysis. Ohlin, on the other hand,
in the first appendix of his well-known text sets forth his model in the form of Cassel- 
ian general equilibrium theory, thus avoiding the use of the concept of marginal utility. 
However, the manner in which the price systems of the two isolated markets are combined 
is remarkably similar to the method used by Pareto. Indeed, Ohlin was later to begrudge 
the unnecessary labour that he incurred through not discovering Pareto's work prior to 
commencing his own [22,586-67]-
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Though Pareto’s contribution was to lie dormant for a number of years, it is to 
him that the honour must go for first having presented a concise general equilibrium theory 
of international trade in terms of a mutually interdependent, multiple-market theory of 
pricing. To the Italian pioneer must also go the credit for having stated the theory of 
comparative cost in terms of relative prices, thus becoming one of the first to break 
with the classical theory of real costs in international trade. Bearing in mind the 
problems with which we shall later be concerned, Ohlin’s contribution is a limited one, 
though in the field of factor allocation and the distribution of income, his work opened 
up new vistas. It is noteworthy, however, that in this context Ohlin tended to abandon 
the full generality of his mathematical model and to revert to an argument in terms of a 
more simple verbal model which, to a large extent, depended upon the earlier work of 
Heckscher and Wicksell.
Unfortunately, despite their generality, the mathematical formulations of 
Pareto, Pietri-Tonelli, and Ohlin do little more than to state that there exists a final 
functional relationship between all variables and parameters. Merely to state that un­
der certain conditions there are sufficient equations to determine the values of the un­
knowns is not, in itself, sufficient. This does not provide a verifiable hypothesis 
nor, in the cases of Pareto, Pietri-Tonelli or Ohlin, were their consequences verifiable. 
The problem of developing general equilibrium theory so that it could indicate the manner 
in which variables might alter, either qualitatively or quantitatively with respect to 
changes in the data, was to remain until restrictions were imposed upon empirically ob­
servable data by which hypotheses could be refuted conceivably. Thus, while a final 
assessment of the work of Pareto, Pietri-Tonelli and Ohlin (his mathematical model) must 
acknowledge the fact that they were among the first to apply general equilibrium analysis
to the theory of international trade and thereby to describe the involved system of price 
interrelationships and the necessary conditions that must be fulfilled in equilibrium, it 
should point out also that they were unable to formulate testable hypotheses about the 
effects upon the equilibrium situation of a change in one of the initial conditions. 
Hence, problems such as the effect of tariffs, transfer payments, etc. on international 
prices could not be studied in terns of these models. It should be remembered, however, 
that their inability to do this was due, not to their failure to apply existing knowledge 
to their problems but, to the then inadequate development of the laws of change of equi­
librium systems.
Theodore Yntema was the first to move in this direction [23]. His work, cast 
in the classical tradition rather than in the general equilibrium mould of Walras, des­
cribes, with the aid of special assumptions, the series of monetary adjustments that 
follow a change in the equilibrium conditions of an international system. Internal equi 
librium is given by relating functionally the supply of and demand for each commodity to 
its price which is specified for a particular set of monetary conditions. All supply 
and demand schedules derived from such functions are assumed to move proportionately 
with respect to a change in the given monetary conditions. This assumption, together 
with the fact that only one price can exist for each commodity in an international market 
is sufficient to determine the exchange rate, which will move proportionately to the com­
mon shift in all supply and demand schedules. Enough equations to depict international 
equilibrium are given by the requirements that for each commodity the sum of net exports 
for all countries combined must be zero and that for each country the value of imports 
must equal the value of exports when expressed in a common currency. Thus, in an m 
country, n commodity world there are (m plus n) equations to solve for (m plus n minus 1)
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unknowns - the n prices and (m minus 1) exchange rates. As one of these equations is not 
independent, the system is not overdetermined.
Yntema1s model is superior to that of Pareto in three respects. First, as 
Pareto proceeds from a description of the individual economic unit to full general equi­
librium analysis with no attempt to aggregate commodities, his system contains not only a 
greater, but an unmanageable number of equations for empirical purposes. This criticism 
is mitigated by his aggregation of countries as opposed to the m country model of Yntema. 
Secondly, Pareto's equations are not related clearly to the monetary system nor to chan­
ges in price-levels and so, thirdly, the effect of a disturbance upon the initial equili­
brium conditions cannot readily be connected with particular elasticities of supply and 
demand.
It is unfortunate, however, that despite the improved insight into the theory 
of international trade made possible by Yntema - particularly into the stability of inter­
national markets - he failed, as did the others, to derive testable hypotheses. His 
model is still too complex, the (m plus n) equations specifying too many relationships 
for practical purposes. In this respect, the same criticism can be sustained against 
Yntema that was made above concerning Pareto, there being a difference of degree only. 
Yntema did not venture far enough along the road from micro to macro economics. While 
he grouped individuals according to the countries in which they lived, he baulked at the 
creation of either country or commodity groups. Though there are strong grounds for 
such a decision, it will be argued later that some further degree of aggregation is ne­
cessary if worthwhile hypotheses are to be formulated.
Unfortunately, serious problems did arise where Yntema attempted to simplify 
his analysis by relating functionally the supply of and the demand for each commodity to 
its own price and nothing else. For the reasons set out above this is a questionable
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assumption in international trade theory.
As in the cases of the other authors discussed, Yntema did not have a knowledge 
of the laws of change of equilibrium systems. His model, however, was in a form that 
was to facilitate greatly the application of imminent and important discoveries in this 
field to problems of international economics.
We come now to the most elegant, rigorous and indeed inspiring formulation in 
mathematical terms of international trade theory [24]. Whereas Pareto superimposed in­
ternational trade upon two Walrasian exchange economies and Yntema developed a classical 
model, Mosak's work is sufficiently general to include both, although it is cast primarily 
in the classical tradition. Mosak, like Pareto, proceeded from the equilibrium condi­
tions for the individual economic unit to the conditions for equilibrium in a closed eco­
nomy. Unlike Pareto, he aggregated individual supply and demand functions before coupling 
his system in trade with another closed economy. Essentially, however, his model is an 
elaboration of Yntema’s and its advantages and improvements can be seen most readily when 
the two models are compared.
One significant improvement in a multi-country model is the exclusion of the 
balance of payments equations. While it is true that such a condition is necessary if 
equilibrium is to exist between two or more trading countries, Mosak dispenses with the 
need for an explicit formulation of it, by including equations for non-traded commodities. 
This, in conjunction with the requirement that money income must equal expenditure in 
each country, means that the balance of payment equations are contained implicitly in 
the equations of supply and demand.
It has been noted already, when comparing the work of Yntema and Pareto, that 
the latter derived his aggregate supply and demand functions from the individual utility
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and transformation functions whereas the former adopted a more simple, though less general, 
approach by commencing his analysis with given aggregate supply and demand functions.
Mosak follows Pareto in this respect.
He records a further major improvement when he avoids the ambiguity of employ­
ing partial equilibrium analysis in a general model. The demand for and supply of any 
commodity is related functionally to all prices and income. Thus, cross elasticities 
of demand are not assumed to vanish identically nor are income effects, i.e. the rate of 
change in the quantity demanded of a commodity as the result of an uncompensated change 
in income, neglected.
Mosak's most important contribution is that his work actually studies the ef­
fects of a disturbance in the initial equilibrium conditions in terms of the recently dis­
covered laws of change of equilibrium systems [25,90-124; 26,301-320; 27,577-6l6]. He 
extends the theory of value for a closed economy to an international one. His use of 
the Hicksian concept of income and substitution effects enables him to deal generally 
with problems of complementarity and substitutability in both production and consumption.
For example, an increase in the price of a commodity will cause consumers to substitute 
out of it, to decrease their demand for complementary products and to increase their de­
mand for close substitutes. Moreover, these substitution and income effects can be 
turned into elasticities that measure the change in the quantity demanded or supplied of 
a commodity in response to a change in any price when all other prices and money income 
are held constant. Hence, these partial elasticities are parameters that are independent 
of the problem under review, are readily recognisable, unambiguously defined and, at least, 
in principle, measurable.2
2 * Cf. the work of R.J. Stone and others in the Department of Applied Economics,
Cambridge [28].
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Mosak's analysis clearly offers the greatest opportunity among the analytic 
methods examined for the formulation of hypotheses which might fulfil the conditions stated 
earlier. In the first place, the parameters in which his results are expressed are mea­
surable under ideal conditions. It is conceivable that any one of the infinite number 
of parameters involved could be computed. Secondly, the theory is simple in the sense 
that the method employed has been used for the solution of economic problems outside the 
field of international trade, i.e. in the theory of value. Unfortunately, two problems 
remain. In the first place, the very large number of variables involved precludes the 
practicability of immediate testing. Answers to specific problems are not forthcoming.
In the second place, in the absence of full quantitative information, he is unable to 
draw unambiguous qualitative conclusions about the behaviour of the solution values of the 
variables in response to changes in the given data because insufficient restrictions are 
imposed upon the original relationships to indicate definite limitations concerning the 
algebraic sign of these rates of change. It would appear that the remedy is to impose 
more severe initial assumptions.
E. CONCLUSION
In section two of this chapter, conditions were stated for the purpose of eval­
uating different hypotheses. Then, within specified limits, we examined different ana­
lytic methods in the pure theory of international trade, concluding:
1. that apparently simple methods of analysis such as the use of offer curves, partial
equilibrium or two-country, two-commodity models either have failed to produce test­
able hypotheses or they have so simplified the analysis with restrictive assumptions 
that the resulting theorems are inapplicable in the real world;
2. that among general equilibrium theorists,
i. the works of Pareto, Pietri-Tonelli, and Ohlin fail to yield testable hypotheses, 
even though they were the first to indicate the mutual interdependence of all 
variables in an international price system; 
ii• the respective models of Yntema and Mosak fail, in the absence of existing com­
plete quantitative information, to produce results from which qualitative con­
clusions can be derived. Moreover, the work of the former is open to the objec­
tion that he omitted, by assumption, certain important variables.
We return now to the suggestion made in Section C of this chapter that a more 
realistic model should include a class of non-traded commodities and take account expli­
citly of the relationships existing between them and the internationally traded goods.
The advantages of such a procedure are twofold. First, the presence of an aggregate, non 
traded commodity is a small but nevertheless significant step toward reality: in succeed
ing chapters it will be shown that a failure to consider the influence of the non-traded 
sector could distort seriously both the direction and magnitude of the shift in certain 
dependent variables. Secondly, the inclusion of the non-traded sector enhances consi­
derably the prospect of the empirical testing of the results of different applications of 
the Heckscher-Ohlin model, as the ambiguity involved in defining exportables and import­
ables is removed.
At the same time, the reader should note that our excursion into a multi-commo­
dity world does not subject the model to the criticism made earlier concerning Mosak’s 
attempt to construct a more general model: namely, that in the absence of full quanti­
tative information no qualitative conclusions can be obtained. For the most part, qua­
litative results follow as readily from the multi-commodity as from the two-commodity 
model. It is important to recall that this statement contradicts the conclusion of
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Meade concerning the development of his own multi-commodity model:
If we are to use our model to illustrate any propositions in the 
theoretical analysis of international economic relationships we 
must further simplify the model, unless we are prepared to he 
content with the contemplation of a string of clumsy determinants 
without any very obvious conclusions to be drawn from them [dj,k6].
Indeed, the fact that qualitative conclusions can be derived from our multi- 
commodity results that are subject, for the most part, to no greater restrictions than are 
the corresponding two-commodity answers, provides the principal justification for the model 
which is developed in succeeding chapters.
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3. A FOUR-COMMODITY INTERNATIONAL MODEL 
A. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter is set forth a model in which the reactions among the variables 
included are accounted for as in general equilibrium analysis but in which the number of 
such variables has been reduced severely by aggregation. Not only are individuals aggre­
gated into community groups, as in more general theories, but also countries and commo­
dities are treated similarly. The value of the conclusions reached must be measured 
against the loss of generality that is involved. The degree of aggregation, however, is 
less severe than that currently employed in the majority of trade models. The most sig­
nificant alteration is the introduction of two non-traded commodities. We shall see 
that the presence of these emphasises the complexity of some apparently simple results 
at the same time as it introduces important qualifications to existing methods of analy­
sis .
The next section gives the part of the notation of the model that occurs most 
frequently.
As the development of the model is dependent particularly upon recent improve­
ments in the theory of value, one might have given, on the one hand, a brief resume of 
the theory of value for a two-country, four-commodity world which would serve to empha­
sise the assumptions underlying the different applications of it. On the other hand, 
such a procedure would be tedious and far from original. Though the different theorems 
of value theory are not commonplace, and though some of the proofs of them are not easily 
understood by the non-mathematical economist, such proofs are set out clearly in a number 
of standard texts. We shall confine ourselves, therefore., in Section C, to a statement 
of the theorems that we intend to use, referring the reader in each instance to a stand-
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ard source for the proof. Moreover, the basic assumptions will be given but not dis­
cussed unless, as in some instances, the application of them is contentious.
In Section D we pause briefly to set out the equilibrium equations for a closed 
three-commodity system and, as the reader will see, there are good reasons for this appar­
ent digression. First, it enables us to show how international trade is introduced by 
the linking together of two such closed economies. Secondly, and more important, condi­
tions are derived for the stability of a closed, three-commodity economy which when con­
trasted, in Section E, with similar stability conditions obtained for the international 
model, shed new light upon the possible cause of instability in the international market.
Finally, the equilibrium equations of our basic free trade model are given and 
described in Section E, and the limited role of money in the model is analysed. Condi­
tions are stated for Hicksian perfect and imperfect stability and the probability of these 
conditions being fulfilled in practice is discussed. In the course of this discussion a 
new parameter is introduced that would appear to have a wide range of applicability in the 
theory of international trade. The section concludes with a criticism of the Hicksian 
concepts of perfect and imperfect stability and an attempt is made to state necessary and 
sufficient conditions for a form of dynamic stability.
The reader should note that the careful development of the model from first 
assumptions, however, accomplishes nothing if it merely demonstrates the mutual inter­
dependence of all included variables. An attempt must be made to determine how initial 
equilibrium positions might change as a result of changes in the given data and to express 
these rates of change in terms of conceivably quantifiable parameters upon which quali­
tative restrictions can be imposed. This means that restrictive assumptions must be in­
troduced and is the reason for the increased degree of aggregation in our model when com­
pared with a fully general one like Mosak’s.
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B. NOTATION
That part of the notation of the model which appears frequently is set out helow 
though most terms are redefined on first appearance to save the reader the necessity of 
constant reference. Primes refer throughout to the foreign country.
Xi, x2, x3 - the respective total quantities consumed in Country One of
/ / / Xi, x2, x3
exportables, importables, and non-traded goods.
- similarly for Country Two. It should be noted that Xi being
Country One's exportables, is Country Two's importables, etc.
Xl, X2 - Country One's exports and imports respectively.
03 - the respective total quantities of good one (exportables),
two (importables) and three (non-traded commodities) produced 
in the domestic country (Country One).
/ / / 
Olj O3 - similarly, for the foreign country (Country Two). 
It follows that
Ol = X! + Xj_
 ^/ /Oi = Xi - Xi, etc.
Y - the value of production in the domestic country.
/Y - the value of production in the foreign country.
M - money expenditure in the home country, i.e. Zp^X^.
/M - money expenditure in the foreign country, i.e. Zp^X^.
Pi; P2 - the absolute prices of goods one and two in both countries 
(there being a common international currency and no impedi­
ments to trade).
P3; P3 - the prices of non-traded commodities in the domestic and for­
eign country respectively. These prices are different as by
definition separate markets exist for each non-traded commodity.
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'ij
"bll- the total elasticity of demand for the i good with respect to 
"bhthe j price, which includes all supply, demand, income and 
other subsidiary reactions, i.e.
^ jl X^i m  \ Pj
öp, dp. + dp. ) X , + ^
j / i
'ij
ij
ij
"i j
°ij
where ß represents other subsidiary reactions.
- the elasticity of demand of the i ^  good with respect to the
price, all other prices and money income being held constant,
i.e.
OX. p.
Op. X.J i
th "bh- the elasticity of supply of the i good with respect to the j
price, all other prices being held constant, i.e.
0O. p .
i J •
O p . o .j i
th- the demand elasticity of substitution of the i good with
"bhrespect to the j price, i.e. the proportionate response of 
"bhthe i good to a small, real income compensated change in the
"bhprice of the j good.
th- the rate of change in the demand for the i good due to a change 
in the price of the good, all other prices and money income 
being held constant, i.e. 
c)X,i .
dp j th- the rate of change in the supply of the i good due to a change
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ij
i j
thin the price of the j good all other prices being held con­
stant , i.e.
dO.l
dp J
, th- the effect on the demand for the i good of a real income
"tilcompensated change in the price of the j commodity.1 '
"til- the rate of change in demand for the i good due to a change
in money income, i.e.
ax.
dM
th dX.
- the marginal propensity to spend on the i good, i.e. P..-
Thus in the domestic country, Clf C2 and C3 represent the mar­
ginal propensities to spend on exportables, importables and non- 
traded goods respectively. In the foreign country C2, Ci and 
C3 are defined similarly.
- the aggregate demand-supply substitution effect; i.e. a. .-0. ..-L J -L J
- the quantity weighted elasticity form of K
ij
Thus,
E11
E22
Xi „ 2 l
Xi ai1 ■ Xi Sl1
—^ 022 - S22X 2 X 2
and
E33 - X3 033 “ O3 S33. 
Similarly for the foreign country.
1 ’ The reader should note that X , 0 and a are respectively the non elasticity form
of g. ., S . . and or. .. ij 10 10
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C. ASSUMPTIONS
The basic assumptions of the model are listed below, though many others are im­
plied by our use of some of the fundamental theorems of value theory. The implications 
of the more contentious assumptions are noted, particularly those relating to the theory 
of international trade.
I. It is assumed that there are two countries: Country One (the domestic country)
and Country Two (the rest of the world). This aggregative procedure has both advantages 
and disadvantages. An alternative approach would be to include a large number of coun­
tries at the expense of reducing the economic description of them to the barest of details.
J. J. Polak [2] and F.D. Graham [3] adopted this method which is vulnerable to the criticism 
that it ignores the indirect influences of changes among the variables, some of which may 
be important.
The method, used, in this thesis, of aggregating all countries apart from the do­
mestic one into a foreign country, while it leaves greater scope for a more adequate des­
cription of reactions among the variables both at home and abroad, is not without its 
critics as anyone familiar with the work of Graham is no doubt aware. He has demonstrated 
on a priori grounds that under certain conditions a multi-country approach could lead to 
greater stability in the international terms of trade than is indicated by two-country 
models. Though existing empirical evidence of severe terms of trade fluctuations in agri­
cultural economies scarcely sustains the generality of his thesis, it is conceded by most 
theorists that Graham's multi-country models have qualified significantly in some instances 
the traditional two-country results [4,27; 5]•
Nevertheless, there is much to be said for the 'one thing at a time' approach.
As our purpose is to rework several international trade theorems when the assumption of 
only two commodities is relaxed, there is some justification for adopting the conventional 
two-country procedure. This fact should be borne clearly in mind, however, when inter-
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preting our results.
2. It is assumed that in the world as a whole there are four commodities, two of
which are traded internationally. This means that there is a class of goods in each
country which because of transport costs, lack of mobility, or peculiar tastes does not 
enter into international trade. These non-traded or domestic commodities may be defined 
as those for which the supply and demand is equal in each country. Therefore, in addi­
tion to its own exportable good, each country is assumed to produce some of the commodity 
which it imports (increasing costs exist throughout each economy) as well as a class of 
domestic goods. It is evident that the domestic commodity of each country will not enter 
into the utility functions of the other nor will its price be a datum for the producers of 
the other country.
This aggregation of commodities into four broad categories, though it represents 
a drastic departure from the n-commodity procedure of Mosak, adds considerably to the 
realism of the model when it is compared with conventional two-commodity formulations. 
Moreover, the reader should note that the severity of the aggregation is not due entirely 
to our search for unfettered qualitative conclusions. We have shown in the Appendix that 
the qualitative nature of our results is unaffected if the model is generalised to include 
n non-traded commodities. It is only for the purpose of a simplified exposition that 
aggregation occurs in the non-traded sector.
In practice, two diametrically opposed methods by which goods may be aggregated 
suggest themselves. First, all those commodities which exert an identical influence 
upon consumption preference fields and production functions may be grouped together. Such 
goods are perfect substitutes for one another. Normally, perfect substitutability of 
this type is unlikely to exist as it would prove impossible to identify the two commodi­
ties as separate products. Any grouping of commodities along these lines, therefore,
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Ideally should concern those goods which are close substitutes for one another. Secondly, 
commodities might be combined because of a high degree of complementarity. Thus, bacon 
and eggs or knives and forks could be grouped as single commodities.
While the type of problem that we wish to examine necessitates the grouping of 
commodities into exportables, importables, and non-traded goods, a procedure which would 
appear to exclude an approximation towards either a high degree of substitutability or 
complementarity, it must be remembered that in international trade we are concerned fre­
quently with situations in which all prices within the exportable and importable sectors 
do tend to move proportionately on impact as the result of a uniform tariff or exchange 
rate variation. Thus, in relation to the problems to be studied shortly, the assumption 
of aggregate exportable and importable commodities appears to be a reasonable one.
3- It is assumed that perfect competition exists in both countries and that full
employment and balance of payments equilibrium are maintained by a flexible price mechanism. 
k. All consumers and producers are assumed to have given respective utility and
production functions, each producer maximising his profits and each consumer his level of 
satisfaction.
5 . Factors of production are assumed to be in fixed supply.
6. By a suitable choice of quantity units it is assumed, without any loss of gene­
rality, that all prices in the free trade model are equal initially to unity. Thus
Pi = P2 = P3 = P3 = 1-
7 . It is assumed that there exists a 'neutral’ fifth commodity called money, common 
to both countries which does not enter into the utility functions of any individual, i.e. 
a doubling of the commodity 'money' would have no effect upon the equilibrium quantities 
of the goods bought and sold. It is stressed that this assumption is in no way vital to
our analysis which is conducted throughout in terms of relative prices. These could he 
as readily defined in terms of physical units of a commodity arbitrarily selected as a 
numeraire. The introduction of money is a concession to the reader who would prefer to 
think in terms of money prices. It follows that in our real world, in which there exists 
a neutral fifth commodity called money which is common to both countries, there is no 
need for an exchange rate.
8. The following properties of individual demand substitution effects are assumed
to hold for aggregate demand substitution effects.
i. a ^  is negative, where a  ^measures the response in demand for the i g o o d  due
thto a real income compensated change in the price of the i commodity. Thus
a compensated increase in the price of a commodity must always lead to a
decrease in the demand for it. As long as the real income effect is not
stronger than, and does not operate in a direction contrary to, the substi-
"thtution effect, (the partial derivative of the i good with respect to
ththe i price) will always be negative. If X_„ is positive, the commodity 
is defined as an inferior good.
ii. a. .=a... It should be noted, however, that X. . does not equal X.. unless theij Ji ij Ji
M Mtwo income elasticities of demand M — and M. — are also equal.. * iX. j X .J=3 i 0
iii . Z p .a. . = 0 . 
j=i J 1J
iv. Zp^.a_ (for all values of j except i) = -p^a^, which is necessarily positive.
As the final results of the different applications of our model are expressed 
in terms of elasticities rather than partial derivatives, the above properties of the de­
mand substitution term are restated below in elasticity notation. The elasticity of de- 
"bh "bhmand for the i good with respect to the j price is defined as the rate of change in
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the quantity of the i good demanded, divided by the rate of change in the price of the
commodity:
eij Xij x'
From the theory of demand we know that g comprises an income and a substitution effect:
o .J
where
and
g.. = -M. ^  X . + o. . ij i j id
dX.
Or,
aij X. aij *
e. . = - c. + a. .1J P±X 1 1J
thwhere Ch = pJVL is the marginal propensity to spend on the i commodity, 
If i = j then (l*3) becomes
eii -ci + °ii
(1-3)
The four properties of the substitution term in elasticity notation are
i. a < 0
V oa. . = cr.. vij ji p1xi
(i = 1,2,3)
ii. (i and j = 1,2,3)
iii. Z a., = 0 (i = 1,2,3) 
j=l J
from which it follows that
iv. E 0 . . (for all values-L J of j except i) = -a±i which is positive
9. Similarly, it is assumed that the following properties of individual supply sub­
stitution effects also hold in the aggregate.
i. 0.^ is positive. Thus, the higher the price, the greater the supply. It
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should be noted that 0 ^ is all substitution effect there being no income effect on the
ij °ji ’
supply side
ii. 0
j=3
iii. Z p .0. . = 0 . 
j=i J 1J
iv. Z (for all values of j except i) = -p_^ (h^ , which is negative.1.
As in the case of demand, the properties of the substitution term are restated
"fellin elasticity form, where S . . is defined as the elasticity of supply of the i good with— u
respect to the price.
i. S. . > 0 .ii
ii. S . . = s .. .ij ji
j=3
iii. Z S. . = 0i—1
I ii ij (i = 1,2,3) .
iv. t S (for all values of j except i) = -S__ which is negative. 
10. It is assumed that the determinant
ij
jj
Ku K.
•H•r-D
M K
is positive where Kii a.. - 0... An outline of the proof follows. Consider the de-li ii
terminant
ii ij
aji ajj
(i)
This is a determinant of income compensated partial derivatives of demand functions. From 
the theory of demand we know that because indifference surfaces are convex to the origin 
this determinant is both symmetric and positive. It is, in fact, the discriminant of a 
negative definite quadratic form. Similarly, from the fact that production possibility
I-' For the formal proof of these properties of demand and supply substitution effects see
[ 26,510-11,321].
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-0 . -0 .ii ij
-0 .. -0 . .ji jj
surfaces defining supply conditions are concave to the origin, we know that the determinant
(2)
is also the discriminant of a negative definite quadratic form. In writing (2) we have 
multiplied all coefficients by minus one, thereby turning a positive definite into a ne­
gative definite quadratic form.
As the sum of two negative definite quadratic forms must itself be negative de­
finite, it follows that
K K. .ii ij
K.. K . .ji jj
(3)
is the discriminant of a negative definite quadratic form and is accordingly positive in 
sign.
Dividing (3) by K. . which is necessarily negative, we obtain an expression*
J J
Ki± - K (M
As all prices are unity initially, (3) can be rewritten in elasticity form: 
la.. - O.S.. X. a. . - O.S..l li l li l ij i ij
L.a.. - 0 .S .. X .a . . - 0 .S . .J ji J Ji J JJ J JJ
with the property of sign unchanged. Dividing (5) hy x.(X a -O.S..) which is necessarilyi j JJ J JJ
negative, we obtain the expression:
X 0
—  a.. - —  S.X_^ 11 X_^ 1
xi °i—  a. . - —  s. .X. I J  x i  I Ji
a.ii ~ li 
ajj ' °jj I j < 0
(6)
The expression ijj appears in all applications of our model
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11. The assumption that community demand elasticities have the same properties as 
the individual concepts is, perhaps, our most controversial one. Two points, in parti­
cular, can he made. First, the reader should note that the use of aggregate elasticities 
is not without precedent; most models implicitly or explicitly adopt an aggregative pro­
cedure. There is, for instance, the authoritative assurance of Raumol that the use of 
community indifference curves in the theory of international trade is a legitimate pro­
cedure [87,19]• Secondly, the reader is referred to a forthcoming work [6, Ch.3] in 
which the author concludes that "Aggregate elasticities are likely to possess precisely 
the same properties of sign and symmetry as individual elasticities." This conclusion
is subject to the assumption that any money income redistribution is random with respect 
to tastes. In a model such as our own, in which commodities are aggregated broadly, this 
does not seem to be an unreasonable economic assumption.
It is noted that problems of aggregation do not arise on the supply side.
12. It is assumed that the demand for each commodity is a function of all commodity 
prices and total expenditure (which need not be equal to the value of production in an 
open economy). As part of expenditure comprises investment it is assumed that marginal 
producers act as a class of ’consumers' whose 'indifference curves' are defined by produc­
tion functions. In this way, any redistribution of investment expenditure due to relative 
price changes, is analogous to the redistribution of consumption expenditure referred to
in the preceding assumption.
13. Finally, supply is assumed to be a function of all commodity prices. It is 
assumed that supply functions are homogeneous of order zero in prices so that a doubling 
of all prices would leave supply unchanged. Furthermore, the transformation surface de­
fining optimum production possibilities is assumed to be concave to the origin.
^0 .
D. MODEL OF A CLOSED, THREE-COMMODITY ECONOMY
Consider an economy in which there are three commodities of which the quantities 
Oi, 02, O3 are produced and the quantities Xi, X2, X3 are demanded for consumption. Perfect 
competition and profit maximization are assumed and there is full employment without in­
flation. The community's preference and supply functions are given.
1. Equilibrium equations
The following equations describe the equilibrium situation in our closed economy.
Xi - 0 i = 0 )
)x2 - 02 = 0 ) • • • (2.3)
)x3 - o3 = 0 )
p202 - P3 0 3 = 0 • • • (3-3)
where X± = Xi(p1 ,p2 ,p3 ,M) and (X = 0±(p1 ,p2 ,p3).
Equations (2.3) are the equilibrium conditions which state that every market
must be cleared, i.e. that in equilibrium there shall be zero excess demand in the system.
Equation (3-3) is an identity, satisfied for any set of prices, which states that expend-
iture (m ) is equal to X p.X. which, in a closed economy, must be equal to the value of 
j=3 j=i J J
production X p .0 ..
J=1 J J
Treating all prices as variables, consider the simultaneous equilibrium of our 
system. We have four unknowns, px, p2, p3 and M and four equations. One of the supply- 
demand equations, however, is not independent. As the equilibrium conditions require 
that every excess demand be zero it is clear that if two of our markets are in equilib­
rium so, too, must be the third. We must, therefore, drop one of the supply-demand 
equations - it does not matter which. This, however, means that we cannot solve for the 
three absolute prices. Since the equations (2.3) are homogeneous of degree zero in prices,
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the number of variables can be reduced by one by using as numeraire the price of any arbi­
trarily selected commodity. Then, ve may solve for two independent exchange ratios and 
for expenditure in terms of the numeraire. It can be shown that these two exchange ratios 
are sufficient to determine the barter terms of trade between every possible pair of commo­
dities .
2. Stability conditions
The set of equations (2.3) and (3*3) are sufficient to determine two independent 
relative prices and expenditure (M) under a given set of conditions which includes the 
preference and supply functions of the community. A change in this given data will mean 
a new set of equilibrium price ratios and it is the nature and direction of the shift in 
these which we wish to describe. In order to do so, it is necessary first to specify the 
properties of the initial equilibrium position subject to the given conditions. These 
properties of the equilibrium position are known as stability conditions.
Hicks was the first economist to attempt a precise statement of stability condi­
tions for a multi-market economy in which income effects are accounted for explicitly [26, 
315]• First, he defined the excess demand for a commodity as the difference between the 
total quantity demanded and the total quantity supplied. Thus, in equilibrium,there 
would be zero excess demand for each commodity. In a single-commodity market the condition 
for stability is that a reduction in the price of a commodity should tend to increase the 
excess demand for it, this increase tending to restore the price to its equilibrium level. 
Thus a positive excess demand means that consumers desire to buy more than is being sup­
plied at the current price. Competition among consumers will then lead to an increase 
in price which, if the market is stable, will increase the quantity supplied (a negative 
excess demand). Correspondingly, a situation characterized by negative excess demand
k-2.
means that suppliers are offering more than consumers wish to purchase at the current price. 
Competition among sellers will force down the price and cause, if the market is stable, a 
positive excess demand. In both cases price will adjust to its equilibrium level.
Stability conditions for a market in which there is more than one commodity, 
however, necessitate a consideration of the effect which a fall in the price of one com­
modity will have upon the excess demand for, and prices of, the other commodities in the 
system. Hicks, therefore, in an endeavour to surmount this difficulty, gave two defini­
tions of stability, the one differing from the other according to the behaviour of the 
other prices in the system. First, he defined a market as imperfectly stable if a fall 
in the price of a good results in an excess demand for it, after all prices have shifted 
in such a way as to equate the quantities demanded and supplied in all other markets save 
the one under consideration. Secondly, Hicks defined a market as perfectly stable if a 
fall in the price of a good resulted in an excess demand for it after any given subset of 
prices in other markets is adjusted so that supply again equals demand in those markets, 
with all remaining prices held constant.
Consider the three-commodity system given by equations (2.3) and (3-3)* If we 
choose to drop the supply-demand equations involving commodity one and select px as nume­
raire,the effects of price changes upon the excess demands (lb) are computed by total 
differentiation:
dD2 = (-^ 2 2 ~^2 2 )dp2 t (X23~023)dp3 + M2dM
ID3 = (X32-C>32)dp2 + (X33-O33) dp 3 + M3CIM
dM = 02dp2 + 03dp3
do dx.
and Mi = 3iT '
where
^3 .
The reader should note that in differentiating the expenditure equation, use has been made
1=3
of the relationship that Z p.dO. = 0, which is equivalent to assuming that the ratio of
i=l 1 1
changes in production must be equal to minus the ratio of marginal costs which, in turn,
is equal to minus the ratio of prices.
Substituting for dM we have:
dJDg = ( K22 ) dp2 + (K23-X3M2) dp3 + M2 ( 02dp2+C>3dp3)
dÜ3 = (K32-X3M3) dp2 + (K33-X3M3) dp3 + M3(C>2dp2+03dp3)
where X.. = -X.M. + a. . 
i<] J 1 ij
and K.. = a.. - 0.. . 
ij ij ij
Making use of the fact that in a closed economy the demand for a commodity must 
equal the supply of it, we have:
dD2 = K22(lP2 t K23dp3 
dDs = K32dp2 + K33dp3
Since K.. may be assumed constant in a small neighbourhood around the equilibrium point, 
(4.3) forms a system of simultaneous linear equations in the variables dp2 and dp3. The 
coefficients of (4.3) form the Jacobian of (D2,D3) with respect to (p2>P3)-
If equilibrium is displaced in the market for commodity two and all other prices 
are rigid (dp3=0) then the first condition for the perfect stability of the market for good 
two is:
( M )
dD
dp2^ = K22 < 0
This does not mean that the displacement of equilibrium in the market for good two has 
failed to react upon the equilibrium of the market for good three. It does mean that 
since the price of commodity three is rigid, the excess demand for good three will fail
to react upon D2•
kk.
The other condition for the perfect stability of the market for good two is 
when P3 adjusts in response to the initial displacement. Solving, we have:
K22 K23
K 3 2  K 3 3dP2
dp2 < 0
K 3 3
Obviously, a similar set of conditions can be obtained for
dp 3
Generalising, there­
K. K .ii i 3
K K . .
Ji JJ
fore, perfect stability for the closed, three-commodity system requires that the Jacobian 
determinants
K. .,in/
be negative and positive respectively for all values of i and j.
The conditions for perfect stability in the Hicksian sense are more stringent 
than necessary for the consideration of many multimarket systems. If the system contains 
no rigid prices the necessary condition is that the i^1 market is stable if
dD
(5-3)
<ip.
lAL < 0 (6-3)
i ii
where |A| is the Jacobian determinant of the complete system given by (4.3) and A is 
cofactor of K.^ in |A|.
Can anything be said concerning the sign of the determinants:
K.. (= A..) andn  11
ii ij
Kji Kjj (=|A|)
From the theory of value we know that a.. and -0.. are negative (see assumptions 8i and 91)*
}} J}
Likewise, it has been shown that |A| is positive (see assumption 10). We may conclude, 
therefore, that our closed, three-good system is both perfectly and imperfectly stable in
the Hicksian sense.
5^ •
For two reasons considerable care has been taken in the setting out of this 
closed economy model and in deriving the Hicksian stability conditions. First, we can, 
as a result, proceed more rapidly with the development of the international model. 
Secondly, the development of similar stability conditions for the international model em­
phasises clearly the source of possible instability in the international market.
At this juncture one of our assumptions should be recalled. The fact that 
any redistribution of money income should be random with respect to tastes is, when 
coupled with the identity of expenditure and the value of output in a closed economy, 
the reason for the non-appearance of possibly destabilizing income effects. We shall 
have cause to remember this when investigating the stability of our international system.
E. A FOUR-COMMODITY, INTERNATIONAL FREE TRADE MODEL 
1. Equilibrium, equations
Consider two closed economies of the type described in the preceding section of 
this chapter. Under pure competition the price ratios between internationally traded 
commodities in the absence of transportation costs must be the same for both countries. 
Wow, it is a basic assumption of the work which follows that at all times expenditure in 
the domestic and the foreign country together must equal the value of production in the 
domestic and foreign country together. Consequently, at all times, the equilibrium of 
the system requires that the price of each commodity be such that all markets are cleared. 
The following six equations describe the equilibrium of our international system where in 
equilibrium all = 0.
Dx = Xi - Oi + Xi - Oi ■ • • (7.3)
b 2 = x 2
/ / - 02 + X 2 - 02 . . . (8 .3 )
f 3 = X3 - 0 3 • ■ • (9-3)
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D3 = Xs - 03 . . .  (10.3)
M = PiOi + P2O2 + P3O3 . . . (11 3)
M = P1O1 + P2O2 + P3O3 . . .  (12-3)
Two points should be noted. First, the fact that all markets must be cleared 
means that one supply and demand equation is not independent. Thus, we might choose to 
drop any one of the equations (7*3 )to (10.3)- Secondly, the balance of payments equation
B = pxxi - P2X2 . . . (13-3)
where B = 0 in this free trade case, is implied by the income-expenditure identities and 
the three independent supply-demand equations.
Our system does not determine absolute prices in money terms nor is it import­
ant for our purposes that it should do so because, as pointed out above, money is used in 
our model in a purely neutral or accounting sense. For what it is worth, the absolute 
level of money prices could be determined by the addition of what is known in monetary 
theory as an equation of exchange:
N = K(Yw ) . . . (14.3)
in which the world volume of money (w) (there being a currency common to both countries) 
and the proportion of money (K) to world income (Y ) are given. Equation (lb.3) could
W
be rewritten:
N =
or N =
from which it follows that
K Zp±X
PlKZ PiPi X.1
N
(1=1,2,3,3')
Pi
4r.
The above relationship states that, in terms of our token money, the level of 
absolute prices will be, given K, directly proportional to the volume of money. This is 
a rigorous formulation of the quantity theory. It is emphasised, however, that as long 
as we assume that money does not enter into the utility functions of individuals it can 
have no influence on the amounts of commodities supplied or demanded in equilibrium.
These are dependent upon the independent price ratios and money expenditure. A doubling 
of the token money would leave these ratios unaffected. Only where money is considered 
in the Walrasian sense as having a direct utility of its own, can the relative price ratios 
alter with a change in the supply of money.
2 . Hicksian stability of the international model
The Hicksian conditions for the equilibrium of the international economy are 
strictly analogous to those given for the closed economy. If we again choose to drop the 
demand-supply equation involving commodity one and to retain the price of domestic export­
ables (p! = l) as numeraire, a total differentiation of equations (8.3 )to (12-3) gives:
dD2 = (X22-022+X22-022) dp2 + (X23-023)dp3 + (X23~023)dp3 + M2dM + M2dM
(ID3 = (X32-C>32)dp2 + (X33-O33) dp3 + M3CIM 
dX>3 = (X32-C>32)dp2 + (X33-O33) dp 3 + M3CIM
dM = 02dp2 + C>3dp3
dM7 = 02dp2 + C>3dp3
Substituting in the first three equations for dM and dM7 and remembering that
i. (IC.j-X.Mp <V°U>J
ii. X^-Ch is equal to the relevant x1; x2, or zero as indicated by the equi­
librium equations;
we have:
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dD2 - (K22+K22+x2M2 -x2M2 ) dp2 + K23dp3 + K23dp3 )
)dD3 - (K32-x2M3)dp^ + K33dp3 ) . . .  (15-3)
dD3 = (K32+x2M3)dp2 + K33dp3 )
The coefficients of (15-3) form the Jacobian |A| of (D2,D3,D3) with respect to (P2,P3,P3).
If the international market is to be perfectly stable in the Hicksian manner, the world 
excess demand for the i^1 commodity must exist irrespective of whether or not the other 
price ratios remain constant or are adjusted so as to equate supply and demand in one or 
more of the other markets. For each additional price that is held constant there is one 
less unknown and one less equation to set equal to zero in (15-3)- Solving for every 
such system the necessary conditions for Hicksian perfect stability are that the determin­
ants
ii'
ii h j
ji
, and IA| (16.5)
should be negative and positive alternately where b is the element in the i row and 
j ^ column of |A| (|A| being the Jacobian determinant of the full system given by (15.3))* 
Imperfect stability requires that there shall be a world excess demand (negative 
or positive for a commodity following a change in its price, after all other price ratios 
are adjusted so as to equate the quantities demanded and supplied in the other markets. 
Thus, if equilibrium is displaced in the market for the i commodity, the system is im­
perfectly stable if
dDi
dpt A.
A. .li
M < 0
'i * ii
where |A| is defined as in (l6.3) and _  is the cofactor of b in |A| .
(IT-3)
In our closed economy we saw that the conditions necessary for both perfect and 
imperfect stability would be fulfilled. Can the same thing be said for our international
^ 9 -
system? Consider first, the requirements for perfect stability as given by (16.3)- Written 
in full, these require that the determinants
K22 + K22 + M2 - M2 , K33 , K33
should be negative;
should be positive;
that the determinants
K22+K22'KM2-M2^i K23 K22~*"K-22+|^ 2 -M^/j. K23 k 33 0
K32“M3Xl K33 ) K32+M3^ a K33 0 K33
and that the determinant
K22+K22+H2 -M2 K23 K23
K32-M3 Xx K33 0
K32+M3OCJ. 0 K33
should be negative.
It is evident that these conditions differ significantly from those established 
in the closed economy. The reason for this difference (apart from the inclusion of an 
extra commodity) is the appearance of asymmetric income effects between the two countries. 
In the closed economy model all income effects were considered to be negligible or self­
cancelling because of the assumption that any redistribution of income would be random 
with respect to tastes. In an international economy, however, where in any one country 
the demand for and supply of any internationally traded good is not equal, this assumption 
neither means that income effects will be negligible nor that they will cancel out. For 
instance, a rise in the price of domestic importables must result (save wheye-infe-plor 
(8€>mm0d4-tio0■ in negative income effects in the domestic country where the demand
for exceeds the supply of importables, and in corresponding positive effects in the foreign 
country where the supply of the good necessarily exceeds the demand for it. In our model, 
where p! is selected as numeraire, this fact is reflected in |A| by the appearance of the
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income effects in column one associated with the change in the price of good two (domestic 
importables). Only in the non-traded good sectors, where by definition the supply of 
equals the demand for the commodity, do the income effects cancel out. To remove these 
asymmetric income effects one would need to extend the assumption that any redistribution 
of income will be random with respect to tastes, so that it refers to the world as a whole. 
There appears to be little or no economic justification for this, particularly as the two 
non-traded goods are separate commodities.
If;therefore;our system is to be perfectly stable in the Hicksian sense, it is 
necessary to resort to probability type arguments. There are many economists who will
not accept such arguments, holding that from ignorance only ignorance can result. Our 
position is not so grim, however. For instance, we do know the minimum and maximum limits 
of our variables, i.e. that K can range from zero to minus infinity, while 1VL must be
positive and less than unity. We shall proceed, therefore, to consider the probable
sign of the seven determinants set out above.
Consider first, the sign of the full determinant, |A|, which appears as the 
denominator in every application of our model. One of the conditions for perfect sta­
bility is that
K 2 2 ’ * "K -2 2 ’ *' (M2-M2) X 2 ^ 2 3 K 2 3
K 3 2 - M 3 X 2 K 3 3 0
K 3 2 + M 3 X 2 0 K 3 3
An expansion of |A| by the first column yields:
IAI = [K22+K22+X2(M2“M2) ] K33K33 - K3 2(K2 3 K33) + 143X2(^3^033) - K3 2(K23K3 3) “ ^3X2(^3*033)
which, when divided and multiplied throughout by K33K33 gives:
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|A|
K22 K23
^ 3 2  K 3 3
^33
k22 k23
K32 K33
K33
m 2 k23 m 2 Ks3
x2 x2 / /
m 3 K33 m 3 K33
K33 K33
K33.K33
(^23 + ^23  + X2023 - X2023)K33.K33
where
ij Kii ' Kij K
ji and 0ij
K. .
-M + M i j K.jj jj
For purposes of discussion, and because most of our subsequent analysis appears 
in this form, |A| is best considered in terms of elasticities. Since our choice of quan 
tity units (which has been made with no loss of generality) implies that
i. M is both a marginal propensity to spend as well as an income effect;
ii. K. .=X.a. .-0 .S. where a. . and S. . are substitution elasticities of demand ij 1 ij 1 ij’ ij ij
and supply with respect to p , and where X_^  and Ch are quantities measured 
as multiples of the quantity of home exports xi, and imports x2; 
it follows that |A| can be expressed in terms of quantity weighted elasticities and mar­
ginal propensities to spend:
IAI = X2(ljj23 + ljj23 + \|/23 ~ ^ 2 3) X-33 • K33 . . •
where
itij
ij
X. 0. X. 0. a.. - S..
(— a.. - —  S..) - (—  a. . - —  S.11 X. 11 X. IJ X. IJ CT . . - si
_c + c ~ sjq 
+ - s >
i i jj jj
jj jj
xA j (j)_ (see assumption 10 above)
ij ij
(18.3)
and
52.
The reader should note that in converting 0. . into \|r. . the term K.. was substituted for
ij ij J Ü
K-* which, of course, we are entitled to do when dealing with partial derivatives.
In order to determine the sign of |A| it is important to determine the sign and
magnitude of its components. In assumption 10, it was shown that d). . = itr. .x. must beTij Tij 1
negative. In addition to the property of sign, it is also possible to infer something
about the magnitude of l(j. . if we have some qualitative knowledge of the kind of commodi-
ties involved. The first expression in square brackets is negative (see assumption 8i).
Likewise, the second term is negative, save where both complementarity in demand and/or
joint supply exist. Thus, as l)j. . must be negative, it follows thatit must be either
d
less in absolute value than (X.cr.. - O.S..) or equal to it.' 1 11 1 11'
Conditions for a large ijj. . which will approximate in magnitude to the quantity
J
weighted sum of the own substitution elasticities for the i"^ good are:
i. that all own elasticities, both of supply and demand, should be high;
"bllii. that the amounts consumed and produced of the i commodity should be large relative 
to the amount traded, i.e. X_^  and 0. which are multiples of x^ should be large;
iii. that there should be low cross elasticities, both of supply and demand, between non- 
traded and importable commodities, relative to the own elasticities of non-traded 
and itfrportable commodities, i.e. cr_ and S low relative to cr__ and respect­
ively and a., and S.. low relative to a .. and S.. respectively;
J J J J
iv. from (iii) it follows that the cross elasticities of demand and supply between non- 
traded and exportable commodities should be high relative to the own elasticities 
of non-traded and exportable goods.
In summary, the expression ijj which is called, henceforth, a coefficient of 
sensitivity, is an aggregation of substitution elasticities in the form of a determinant.
53.
It reflects the sensitivity of the goods concerned to price changes in the system by con­
sidering not only the impact effect of a price change but also indirect effects which are 
reflected in the relative degree of competitiveness, both in production and consumption, 
between importable and non-traded goods on the one hand, and exportable and non-traded 
goods on the other. It has generally, the usual properties of an elasticity, being lar­
ger when substitution possibilities are greater, and smaller when there are both comple­
mentarity in consumption and/or joint supply.
Consider next the sign of
*ij -c. + c.C^ 1* J1) .1
We know from the theory of demand that in a three-commodity world, cr3i+<732+<733=0 (see 
assumption 8iii), 033 is inherently negative, and that <73/1 and 032 will be positive, save 
in the exceptional case where only three goods are consumed, of complementarity in consump5 
tion, in which case one of them could conceivably be negative. As long as they are po­
sitive, 03i and (732 each must be numerically less than (733. A parallel relationship 
holds for supply elasticities though they are of opposite sign. Thus, S31 and S32 each 
will be less in absolute value than S33. Again, the case of joint supply, analogous to
complementarity in demand, is excepted. Hence, the expression
<7 .. - S..Ji Ji
(7 . . - S. .
33 33
normally will be less than unity and, since the numerator and denominator are of opposite
sign, negative. As the multiplying term, C., must also be less than unity, this wouldJ
reduce further the magnitude of the bracketed expression. The final value of \]/_ is ob­
tained by adding the negative value of the relevant marginal propensity to spend on im­
portables. We may conclude, therefore, that the term \J/. . will be negative and less thanJ
5^ .
unity though it will exceed in magnitude the marginal propensity to spend on importables, 
the extent of this excess depending upon the relative degree of substitutability between 
importables and non-traded goods on the one hand, and exportables and non-traded goods 
on the other.
Thus, \|/23 and ty23 normally will be larger than C2 and C2 respectively, but less 
than unity.
We are now in a position to examine the probable sign of jA|. The necessary
conditions for a positive ]A| and, consequently, for possible instability are that
^ 2 3 + ^ 2 3 + ^23 “ ^23 > 0
which requires:
i. that the foreign country’s marginal propensities to spend on foreign exportables 
and non-traded goods respectively should exceed considerably the domestic coun­
try' s marginal propensities to spend on the same commodities; 
ii. that in each country the quantity weighted own elasticities of demand for and
iC
supply ofmimportables be very small as this would ensure small coefficients of 
sensitivity.
There are strong a priori reasons for considering the fulfilment of these con­
ditions to be abnormal. First, for |A| to be positive both coefficients of sensitivity
must be small, which implies complementarity in demand and joint production: if q 22 and
/S22 are very small it means that commodity two cannot be substituted for either goods one 
or three so that commodities one, two, and three all must be consumed and supplied in 
fixed proportions; similarly, in the domestic country. Now,, it is improbable where 
such strong complementarity exists in each country that tastes and production conditions 
would not be similar also in the two trading areas. If this is so, it is easy to demon­
strate that \|/23 and ty23 would tend to cancel each other out.
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Secondly, by considering a sufficiently small volume of trade relative to the 
scale of the world economy, the negativeness of |A| can always be secured, for every 
and 0 in the model is measured relative to X;l=x2 (providing the trade balance is small 
in relation to the volume of trade). Indeed, a sufficient condition is that one country 
produces the majority of its consumption of importables or that its consumption of export­
ables is large relative to its exports. As the foreign country in our model represents 
the rest of the world, these conditions are likely to be satisfied.
Finally, recourse is had to the probabilistic argument that the sum of two terms 
(ljj23 + ^23); the value of each of which can range from zero to infinity, is almost certain 
to be greater than the difference between two terms (\|/23 - ^2 3 ) > the value of each of 
which cannot exceed unity. This line of reasoning, of course, is vulnerable to the scep­
tic1 s objection that from ignorance only ignorance can result. Nevertheless, we are not
entirely ignorant - at least the range of values of the parameters is known.
Consider next the three second-order principal minors
K22+K22+(M2-M2)x2 K23 K22+K22+(m 2-M2)x2 ^23 H cl)> k 33 0H BI ) > / / /Ks2-M3X2 K33 K32+M3X2 K33 0 K33
whose signs must all be positive if the conditions for perfect stability are to be satis­
fied. ID| is obviously positive by inspection. An expansion of |B| yields
IBI = [K22+K22+X2(M2-M2) - K23 + X2M2 K33
which, when converted to elasticities, gives
IBI = x2[ l|l23+\(/23+E22+C2] E33 . . .  (19.3)
A positive |b | requires
^23 + ^23 + E22 > -C2
For reasons advanced above it is scarcely conceivable that this condition would not be
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met. A similar expansion of |c| gives
ICI = X2[^23-^23+E22-C2]E33 . . . (20-3)
which, if ICI is to he positive, requires
, / / 
y23 + E 22 - C2 >  ^23
From inspection it can he seen that |b | is more likely to he positive, on prohahility 
grounds, than is |c|. Nevertheless, |c| is almost certainly positive, the same arguments
applying here as were used to justify the negativeness of the full deteminant.
Finally, we must consider the three, first-order, principal minors
[K22+K22+ (M2-M2)] = |E|, K33, K33,
of which the last two necessarily are negative. If |E| is less than zero, all the con­
ditions necessary for the perfect stability of our model are satisfied. Converting |E| 
to elasticities we have
IEI = —  CT22 + —  CT22 - ~  S22 - ~  S22 + C2 - C2 . . .1 1 x2 x2 X2 x2
which, if IE| is to he negative, requires
( 21.3)
X2 X2 / 02
+ “  CT22 " ~  b22x2 x2 - S22 >  - c2x2
Once again, the arguments used above apply with undiminished force. All of our X_^ are 
multiples of x2, so that the magnitude of g22 and- C22 wou-^ "b0 enlarged accordingly. At 
the same time, we have the sum of four parameters each of which can range in value from 
zero to minus infinity, offset only by the difference between two propensities which in­
dividually cannot exceed unity. Finally, it should he noted that there are grounds for 
considering the difference between the two income effects to he negligible. It was 
pointed out earlier that international trade introduces asymmetric income effects, a rise 
in the price of domestic importables necessarily reducing income in the home and increas­
ing income in the foreign country. Where a common good is involved it seems plausible
to argue that the income effects incurred by the surplus of consumption over production 
in the one country should cancel the income effects arising from the surplus of produc­
tion over consumption in the other country. Necessary and important qualifications are, 
of course, that tastes are more likely to differ between trading areas than within them 
and that income effects involving the non-traded commodity of each country do not refer 
to a common good.
The argumenis set out above hold a fortiori in the case of imperfect stability 
(see equation (17-3)) where it is only necessary to show that |A| is r\e«3«*■ ^‘m  and that 
aliietorid order principal minors are poi Hence, it is contended that on reason­
able economic and probabilistic grounds our international system is both perfectly and 
imperfectly stable in the manner defined by Hicks.
3• Dynamic stability of the model
We must concern ourselves with a fundamental objection, first made by 
Samuelson [93j9^]> to "the Hicksian concepts of stability.
Hicks pointed out in his text that the method of comparative statics has no 
meaning unless the economic system is dynamically stable, for only stable systems tend 
to approach equilibrium when disturbed. He concluded correctly, therefore, that the 
conditions for true dynamic stability would provide important information about the pro­
perties of static equilibrium:
The laws of change of the price-system, like the laws of change 
of individual demand, have to be derived from stability condi­
tions. We examine first what changes are necessary in order 
that a given equilibrium system should be stable; then we make 
an assumption of regularity, that positions in the neighbour­
hood of the equilibrium position will be stable also; and hence 
we deduce rules about the way in which the price-system will 
react to changes in tastes and resources [26,62].
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Unfortunately, the Hicksian conditions of stability are not time dynamic stabi­
lity conditions. Samuelson has shown that it is inadmissible to assume, as does Hicks, 
that when the price of one commodity is out of equilibrium the prices of all other commo­
dities are either unchanged or are adjusted instantly to their new equilibrium [93  ^H I -112]. 
When a dynamic system is involved true dynamic stability depends not only upon the slopes 
of the excess demand functions, D , but also upon the relative speeds of adjustment in the 
different markets. For instance, Samuelson gave examples showing that neither perfect 
nor imperfect stability of the Hicksian kind is sufficient to ensure true dynamic stabi­
lity under all circumstances. Indeed, a system could be dynamically stable even though 
it were neither perfectly nor imperfectly stable in the Hicksian sense.
Since Hicks does not refer explicitly to speeds of adjustment in the different
markets, he would appear to have developed stability conditions which are independent of
reaction speeds. For instance, in assessing the effect of a change in price of the i^1
commodity Hicks assumes that all other prices adjust to their new equilibria while no
further change occurs in the price of the i ^ commodity. Thus the reaction speed in
the i^ *1 market is assumed small, relative to other reaction speeds. But when consider- 
thing the j market he must likewise assume that the speed of adjustment in this market 
also is small relative to other reaction speeds. Yet this is inconsistent - the reac­
tion speed in the j^1 market cannot be small relative to the reaction speed in the i^1 
market at the same time as the reaction speed in the i market is small relative to that 
in the j ^  market. In fact, Hicks is postulating a different dynamic system for each 
market and it follows that the stability conditions he derives cannot be consistent with 
multi-market equilibrium unless stability is independent of the different reaction speeds.
If time is introduced to our model, an explicit statement must be made concern­
ing the laws of price change before the time paths of the prices, following a disturbance,
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are investigated. Many different types of adjustment processes may be introduced 
[2 5;263-69]• Generally, a multi-market equilibrium is dynamically stable if every price 
approaches its equilibrium level over time following a slight displacement from equilib­
rium, i.e. if
lim
t-»°o
O
where p is the price of X . at time t and p° is the equilibrium price of X ..J J J
Consider again our international system, this time assuming that if the price 
of a good falls when its supply exceeds its demand, the system is dynamically stable. It 
is assumed that stability is dependent not only upon the slopes of the excess demand func­
tions, but also upon the relative speeds of adjustment in each market. Assume further 
that the rate of change in price in each market is proportional to the amount of excess 
demand (negative or positive) in the market. Then, in such a system,
Ir2 = (feDs
d£3
dt
dP3
dt
C^3^3
3^3
where Ih is the (negative) excess demand function and cth is the proportionality constant
relating (in this case of excess supply) the rate of decrease in the i ^  price to the
"thamount of negative excess demand for the i commodity.
In our three-equation system, therefore, we have for small deviations from 
equilibrium
dps
dt
dps
dt
dp 3
0 2^ 2^ 2(P2-P2)t0^k£3(P3“P3)+ l^pt,23(p3"p3 ) 
(P2 "Pi) 33 (P3 ~P3)
a3t>32 (P2~Pa) tctekAC P3-P3)
)
))
)
))
(22.3)
dt
where b is defined as in (l6.3) and the superscript ° refers to the equilibrium price.
By standard mathematical procedure the characteristic equation of the differ­
ential equations (22.3) is:
which, if non-zero solutions are to be obtained^must be identically equal to zero.
Now, it is a well-known mathematical fact that if a differential equation system 
with constant coefficients such as (15*3) is to have stable solutions ,the real parts of 
the roots of (23*3) (including the real parts of any complex roots), must be negative. 
Otherwise, the necessary dampening factors would not be present in the exponential solu­
tions .
racteristic equation such as (23.3)> known as the Routh-Hurwitz conditions [25, ^ -29-39] .> 
to guarantee stability. These are that in (23-3) 
i. -Za.b. . > 0
0^3^33 " A 0
0 013^33 “A
(23.
There exist necessary and sufficient conditions on the coefficients of a cha-
1 ii
/
i*23 b 2 3
Ü . -OLrpLrpiQ b32 1*33 0/
/ /b32 0 b33
(i,j-2,3,3')
We proceed with the laborious task of expanding these different conditions.
(l) -2a.b.. > 0. 1 11
If we revert to the elements of (16.3) this becomes:
- [C^2(K22+K22+X2M2-X2M2) + O3H33 + 0^33] > 0
or; in terms of quantity-‘weighted elasticities and marginal propensities to consume:
-  [ (X 2x 2 ( ^ 22+ ^ 22+ ^ 2 ~ ^ 2 ) + O3E33 + O3E 33] > 0
where E is the aggregate quantity-weighted sum of the demand and supply substitution 
elasticities for the i ^ commodity with respect to the i^1 price. It is most improbable 
that this condition would not be fulfilled. At a glance, it can be seen that the condi­
tion is stronger than the first order conditions needed to ensure Hicksian perfect stabi­
lity for, even if C2 > -E22-E22+C2, the excess times 0L2 "would need to exceed a3E33+a3E33 -
a most improbable situation.
;  ^22 ^23 23(2) ^32 ^33 0
b32 0 b33
-020303 IA I > 0 .
Once again, replacing the b. s by their respective elements in (l6 .3 ), we required
-O2O3O3 K32-M3Xa
/ /
K32+M3Xi
K23 K23
K33 0
/
0 K33
> 0
An expansion of this determinant by the first column, when multiplied throughout and di-
/ /vided by O3K33.O3K33, and converted into elasticity form, yields the condition:
-X2 [Q:2 (^23+^23+^23-^23) 10:30:3(^33 ^ 3 3 )  >  0 .
We have seen that the expression in curved brackets must be negative if the third 
order condition for Hicksian perfect stability is to be fulfilled (equation (18.3)). It
follows that the similar condition for dynamic stability is neither more nor less restrict-
;ive. As in the static case, the expression can be of perverse sign if, and only if, ty23 
exceeds 1^ 2 3+^23+^23 in absolute magnitude. Arguments advanced earlier suggest that this 
would not be the case in practice.
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(3) Finally, we require:
( - m ^ ±±) (zcaqi l i  i j  
V  bjj
J+aaCtePtel-Al > 0,
A laborious expansion of this expression and a cancellation of like terms gives us, upon 
conversion to elasticities, the condition:
-{ [a|hl3xiß+a§a2X2E33] (7)E33+[o;|a3xlß4^|/a2X2E33] (M.)E33-faia3(Ei3E33)4a32Q;3(E3§E33)
+2(E33E33) [Ql2Ctf3$3X2ß] } > 0
where E ^  is the quantity-weighted elasticity form of K.^,
ß = E22"^E22”^ E2-C2 )
7 ~  ^ 2 3 + ^ 2 3 + E 2 2 + C2>
and q = ljJ23-^ 23'^ "E22-E2 *
It can be seen that our last condition could be negative if, and only if, ß or 
7 or q are negative. We have already lad occasion to examine the probable signs of these 
expressions, concluding in each case that they would be negative. ß is one of the first 
order conditions for Hicksian perfect stability and 7 and q are two of the second order 
conditions. It is noteworthy that while the non-fulfilment of any one of these conditions 
could destroy perfect stability in the Hicksian sense, this would not necessarily be so 
where dynamic stability is concerned. The final result would depend upon the different 
reaction speeds.
In the special case where all reaction speeds are the same, the unit of time 
could be selected in such a way that they all equal unity. Then the conditions for the 
dynamic stability of our system become:
(1) -{x2ß + E33 + E33} > 0 .
(2) -{x2[I|J23+^23+^23-^23]E33E33} > 0 .
(3) -{E33(x2ß+X2E33)7+E33(x2ß+X2E33)p+E33E33(E33+E33)+2X2(E33E33)ß} > 0.
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At this juncture, the following tentative conclusions are offered.
1. Subject to the nature of our dynamic assumptions, there is a strong case for 
expecting our international system to be dynamically stable.
2. These arguments would appear to be m o v e  conclusive those offered to
establish the perfect stability of our model in the sense used by Hicks. In other words, 
our conditions are less restrictive.
3- Obviously, different dynamic assumptions would yield different stability con­
ditions. For instance, we might have assumed:
i. a cobweb relationship whereby supply adjusts to price after a given time lag;
ii. a situation in which price falls, not when supply exceeds demand, but when accumu­
lated stocks exceed a normal value;
iii. a situation in which the rate of adjustment in one market depends upon the excess 
demand not only in that market but also in other markets; etc.
4. Finally, even within the limits of our dynamic assumptions, the stability of our
model holds only in the 'small’. Where other than small deviations from equilibrium are 
contemplated our method of analysis is inadequate. However, it is worth mentioning in 
defence of linear approximations first, that several empirical investigations support this 
assumed relationship and, secondly, that a proof has been given that the stability of 
linear approximations is itself a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for the stabi­
lity of more complex dynamic systems [94,256-257]*
F. CONCLUSION
In concluding a long chapter the opportunity is taken to emphasise three points 
which have emerged in our analysis.
First, this chapter has served to introduce two expressions which appear con­
sistently in later applications of the model - the coefficient of sensitivity Ijj_ and the
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propensity term \|r. .. That qualitative conclusions can he drawn from a four-commodity-4 J
model is due to the fact that we are ahle to establish certain qualitative and quanti­
tative properties concerning these parameters.
Secondly, as pointed out in the last section, our model can be assumed to be 
dynamically stable subject to the nature of our dynamic assumptions. Moreover, in slightly 
varying form, the expression ^23+^23+^23-^23 appears as the denominator in all developments 
of our model. In every case we assume it to be negative which is similar to assuming that 
our model is also imperfectly stable in the Hicksian sense (see equation (17-3))• One 
might argue that too much stress has been placed on establishing the stability of our sys­
tem - that as we do in fact observe a stable pattern of behaviour in the real world it may 
be better to assume stability from the outset. While there are many precedents for this 
approach the primary objection to it is that instability has been acknowledged in the 
literature as a distinct possibility and that such an approach obscures its real cause.
This leads us to our third point which is that low elasticities are not in them­
selves, as is popularly believed, sufficient to ensure the instability of the international 
system. Low elasticities are necessary, but the other necessary condition is the presence 
of asymmetric income effects which arise, as long as we assume that within a country money 
income is redistributed at random with respect to tastes, because of the disparity between 
the supply of and the demand for internationally traded goods in each country. This point 
is shown clearly in our testing of the stability conditions where, in every case, one income 
effect must exceed another as a necessary condition (though not sufficient) for instability. 
Thus, in the cases cited, instability could only occur if
Cs > Cs , C% ‘> , X, > C 1 ,
423 > 423 •or
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4. THE TRANSFER PROBLEM 
A. INTRODUCTION
One hesitates before embarking upon an analysis of the transfer problem because 
that once controversial topic appeared, to have been settled finally by two masterly ar­
ticles of Samuelson [35;36] and a subsequent note by Johnson [37]• However, though they 
exhausted thoroughly the logical implications of a two-good, two-country model, these 
comprehensive surveys of the topic did not deal in a rigorous manner with a world in which 
non-traded commodities were included specifically. Among other qualifications of his 
analysis mentioned by Samuelson was the comment that
... we are still a long way from the conditions of the real 
world, involving many goods ... in the case where domestic 
goods are created by transport costs ... it is not clear that 
the terms of trade ... can be presumed to change in any one 
direction [36,288].
In this chapter the four-commodity model just developed is applied to the trans­
fer problem, the analysis dividing readily into two parts. Section B is concerned with 
a rigorous examination of the effect of a transfer upon relative prices and real income in 
a world characterised both by the presence of non-traded commodities and the absence of 
all impediments to trade, whether of an artificial variety such as tariffs or of a natural 
variety such as transport costs. In Section C the model is expanded to include the effect 
upon the general solution of tariffs and transport costs. In the final section our re­
sults are summarized.
Two points should be noted. First, at no stage is an attempt made to review 
the extensive literature which centres upon this once controversial issue as this would 
involve a mere restatement of doctrinal history already covered comprehensively in several 
standard works [52,290-387; 14,63-83; 35; 36]. Secondly, the problem is approached from 
the classical viewpoint, it being assumed that the value of world production and world
expenditure are equal and that all resources are fully employed. These assumptions con­
trast with those used in Keynesian-type models with constant price levels and national 
products determined by aggregate demand. In other words, the transfer problem which we 
shall investigate is a real as opposed to a monetary phenomenon.
B. THE ZERO-IMPEDIMENTS CASE
1. Development of the Model
It is our intention in this section to obtain a general four-commodity criterion for the 
effect of a given transfer (B) upon the terms of trade when there are no impediments to 
trade such as tariffs or transport costs. (B) appears as a trade deficit for the for­
eign (receiving) country and as a surplus for the domestic (paying) country. In fact, 
it could be considered either as a balance to be manipulated by relative price changes 
in which case it would concern the problem of the balance of payments, or as a given trans­
fer requiring such relative price changes. We adopt the latter approach and consider B 
as an independent variable.
The set of equations (1.4 )to (6.4) provides the equilibrium equations of the
model:
/
X H II 0 H 1 X H II X H 1 o H 
's . . . (i.4)
x2 - Xg “ C>2 — O2 ~ X2 . . . (2.4)
0 = x 3 - O3 . • . (5.M
0 ii X « ^ 1 O3 (4.4)
M = Cqpx + O2P2 + O3P3 - B . . . (5.4)
M 7 = OiPx + O2P2 + O3P3 + B (6.4)
The equations (1.4) define the paying country's exports^ x1;as equal on the one 
hand to the domestic supply of exportables, Oi, less the domestic consumption of export­
ables, Xi, and on the other hand, to the difference between foreign demand for home
67-
exportables, x£, and the foreign supply of them, Oj.. Similarly, the domestic (paying) 
country's demand for imports, x^, is defined as equal either to the home consumption of 
importables, X2 , less the domestic supply of them, O2 , or to the foreign supply of home 
importables, C>2 , less the foreign consumption of them, X^- These equations reflect the
fact that in equilibrium the world supply of and demand for each internationally traded 
good must be equal. The third and fourth equations are given by the requirement that 
the supply of and the demand for non-traded goods must be equal in each country. The only 
modification made to the free trade set of equations is because of the transfer. Expend­
iture is no longer equal to the value of production in each country, being less in the 
paying country and greater in the receiving country by the amount of the transfer itself. 
It is still true, however, that total world expenditure is equal to the total value of 
world production.
This time, in our development of the model, we select p2  ^ the home price of im­
portables, as the numeraire and drop the supply-demand equation(1.4). Furthermore, by 
an appropriate choice of quantity units p2 is set equal to unity. We know that in each 
country the demand for a commodity is a function of the two independent relative prices 
and of money expenditure, while the supply of a commodity is related functionally to the 
two relative prices. Thus, in the domestic country,
X. = X (Pl,P3,M)
and
°i = °i(pi>P3)
while in the foreign country
x' = x'(p!,P3,m')
and / / /
°i = °i(Pl'P3)
Differentiating totally the set of equations (2.4) to (6.4) we obtain, where
60.
0 . . = =-— - ,
1J 6m
) and M
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dxs = (X2i-02i)clp1 + (X23-O23) dp3 + M2dM . . . (7-4)
dX2 = - (X21-O21) d-P! - (X23-C)23)(3-P3 ~ IV^ dM . . .  (8.4)
0 = (X31-O31) dpx + (X33-O33) dp3 + M3CIIVI . . .  (9.4)
0 = (X31-O31) dp! + (X33-O33) dp3 + M3CIM . . . (10.4)
dM = Oxdpi + 03dp3 -dB . . .  (11.4)
dM7 = Oidp! + 0^dp3 + dB .. .  (12.4)
In the last two equations use has been made of the condition that Zp^dCh=0.
More simply, this means that in a world in which full employment without inflation is 
assumed, the ratio of changes in production must be equal to minus the ratio of marginal 
costs which, given perfect competition, is equal to minus the ratio of prices. This ac­
counts for the omission of all terms in the last two equations involving a price times 
quantity change.
We now proceed to:
i. substitute equation (11.4) into equations (7-4) and (9.4);
ii. substitute equation (12.4) into equations (8.4) and(l0.4);
iii. substitute into the resulting equations (K. ,-X.M.) for (X. .-0. .) where K. . is the
1 J J -L -LJ -L J -L u
aggregate demand-supply substitution effect; and for the terms (X -0^) which 
arise after these substitutions, the relevant xi, x2 or zero as indicated by 
the equilibrium equations;
iv. cancel and collect terms wherever possible.
This yields the following rearranged set of equations.
(K2i+x1M2)dp1 + K23(iP3 - dx2 = M2dB . . . (13.M
( K 3 i + X 1M s ) d p 1 + K 3 3 d p 3 = M3dB . . . (14.4)
(K^i-XiM^dp! + K23dp3 + dx2 = -MsdB • • . (15.4)
(K3i“XiM^)dp! + K33dp3 = =MsdB . . . (16.4)
The change in the price ratio px is our measure of the change in the terms of trade due 
to a transfer from the domestic (paying) country to the foreign (receiving) country. A 
positive dpx means that the terms of trade of the paying country have improved, px rising 
relative to p2 . Conversely, a negative dp2 would mean a fall in px (the price of domestic 
exportables) relative to p2 (the price of domestic importables) and an adverse movement in 
the terms of trade of the paying country. It follows that an adverse movement in the 
terms of trade of the paying country must represent a favourable movement in the terms of 
trade of the receiving country and vice versa.
The solution for the effect of a transfer on the terms of trade obtained from 
the set of equations (13-4) to (l6.4) is:
dp
dB
m 2 K 2 3 0 -1
m 3 K 3 3 0 0
1 s IV) ^ 0 K 2 3 1
-M3 0 K 3 3 0
K2x+XxM2 K23 0
K3X+X1M3 K33 0
K 2 1 -XxM 2 0  K 23
0K31“XxM3 K 3 3
-1
0
1
0
In the denominator of this result we make use of the homogeneity condition that B.p.K..=0
J J J
to add column two and three to column one, thereby obtaining aggregate demand-supply sub­
stitution effects with respect to the price change in commodity two in both the foreign 
and domestic countries. At the same time, providing the transfer is small relative to 
the total value of trade and given that prices are unity initially, xx must be approxi­
mately equal to x2 .
TO.
Our solution may now tie written:
dp
dB
M3 K33 
/-M;
-M3
0 -1 
0 0 
K23 1
K33 0
(= |A|)
K22-X2M2 ^23 0 -1
K32-X2M3 K33 0 0
/ /
K22"^ "X2M2 0 K23 1
K32+X2M3 0 K33 0
(= |B|)
A Laplacian expansion from the first two rows of |Aj and |b | gives:
M  2 K23 / M 2  K23
K33 + / K33
^ M 3  K33 M 3  K33
dB^ =
K22 K23 / K22 K23 M2 &23 / M2 ^23
K33 + /  / K33 ~ x2 K33 + x2 / /
K32 K33 K32 K33 M3 K33 M3 K33
K33
Dividing top and bottom by (K33*K33),
M2 ^23
/ r
M2 K23
/
M3 K33 M^  K33
dp
dB
K33 K33
K22 K23 m2 K23 M2
/ / x2 X2 /
K32 K33 m3 K33 m3
K 3 3 K33 K33
Expanding the determinants of our answer, we have:
____________  ^23dpj
dB
/
 ^23
^23 + ^23 + X2023 “ x2(l) 23
(IT A)
where
and
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0ij = -Ml + MJ K
ij
ji(j). . - K. . - K. . u  ii ij
Since our choice of quantity units (which has heen made with no loss of generality) implies
that i. M. is both a marginal propensity to spend as well as an income effect;
ii. K. ,=X.g . .-0.S. where a. . and S. . are substitution elasticities of demand and ij i ij l i j ' ij ij
supply with respect to p., and where X. and 0. are quantities measured as mul-J 1 1
tiples of the quantity of home exports xx (=x2 approximately, as long as prices 
are unity and B is small relative to the volume of trade); 
it follows that can be expressed in terms of quantity weighted elasticities and mar-CLd
ginal propensities to spend:
H =
\]/23 -  2^3
^ 23  +  ^ 2 3  + ^23 " ^23
(18.4)
where H (= ™ )  is the rate of change in the terms of trade due to a transfer expressed
as a proportion of the value of trade,
ij -C. + Cl
gji ~ S.Ü 
°jj ' Sjj
tij
°icr. . ^ • •X^ 11 X 11 X. aij — s . .x. ij
■ii - S.ii 
°jj ' Sjj"
^ij = ^ij and
xA j  =
The reader should note that in converting <|> into \|/_, the term K _  is substi­
tuted for K. . which, of course, we are entitled to do when dealing with partial derivatives. 
1 J
2. The Direction of the Shift in the Terms of Trade - the Two-Commodity Case
Before the more complex multi-commodity criterion (equation 1Ö.4) for the ef­
fect of a transfer on the terms of trade is analysed, it may be of assistance to the reader
if the simple two-commodity answer is derived from it by setting to zero all terms which
T2.
involve non-traded commodities:
C2
/Xg
'x2 0 2 2 “
Og
x2 0 + (“~  a2 2 “ x2
Ö2
X2 S22) + (c2 - c2)
(19.4)
Given stability in the international system, the direction of the shift in the 
terms of trade is dependent upon the numerator of H. Consider for a moment the reason 
for a shift in the terns of trade. Obviously, such a movement will occur only in res­
ponse to an excess demand, generated as a result of the transfer, for one of the traded 
commodities. As long as the receiving country increases its consumption of the two goods 
by the same amounts as the paying country reduces its consumption of them, there will be 
no excess demand, no induced price movement, and no shift in the terns of trade. This 
fact reflects itself in the criterion: as long as the marginal propensity to spend on
importables in the paying (expenditure-reducing) country is the same as the marginal pro­
pensity to spend on the same good in the receiving (expenditure-increasing) country, there 
will be no excess demand for either commodity and no change in the terms of trade, money 
and real income declining by exactly theamount of the transfer in the paying country and 
increasing by exactly the amount of the transfer in the receiving country.
What if the paying country’s marginal propensity to spend on importables exceeds 
that of the receiving country? In this event, the reduction in the amount of importables 
consumed in the paying country would exceed the increase in consumption of domestic im­
portables in the receiving country, thereby generating an excess supply of importables 
upon the world market, or, necessarily, an excess demand for the paying country's export­
ables since income is assumed to be equal to expenditure, i.e. C1+C2 =Ci+C2 =l• Given 
stability, this excess demand for domestic exportables can be eliminated only by a rise 
in their price relative to that of importables, the terms of trade necessarily improving
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for the paying country. Conversely, if Cg should exceed C2 , the terms of trade movement 
would favour the receiving country.
Samuelson has pointed out that in the zero-impediments,two-commodity case there 
can he no a priori grounds for supposing that one marginal propensity should exceed the 
other. As long as we are ignorant concerning the quantitative magnitudes of the para­
meters, there can he no presumption in favour of the orthodox conclusion that the terms 
of trade should move adversely for the paying country [35^299]• Arguing on equiprobabi- 
lity lines, as does Samuelson, that the marginal propensities are identical in each coun­
try, means that there would he a zero terms of trade effect. We turn now to examine the 
effect upon the criterion of the introduction of non-traded commodities in each country.
3• The Direction of Shift in the Terms of Trade - the Four-Commodity Case
Remembering that the international system is assumed to he stähle, the relevant 
criterion is now given hy the numerator of equation (l8.4):
^23 = ^23 • • • (20.4)
where \|r. . =  -C  . +C pji~Si,i
ij 1 jOjj'Sjj
This states that the terns of trade will improve (deteriorate) if the value of 
the paying country's propensity term exceeds (is less than) that of the receiving country. 
The influence of the non-traded commodity is hest considered in two stages: the effect 
of the marginal propensities to spend on non-traded commodities; and the effect of the 
substitution possibilities in consumption and production upon the magnitude of the mar­
ginal propensities.
i. Superficially, from an examination of the propensity terms, it would appear
that the larger the magnitude of the marginal propensity to spend on non-traded goods in 
the paying country and the smaller the non-traded propensity in the receiving country, the
7^.
greater is the possibility of the terms of trade movement being favourable to the paying 
country. In fact, the larger the non-traded propensities, the greater -will be the influ­
ence of the non-traded commodity upon the direction of the shift in the terms of trade but 
it is impossible to specify in which direction this influence will tend unless something 
is known of the substitution possibilities in the system.
ii. The direct effect of the transfer is to increase expenditure on commodities at 
constant prices in the receiving country and, likewise, to reduce expenditure upon commo­
dities at constant prices in the paying country. Excepting the unlikely case in which 
one of the non-traded commodities is an inferior good, or where either the own elasticity 
of supply of, or demand for, the non-traded commodity is infinite, this increase in ex­
penditure in the receiving country must increase the price of non-traded commodities and 
the decrease in expenditure in the paying country must reduce their price. As a result 
of these changes in the prices of the non-traded commodities, the consumption of traded 
commodities would increase in the receiving and decrease in the paying country; similarly, 
the supply of traded commodities would decrease in the receiving and increase in the pay­
ing country. The net effect upon the terms of trade of these shifts in consumption and 
production (which would tend to depress the price of traded goods in the paying and to 
raise the price of traded goods in the receiving country) would depend upon the substi­
tution possibilities in consumption and production. Generally, given the magnitude of 
the non-traded propensities, the greater the substitution possibilities in consumption and 
production in each country between non-traded commodities and exportables relative to the 
substitution possibilities between non-traded commodities and importables, the more pro­
bable is the orthodox presumption that the terms of trade would turn against the paying 
country.
Let us now consider whether a presumption can be established that the terms of
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trade will move in a direction either adverse or favourable to the paying country. In 
our analysis of the two-commodity case it was pointed out that on equiprobability grounds 
there exists no reason for assuming a terms of trade movement in favour of either country 
when there are no impediments to trade. This conclusion was reached by Samuelson who 
rigorously terminated what had seemed to be an interminable squabble between the adherents 
of the orthodox (terms of trade movement adverse to the paying country) and modern (terms 
of trade movement favourable to the paying country) exponents.
Several economists, however, have endeavoured to create a presumption one way or 
the other by the addition of non-traded commodities to their models. Of these attempts 
only that of Viner [52,548-49] is logically successful in providing a defence for the or­
thodox position. His argument, which depends entirely upon the assumption that there 
exists in each country a class of non-traded goods which is infinitely substitutable in 
production with exportables, is seen as a special case of our own general, multi-commo­
dity criterion. This assumption of Viner's would have the effect of reducing to zero 
the substitution elasticity weight in the paying country's marginal propensity term (\]/23) 
while, at the same time, the corresponding weight in the receiving country's propensity 
term would be increased to minus unity. The criterion would then become:
C2 g C2 + C3
/Arguing along equiprobability lines that C2=C2 , it follows that the terms of trade of the 
paying country would deteriorate, thus vindicating the orthodox point of view. Viner's 
approach, however, depends not only upon equiprobability arguments but also upon his res­
trictive assumption concerning production substitution possibilities, which is the same 
as assuming non-traded and exportable commodities to be one and the same good as far as 
producers are concerned. There would appear to be no economic justification for this.
Moreover, even if a bias did exist so that, in production, non-traded commodities were
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more competitive with exportables than with importables, the effect of this could be more 
than offset by an opposite bias on the consumption side.
Before this restricted but nonetheless logically successful attempt of Viner's 
to support the orthodox viewpoint, Elliott [85] and Samuelson [35>302-3] with even more 
restrictive assumptions failed to achieve the same result. Again, their attempts appear 
as a special case within the context of our general model.
Samuelson introduced the non-traded commodity by assuming, first that supply 
elasticities were zero, and secondly, that the effect of any change in non-traded prices 
upon the marginal propensities to spend would be neutral, i.e. (731=0-32 and 032=0-31. In 
this case our formula reduces to:
-C2 + C3 (--!-) g -C2 + C3 (--I)
where again, there can be no presumption either way if we argue along equiprobability lines. 
This approach, of course, neglects entirely the influence of the substitution possibilities 
upon the direction of the shift in the international price ratio.
Are we then to conclude, when there exist no impediments to trade, that the in­
troduction of non-traded commodities fails by equiprobability argument to indicate grounds 
for a presumption as to the direction of the movement in the terms of trade following a 
transfer? In fact, though we shall conclude that insufficient grounds exist for such a 
presumption, the writer would like to record first, a special case which does provide a 
slight bias in favour of the orthodox case and, secondly, another similar case which pro­
vides no presumption either way. Both examples depend entirely upon equiprobability type 
arguments, the first containing more restrictive assumptions than the second.
Consider the terms <t>23 and <|>23 as they appear in equation (17.4). Forming
elasticities our criterion becomes when written in full:
TT.
-C2 , r r , P x 2 CT23-02S23 2 3 X3 ^33-03833 C3
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cr^ 3“04S^3 0 .
Now, extend the equiprobability argument so that not only are marginal propensities to 
spend equal in each country hut also average propensities to spend and demand and supply 
elasticities. In this case, the above criterion leaves a remainder (R):
k = ^3X2g2T  I + V) > 0tf33-t>33\ X3 A3y
which is due essentially to the fact that, given our assumptions, the sum of the supply 
and demand for domestic importables in the foreign (receiving) country necessarily is 
greater relative to the volume of non-traded goods than is the same sum in the paying 
country. Thus,
X2 X;,
x3 X3 (average propensities to spend equal)
but X2 > 02
whereas X2 < 02
hence,
0J| CO
oloII
oil co 
olx 02 02 X3 ~ o£
The remainder would tend to disappear, given our assumptions, only if S23 were to exceed 
Sufficiently S23 and there does not appear to be any a priori reason why this should be 
the case. However, the magnitude of the remainder normally would be small unless the 
volume of trade approximates in size to the consumption of non-traded commodities in each 
country. Nevertheless, that is nevertheless for those who would accept this equiproba- 
bility type of argument, a slight presumption has been created in favour of the orthodox 
viewpoint that the terns of trade of the paying country would deteriorate.
At this juncture it may be thought that a further logical extension of the equi-
probability argument, so that average propensities to produce were also equal, would re­
establish Samuelson's two-commodity conclusion that no presumption can be made in either
direction. In fact, if we assume the latter and equal average propensities to spend, it 
follows that X2=C>2, etc., and that no trade would occur. Symmetry assumptions in terms 
of average propensities to spend and to produce are inconsistent with trade.
Next, we consider a less restrictive case which favours the 'no presumption' 
hypothesis. This time, in equation (1 7 *4), before converting $23 and $23 to elasticities 
to- elaotiei-tl-ee we substitute K32 and K32 for K23 and K23 respectively and our criterion 
in elasticity notation becomes:
-Ca + c'£ + C3 P3£13g - C3 * 0CT33-b33 CT33-t,33
The reader will note that the quantity weights associated with the elasticities have been 
cancelled out. In this case, the assumption of equal average propensities to spend is 
no longer relevant, but the assumption of equal marginal propensities to spend and of 
equal supply and demand elasticities in each country leads to the conclusion that there 
will be no remainder, and hence, no presumption as to a terms of trade movement in either 
direction.
There is a tendency, because of the initial substitution, to identify the two 
cases set out above. In fact, S23=S23 implies that 832^32 unless average propensities 
to produce are also identical, and this we have seen to be inconsistent with trade. The 
two cases involve, therefore, quite different assumptions.
This last conclusion should not be taken to mean, however, that because by equi- 
probability argument there can be established no or only a slight presumption as to the 
direction of the terms of trade change, the influence of the non-traded commodity upon 
the outcome is negligible, for as was shown earlier, the additional relationships intro-
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duced by the presence of non-traded goods could affect vitally both the magnitude and the 
direction of the shift in the terms of trade. To ignore these relationships when making 
a quantitative assessment would be to risk a serious error.
Finally, we note the 'few tentative speculations' of Samuelson upon the effect 
of non-traded commodities upon the transfer problem [36,289]. He was of the opinion that 
the determining factor would be the relative degree of substitutability, on the side of 
production only, between non-traded and exportable goods on the one hand, and non-traded 
and importable commodities on the other. Generally, he felt that the production relations 
between exportable and non-traded goods would outweigh the others, thereby supporting the 
orthodox conclusion. It has been shown clearly, however, that substitution effects on 
the side of consumption are equally important. One may presume that Samuelson's failure 
to perceive this was due to the special case of Viner in which the demand substitution 
possibilities do not affect the issue.
4 . The Effect of a Transfer upon the Price of Non-Traded Goods
Conventional two-commodity or partial equilibrium analysis frequently has led 
economists to consider the terms of trade as the dependent variable by which international 
adjustments to equilibrium are secured. In recent balance of payments models this pre­
occupation with the internationally traded good sectors in each country emphasises the 
role of a relative price change among the traded commodities in relieving an excess supply 
of, or demand for these goods, whereas it may well be that shifts in the price level of 
non-traded commodities relative to the prices of the traded goods are the more important.
It is possible that recent writers, when considering the mechanism of adjustment 
to international equilibrium, have excluded non-traded commodities from their models be­
cause of the added complexity of the analysis generally and the apparent lack of precision
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in the results.1 Nevertheless, the problem is an important one.
It is evident, of course, that an increase in expenditure in the receiving coun­
try and a decrease in expenditure in the paying country would tend to increase the price 
of non-traded commodities in the former and decrease it in the latter. But what, one may 
ask, is the extent of this shift in relation to the prices of the internationally traded 
commodities?
It should be noted that several classical [79*315] and neo-classical [52,324; 
8l,106] writers were aware of the important influence of non-traded commodities upon the 
adjustment process. Viner reflected the awareness of these earlier economists when he 
stated that there would be:
... for the borrowing country, a rise of export prices relative 
to import prices and of domestic commodity prices relative to 
both export and import prices [52,324].
Later, Wilson, in an empirical study, endorsed this conclusion noting that:
... some verification is found in Australian experience for the 
proposition that imports of capital tend to be positively corre­
lated with increases in the ratio of the "domestic" price level 
to the price level of "international" commodities [8l,106].
Should Viner's intuitive hypothesis be correct, it follows that the terms of 
trade are not the only dependent variable by which an adjustment to equilibrium is secured 
and, indeed, it may well be that the influence of the terms of trade is slight when com­
pared with the effect upon the adjustment mechanism of a shift in the price of non-traded
1 A notable exception to this generalisation is I.F. Pearce's paper on the problem of the 
balance of payments [82]. Pearce emphasises the importance of the role of the non-traded 
commodity in the equilibrating process, concluding that 'It may well be that the success 
of exchange depreciation as a policy rests more upon its power to reduce the price of non- 
traded goods relative to those traded than upon its power to affect the real terms of 
trade' [82,28]. As pointed out below, this conclusion, which is in the tradition of the 
Viner-Wilson hypothesis, fails to consider fully the indirect effects of the shift in the 
terms of trade and needs, therefore,to be qualified accordingly.
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goods relative to the prices of the traded commodities. Viner1 s statement, however, is 
not without ambiguity. For instance, if the terms of trade should move favourably for 
the expenditure - jnc t e a ( t e c e n t i r i j )  country, one would expect the price of importables to 
fall relative to the price of non-traded goods, in the manner predicted by Viner. But 
what of the price of exportables? One must consider carefully not only the impact effects 
of the transfer but also the other reactionsamong the variables including, in particular, 
the shift in the terms of trade.
The remainder of this section is concerned with a rigorous examination of the 
Viner-Wilson hypothesis.
In solving for the change in price of the paying country's non-traded good, p3,
relative to the price of domestic importables, p2, the solution for in equationdB Pi_
(l8.4) can be substituted into equation (l4.4) so that, when rearranged,
dp3 xx _ X!M3(H-1) + HK31
dB p3 -K33
When converted to elasticities this yields:
dp., X, + ( ^ - S 31)H
dB p3 -O33 + S33
Given stability in the international system and the absence of inferior goods
or complementarity in demand or joint supply, an examination of H (equation(l8.4))reveals
that if the numerator is negative, H cannot exceed plus unity; and if the numerator is
positive, H can range in value from minus infinity to zero. Thus, when the terms of
trade of the paying country deteriorate, H conceivably could tend to minus infinity.
Nevertheless, in all but exceptional cases, H would be less than unity, the numerator
necessarily being less than unity and not very different from C2-C2,while the denominator
is almost certain to exceed unity. In what follows, therefore, H is assumed to range in
value from minus to plus unity.
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Consider first, in equation (21 A), the orthodox case in which the terms of trade 
of the paying country deterioriate (H<0). As both terms in the numerator are negative, 
the price of non-traded commodities will fall relative to the price of importables in the 
paying (expenditure-reducing) country. In this instance, the Viner-Wilson hypothesis is 
unambiguously correct.
Our formula reflects clearly the different influences which induce P3 to fall 
relative to p2 when the terms of trade move adversely for the paying country. The first 
term in the numerator shows the influence of two income effects, both of which reduce the 
demand for commodity three. There is the income effect associated with the fall in the 
price of domestic exportables and there is the other negative income effect associated 
with the reduction in expenditure due to the transfer. The magnitude of these effects
will be augmented, the larger the marginal propensity to consume the non-traded commodity 
and the greater the importance of trade to the domestic country as measured by the ratio 
of the value of exports and non-traded commodity consumption. The second term in the 
numerator is a measure of the substitution effect of the fall in the price of domestic 
exportables relative to the price of importables (the numeraire) which causes a shift of 
consumption from, and of production towards the non-traded sector. Both influences would 
tend to depress the price of non-traded goods. Finally, in the denominator}are the sub­
stitution effects which measure the effect upon the consumption and production of the non-
is either
traded commodity of the fall in its price. Obviously, the larger/own non-traded sub­
stitution elasticity, the less will be the effect of the other influences detailed above 
upon the price of the non-traded good.
What if there were no movement in the terms of trade (H=0)? In this case, both 
the income and the substitution effects of a change in the terms of trade are excluded 
from our formula. The direction of the shift in the non-traded/importable price ratio
is determined unambiguously by the reduction in the demand for commodity three associated 
with the transfer, while the magnitude of the result is decided by the importance of trade 
to the country, by the size of the marginal propensity to consume non-traded goods and by 
the magnitude of the own non-traded substitution elasticities for good three.
Consider next the shift in the price of domestic non-traded goods relative to 
the price of domestic importables when the terms of trade improve for the paying country 
(h>0). This case is important, for it emphasises the fact that Viner and Wilson do not 
consider the indirect influence of the terms of trade. Our formula shows that the same 
influences are at work but that the direction of these effects is in conflict. In the 
first term of the numerator the income effects pull in contrary directions. While the 
impact effect of the transfer upon expenditure reduces demand for good three, the price 
induced income effect of the terms of trade change increases demand for good three. As 
long as the international market is stable, however, the net influence of this term must 
be to reduce the demand for commodity three. The magnitude of this net effect would de­
pend upon the same factors as were detailed above. Unfortunately, the effect of the 
second term in the numerator, which reflects the substitution effect of the change in 
the terms of trade, is to increase the price of good three - the rise in the price of ex- 
portables increasing the demand for non-traded goods and reducing the supply of them.
We see, therefore, that there are two forces - one an income, the other a substitution 
effect - which together might prevent a realization of the Viner-Wilson hypothesis. One 
point should be noted, however. When examining the determinants of the direction of the 
shift in the terns of trade, we saw that the smaller were 031 and S31, the greater was 
this shift likely to be. Thus for H to be large in (21.4), 031 and S31 should be small. 
But, if p3 is to rise relative to p2 when the terms of trade are favourable to the paying 
country, we require CX31 and S31 large. It is therefore improbable that both H and
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(031-S31) together can be large.
What of the relationship between the exportable and the non-traded goods price?
We know
P3 = P3/P2 
Pi P1/P2
Differentiating totally (logarithmically) with respect to a transfer expressed as a pro­
portion of the value of trade,
d-(p3/pi) X! = dp3 xi _ dp^ Xi 
P3/P1 P3/P1 ®  P3 dE Pi
Substituting from (21.4) and from (l8 .4) for dpx and dp3 respectively, and making use of
the relationship that Z PjK_=0,
j
we obtain:
a(P3/Pi)x-, g t  c3(h -i ) - (P32-s3s )h
P3/P1 d£ -CJ33 + S33 (22.4)
This time, when the terms of trade change is favourable to the paying country 
(HX)), the Viner-Wilson hypothesis needs no qualification. As H cannot exceed plus unity 
the numerator of (22.4) is negative, which means that the price of exportables must rise 
relative to the price of non-traded goods. The case in which H=0 again emphasises the 
fact that the Viner-Wilson hypothesis holds unambiguously only when the terms of trade 
effect is ignored. Trouble occurs when the terms of trade movement is adverse (H<0).
The shift in the terms of trade raises p2 relative to p! and gives rise first to an income 
effect which tends to reduce the demand for and price of good three, and secondly to sub­
stitution effects which, by increasing the consumption and reducing the production of 
non-traded commodities, tend afese- to increase the price of good three. The other income 
effect, associated with the transfer, still reduces the demand for good three.
Similarly, results can be obtained for dp3 (in terms of the price of domestic
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importables) and for dp^-dp! (which is a change relative to the price of home exportables). 
Table One summarizes these results:
Table One. Summary of shifts in traded/non-traded commodity price ratios
Relative
price C r i t e r i a
Effect on relative 
price
0<H<1 H = 0 -1<H<0
äP3 Xj. = 
dB p 3
H  C3(H-1) + (o 3i -S3i )H
? - -
- C 3 3  +  s 3 3
d(p3/pi) Xi _ C3(H-l) - (ff32-S32)H 9
dB P3/P1 ~ C33 + s33
Ü P 3 Xi .. Cs(l-H) + (031-S3l)H 1 1 9
dB vl “ CT33 + s 3 3 T T .
d(ps/Pi) X-] _
dB P3/P1
E + H  C3 (l-H) - (a32-S32)H 
~ C33 + s33 ? + +
, Pixi Q' P}*i N
dp3-dp3 _ / C3_p3X3 3 P3X3 V h -1)
dB Ua33+S33 -O33+S33/
? ? -
+ (C31 ~^ 31 _ 0~31 ~^ 3^  ^ g
\ “C33+8 33 -C33+S33y
These results are symmetrical. Should the terms of trade not change (H=0), 
the price of the receiving country's non-traded goods must rise relative to the price of 
its traded goods, and vice-versa for the paying country. This, however, is the only case
in which the Viner-Wilson hypothesis is unambiguously correct. If the terms of trade 
change, the price of the receiving country's non-traded good will rise relative to which­
ever traded commodity has fallen in price relative to the other traded commodity as a 
result of the terms of trade change. Whether or not the rise in the price of the non- 
traded good will exceed the rise in the price of the traded good whose price has improved 
relative to the other traded good will be determined by the magnitude of the terms of
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of trade effect, by the importance of trade in the country concerned, by the magnitude of 
each country's marginal propensity to spend on non-traded goods, and by the relative degree 
of competitiveness between non-traded goods and exportables on the one hand, and non-traded 
goods and importables on the other. The reader can see from Table One that a correspond­
ing degree of ambiguity exists when the price of the paying country's non-traded commodi­
ties is considered.
In the final row of Table One results are given for dp3-dp3. When there is no 
terms of trade movement the price of non-traded goods in the receiving country rises re­
lative to the corresponding price in the other country. This is still true when the 
terms of trade change, providing H is sufficiently small, and/or if the difference between 
substitution possibilities for non-traded goods in the two countries is sufficiently small, 
or if HX) and the latter difference is negative or if H<0 and the latter difference is 
positive.
Finally, having pointed out the ambiguity implicit in Viner's original state­
ment, we make an attempt to restate it. Knowingly or otherwise, Wilson commented accu­
rately that there is some evidence of a positive correlation between the price of non- 
traded goods and the price level of traded goods. The difficulty, of course, is the con­
cept of a single price for traded goods when the prices of imports and exports move in 
opposite directions as a result of the terms of trade change. In fact, it can be shown 
that there is a weighted index of the prices of traded goods taken together, in relation 
to which the price of non-traded goods must rise in the receiving country.2 If such an 
index is to have positive weights which sum to unity for all possible magnitudes of income 
and substitution effects (subject to the assumption that all K_'s > 0, that i/j, and that
The author is indebted to Professor T.W. Swan for assistance with this point.
H < l) there is only one such index, namely a Divisia index, defined by
dP = qdp! + (1 - q) dp2
■where
and
q _ 0 3 1 - S 3 1
“ CT33+S33
= 0 3 2-^ 32
"O33+S33
It is easily verified that for this index
dp3-dP P3X3 C3(H_;L)
dB Xl -033+S33 < ° ’
Of course, the uncertainty of the sign of dp3-dp3, when H^O, still persists, because P^P 
unless the ratios of the substitution possibilities are equal or the terms of trade move 
ment is zero.
Three general conclusions emerge from our analysis:
1 . that the Viner-Wilson hypothesis fails to consider the indirect effects of the terms
of trade upon non-traded/traded relative prices and so at any one time (except where 
the terms of trade do not change) their hypothesis could be only partially fulfilled 
unless
2. the hypothesis is reformulated to read: that there exists some index of the prices
of traded goods taken together, in relation to which non-traded prices in the receiv 
ing country must rise. A similar index can be defined for the paying country, in 
relation to which the non-traded commodity price must fall;
3 - that those factors which might cause a revision of the Viner-Wilson hypothesis, and 
about which some quantitative knowledge is required are:
i. the possibility of high own non-traded substitution possibilities in each
country;
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ii. the possibility of a small shift in the terms of trade, i.e. low coefficients 
of sensitivity;
iii. the relative degree of substitutability between non-traded commodities, and
importables and exportables respectively; and
iv. the relative importance of the-trade to the country concerned.
5• The Effect of a Transfer Upon the Real Income of the Paying Country
Real income in the paying country will decrease by an amount equivalent to the
transfer itself, plus or minus an amount determined by the direction and magnitude of the
3shift in the terms of trade. The latter is equal approximately to the increase or de­
crease in the cost of obtaining the initial volume of imports as a result of the shift in 
the terms of trade. It follows that the total change in the real income of the paying 
country, U, as the result of a transfer is given by:
dU = dpxx2 - dB
so that
dU _ dpxxx , 
dB dB P!
(x]_-X2, since prices are unity initially and the change in the trade balance is assumed 
small relative to total trade ).
Substituting for from equation (l8.4) we obtain:
/
d-U =  _________- ^ 2 3  _
dB ^23 + ^23 + ^23 ” ^23
which, when rearranged, gives:
dU = - - V23
dB jp23 + ^23 + ^23 - ^23 (23-4)
As the coefficients of sensitivity must be negative, this equation states that the real
T3" By assumption we ignore the possible real income effects of a redistribution of income 
between the different individuals of each country.
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income of the transferring country cannot increase as a result of the transfer unless the 
foreign market is unstable in the sense defined above, i.e. the denominator on the right- 
hand side is positive. This multi-commodity result confirms a similar conclusion of 
Samuelson in the two-commodity case [25,2^].
A more important conclusion concerns the magnitude of this real income effect. 
Obviously if the terms of trade move adversely for the paying country (\|/23<^ 23) real income 
will increase by more than the amount of the transfer; if the terms of trade move favour­
ably, by less than the amount of the transfer. Given the difference in the propensities, 
the determinants of the amount by which real income falls short of or exceeds the trans­
fer are the coefficients of sensitivity; the magnitude of this amount being related in­
versely to the size of them, being large when they are small and small when they are large. 
Conditions making for large or small coefficients of sensitivity have been established and 
discussed when these terms were defined. Generally, we know that they will be smaller 
than the sum of their respective own substitution elasticities of demand for, and supply 
of importables. This fact, given the sign and magnitude of the difference in the propen­
sities, makes for a larger shift in the terms of trade and a larger real income effect.
We are unable, however, to conclude that this will be the net effect of the introduction
of non-traded commodities for we have seen that they could decrease or increase the move­
ment in the terms of trade by their effects upon the propensity terms. Our single con­
clusion must be that to neglect the effect of non-traded goods both upon the magnitude and
direction of the shift in the terms of trade is to risk a seriously distorted result.
C. THE TRANSFER PROBLEM: TARIFFS AND TRANSPORT COSTS
1. Development of the Model
It is our intention in this section to obtain a general four-commodity criterion
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for the effect of a given transfer upon the rate of change in the terms of trade of the 
paying (domestic) country when both transport costs and tariffs are allowed for explicitly. 
The assumptions and notation used in earliedevelopments of the model are retained with 
some exceptions. For instance, we assume, as does Johnson [57] > that the transport of a 
commodity will absorb normally some of each country's internationally traded goods. For 
analytical reasons the transportation of commodities is assumed to involve two distinct 
processes, best thought of as sea transport provided by the domestic (paying) country from 
its own exportable good, and land transport provided likewise by the foreign (receiving) 
country from its own exportable commodity. Thus the act of transportation involves in 
each instance up to the trans-shipment point the use of the exporting country's exportable 
good and, after the trans-shipment point, the use of the importing country’s exportable 
commodity.
Additionally, it is assumed that each country levies a constant ad valorem 
tariff. It follows, therefore, that each commodity has four distinct prices, each of 
which is applicable at some stage of the marketing process. The price of the paying 
country’s exportables is given in the paying country by px, at the trans-shipment point 
by Pi, at the border of the receiving country exclusive of tariffs by pi, and in the mar­
ket of the receiving country tariff inclusive by Pi, Similarly, the price of the re­
ceiving country's exportables in the receiving country is p2> at the trans-shipment point 
P2 , at the port of entry to the paying country p2, and in the market of the paying coun­
try P2 . Hence , =^- are the ratios of the values per unit of commodities one and two
at the trans-shipment point to their respective transport-inclusive values at the port of
- /
destination. Similarly, and —  are the ratios of the transport-inclusive prices ofPi P2
good one and two respectively to their transport plus tariff-inclusive market prices. As
the denominator in each of the above ratios exceeds the numerator, each is less than unity
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in magnitude.
In an analogous fashion, xi and x2 respectively represent the quantities of ex­
ports of goods one and two which have not been used up in transport at the trans-shipment 
point. Note, however, that that part of the cost of transport of domestic imports which 
is incurred in the exportable good of the domestic country after the trans-shipment point 
is assumed to be provided for by the sale of a quantity of imports equal to (P2-P2)x2 • 
Similarly, in the foreign country, a portion of imports equal to (Pi-Pi)x1 is sold to de­
fray that part of the cost of transporting foreign imports which is incurred in the foreign 
exportable good.
The equilibrium equations are:
= xi - oi . . . (24.4)
*i = Oi - Xj. . . . (25.4)
*2 = x2 - 02 . . . (26.4)
*2 = o2 - x2 . . . (27.4)
0 = x3 - 03 . . . (28.4)
0 = X3 - o3 . . . (29.4)
M = PiXi+(P2-P2)x 2+PiXi+P202+P303+(P2-P2)x 2-B . . . (30.4)
M / = Pi0i+P2X2^i-Pi )xi+p2x2+p303n(pi-pi )xx+B . . . (31-4)
P2 = P2 [1 + (jf * 1)1 • • • (32.4)
P2 = Pa [1 + (ff - 1)1 • • •P2 (33-4)
- /
P2 = P2 [1 + (“T - 1)] . . .P2
(54.4)
Pl*l = iixi • • • (35-4)
p2x2 = P2X2 . . • (36.4)
B = P1X1 - P2X2 • • • (37-4)
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Of these equations the first six are the basic supply-demand equations of the 
model. The next two are the expenditure equations suitably modified to include the pre­
sence of a tariff revenue term in each country. Thus in the domestic country, expenditure 
is equal to the value of output of good one (which comprises domestic consumption, P1X1, 
plus exports, PiXi=PiXi, plus the value of exportables,(p2-p2)x2, used up in the trans­
portation of imports from the trans-shipment point), good two, and good three, plus tariff 
revenue, (P2-P2)x2.> less the amount of the transfer. The foreign expenditure equation is 
defined similarly. Next come three price equations for p2, P2 and p2 respectively. Simi­
lar equations could be given for any two of pi, pi and p1; but they are omitted because, 
by the assumption of constant tariff and transport cost loadings, any change in these price 
ratios is zero. Equations (35*4) and (36.4) state that the value of exports in each coun­
try before any transport costs are incurred must equal the value of exports at the trans­
shipment point, the increased cost per unit of exports being inversely proportional to the 
reduction in the volume of exports. Finally, equation (37-4) states that the transfer, B, 
is equal to the value received by the exporters of the paying country for their exports, 
less the amount of money paid to the foreign (receiving) country's exporters for imports.
Not all of these equations are independent. We choose to omit numbers (25*4), 
(27.4), (35-4) and (36A). This time, without loss of generality, the domestic price of 
exportables, px, is selected as numeraire and quantity units are chosen so that Pi=P2=P3~J?3~1.
Differentiating totally the above equations we obtain:
^ 1  = (Xi2_0i2)dp2 + (X]_ 3-O13) dp 3 + MidM . . . (30*4)
dx2 = (X22-022)dp2 + (X23-023)dp3 + M2dM . . . (39«4)
0 = (X32-C>32)dp2 + (X33-O33) dp 3 + MsdM . . . (40.4)
0 = (X32-032)^12 + (X33-O33) dp3 + M3CIM . . . (4l.4)
dM = 02dp2+03dp3+d(p2-p2)x2+d(p2-p2)x2+(p2-p2)dx2-dB (42.4)
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where X . .= ij
ÖX.
J
dM/ = 02dp2 + 03<ip3 + Pi(l- ^-) dici + dB 
dp2 = p2dp2 
dp2 = p2dp2 
dp2 = p2dp2
dB = ^  dxi - p2dx2 - x2dp2Pi
do. dx.
■y-~ and M. = -yrr^  • o p . i oMJ
(43 -4 )
(44.4)
(45A)
(46.it)
(1*7.4)
The reader should note first, that in equations (1*2.4) and (4j.4) use is made
of the homogeneity condition that E p^dCh=0 where care should he taken to distinguish
i
between the change in the production of that part of exportables measured in terns of im­
ports which is included in the E p^dO and the change in tariff revenue due to the change
i
in imports which is not part of the E p^dO.; and secondly, that in the equations (44.4)
i - - /
to(46.4) all changes in the relative prices, , ^-7 and ^ 7 , are zero by the con-p2 p£ p2
stant tariff and transport cost loading assumption.
We now proceed to
i. substitute in (42.4) for dp2 from (45.4) and into (42.4) and (4j.4) for dp2 from 
(46.4);
ii. substitute equation (42.4) into equations (39*4) and (40.4);
iii. substitute equation (43-4) into equations (30*4) and (4l.4);
iv. substitute into the resulting equations for dp2 from (44.4);
(K. .-X.M.) for (X. .-0. .) where K. . is the net demand substitution effect; and v ij J 1 v iJ ij' ij
for the terms (X^-Ch) which arise after these substitutions, the relevant x1, x2, 
Xi, x2 or zero as indicated by the equilibrium equations;
v. cancel and collect terms wherever possible.
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This yields the following rearranged set of equations:
(p2K22-x2M2)dp2 + K2 3dp3 + M2 (p2-p2 )dx2 - dx2 = M2dB
(P2K32-x2M3)dp2 + K33dp3 + M3 (p2 -p2 )dx2 = M3dB
(Ki2+x2Mi)dp2 + Ki3dp3 + Mi(pi“Pi)dxi - dxx = -Mi dB
(K32+x2M3) dp2 + K33dp3 + Pi -Pi) dxa. = -M3dB
3
Pidxi - p2dx2 - x2dp2 = dB
The rate of change in p2 is our measure of the rate of change in the real terms 
of trade. As the Z
j
due to a transfer is:
(48.4)
(49.4) 
C50.it)
(51.U)
(52.1)
dj4
dB
pjKij=0> the solution for the rate of change in the
m 2 K23 0 0 M2(P2“P2)“1
m 3 K33 0 0 M3(P2“P2)
-Mi 0 K-13 Mi(pi-Pi)-1 0
-m 3 0 K33 M3 (Pi-Pi) 0
1 0 0 Pi
- /-P2
(= M )
(P2K22“x 2M 2 ) K23 0 0 M 2 (P2“P 2 )“1
(P2K32“x 2M3) K 33 0 0 M 3 (P2“P2)
(“P i K h +x 2M i ) 0 k A Mi(Pi~Pi)“1 0
( -PiK3i+x2M 3 ) 0 K 33 M 3 (Pi-Pi) 0
-X2 0 0 Pi
-  /
-P2
(■ lB l)
A Laplacian expansion of jA| by the first two rows gives, when the result is multiplied by -1:
|A|
M2 k23 kA  mA pA pA-1
M3 K33 K33 M3(pi-pi) (.Vs)
K23 M2(p2-p2)-1 Ki3 M1(p1-p1)-l ■Mi K13
K33 M3(p2-p2) K33 M3(pi“Pi)
+
M3 K33 (A)
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S im i la r ly ,
N
(P2 K2 2 - x2 M2 ) K23
(P2K32-X2M3) K33
K 3^ M i( p i - p i)-1 
K33 M3(p1-p 1 )
(P2)
K2 3 M 2 (P 2 "P 2 )_1 kB Mi ( P i - P i ) -1 P l ^ l l " x 2Mi K13
K33  M3(p2 -P 2 )
x 2
K33 M3(P i - P i )
+
P 1K3 1 -X2M3  K33
bt
i
H
1 __
_
il
l
D iv id in g  |A| and j B| by
we o b ta in
K 3^
K33
M i( p i- P i)-1
M3(P i -P i )
and
K23 M2 ( p 2- P2)-1
K33 M3(p 2 -P2)
1 +(P2)
dP2
dB
M2
m3
K23
K33
^23 M2(P2_P2) " I
K33 M3(p2 -P2)
+ (p j
Mi K i3
M3 K33 K 33 M3 ( P i - P i )
X2+ (p2 ) P2K22
P2K32
K23
K33
X2M2
X2M3
K23
K33
K2 3 M 2 (P 2 “ 5 2 ) “ 1
K33 M3(p2"p2)
+ (P l)
P1K31
K i3
K33
x2Mi
X2M3
kD
K33 K33 M ^ P i-P i)
( 53. 4 )
By expanding  t h i s  r e s u l t ,  fo rm ing  e l a s t i c i t i e s  (rem em bering t h a t  p2 , P i ^ l ) ,  and m u l t ip ly ­
in g  b o th  s id e s  by X2(-X].) we o b ta in :
n P2 P 2 . 1 P i pL  /  1
„ /  _ ~ 1 ~ kjp ' 23 i:it  i b 13 ä /
-  /  - - /
(54.4)
1  +  P 2 ^ 2 3  T  +  P l ^ l 3  T / +  ^  ^ ^ 2 3  T  +  ^ ^ 1 3  T /V
w here %  | | )  i s  th e  change in  th e  te rm s o f  t r a d e  due to  a  t r a n s f e r  ex p re sse d  a s  a 
P2 dB
p ro p o r t io n  o f  th e  v a lu e  o f  t r a d e ;  where l)j and l .  . a r e  d e f in e d  a s  above,
i j  _/
A = 1 + ^2 3 (1 - and  = 1 + ^ 3(1- ^ r )  .
P2 P i
The formula given in equation (54.4), though superficially quite different, in 
fact is identical to that obtained in the zero-impediments case (l8.4) if all terms intro­
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duced by the presence of tariffs and transport costs are set to zero. 4
Shortly, we shall see that the effect of the introduction of transport costs 
and tariffs upon the magnitude of the coefficients of sensitivity and upon the propensity 
terms is small. It follows that these assumptions do not normally affect significantly 
the stability of the model and so it is still assumed that our international system is 
stable, i.e. that the sign of our denominator is negative. In this event, the direction 
of the shift in the terms of trade is determined by the sign of the numerator, being fa­
vourable or adverse to the paying country according to whether
- \|r2 3 ~  T  “ tyi3 I 1 . . .P2 P2 A Pi Pi A
As in the zero-impediments case use is made of the time-honoured method of gradually 
diminishing abstraction to examine the properties of (55-4). Accordingly, criteria are 
established for the multi-commodity case in which tariffs exist but in which there are 
no transport costs, and for the corresponding transport cost and/or tariff inclusive 
two-commodity cases.
Where transport costs are assumed to be negligible or zero, Pi=Pi=Pi and
/ - / -
V2.-V2.~V2.) so that our criterion reduces to
- t23 2a i  - t h  ^  A i  1 . . .P2 A Pi A
Similarly, in the case of zero tariffs, Pi=Pi and V2=V2) the \  terms reducing to unity, 
and the criterion becoming:
4 Making use of the fact that I p.K. .=0, it can be shown that 3=1^ 23 and that
4 J 1J
/ / ^l+\|/13=-\|/23 (see page ll^below).
(55.4)
(56.4)
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/ >-  \j/1 3  -  ^ 2 3  . . .
which is the zero-impediments result established in the previous section (l+\|/i3 ==-\|/-2 3 ).
If, in the three criteria (55.4), (56.4) and (20.4) given above, all terms in­
volving the non-traded commodities are set to zero, analogous two-commodity criteria are 
obtained:
i. where both tariffs and transport costs exist:
C2 ik P£ 1 + Cl 4  1 I !
(20.4)
$2 JP2 A Pi Pi A (57-4)
- /
where A=l-C2 (l-— ) and A/=1-Ci(l- ^-) ;P2* Pi
ii. where only tariffs exist, transport costs being negligible or zero:
c2 A i + d 4 1 11
Ps A Pi A (58.4)
iii. where both transport costs and tariffs are non-existent:
C2 + c{ 1 1 ... (19-4)
Consider the effect of tariffs upon the direction of shift in the terms of 
trade following a transfer, as reflected in the two-commodity criterion (58.4).
First, we examine the properties and influence of the A terms which arise because 
of the existence of a prior tariff. From inspection, it can be seen that as long as each 
country's marginal propensity to spend on importables is less than unity/>-'and the—tariff 
4oec-no%.''Oxee-od'One hundred per cent, the A terms will be less than unity in magnitude, 
but positive. Normally, they would approximate to unity. Their influence is best ex­
plained thus: the effect of the transfer at constant prices is to decrease (increase) 
the tariff revenue receipts of the paying (receiving) country. This means that in the 
paying country the reduction in imports will be determined not only by the size of the 
transfer and the marginal propensity to spend on importables, C2 , but also by the reduction
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in tariff revenue. Similarly, in the foreign country the increase in the amount of im­
ports demanded at constant prices is determined by the size of the transfer, by the for­
eign marginal propensity to spend on importables, and by the gain in tariff revenue upon 
each additional unit of imports. Thus the effect of a loss in tariff revenue in the 
transferring and a gain in tariff revenue in the receiving country is to increase the 
magnitude of C2 and Ci (the respective domestic and foreign marginal propensities to spend 
on importables). Arguing along equiprobability lines that these two propensities initially 
are equal to one half, it follows that there is a presumption in favour of the modern opin­
ion that the terms of trade will move adversely for the receiving country. As one would 
expect, our A terms become unity if there is no initial tariff.
Secondly, and offsetting this influence of the prior tariff, is the presence of 
the other weighting terms, the price ratios Pi/pi and P2/P2 which both reflect the fact 
that more costly imports (due to the tariff)shift each country1s marginal physical con­
sumption propensities, M2, Mi, in favour of their own exportable good. Thus if we argue 
on equiprobability grounds that C^=C^_=^: it follows that M2 and Mi are each less than one 
half and that, accordingly, the amount of the reduction in the demand for imports in the 
paying country and the amount of the increase in the demand for imports in the receiving 
country will be reduced.
Johnson [3 7>ll6] is of the opinion that nothing conclusive can be said about the 
net influence of these two effects upon the criterion, arguing that while dearer imports 
would tend to restore the orthodox conclusion, the effect of tariffs upon the marginal 
propensities to spend might offset it. In fact, it can be shown that the net influence 
would strengthen the orthodox presumption. The foreign propensity term from (58.4) can
be rewritten:
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Ci = C1 “ r---------------
™  El  - - 1)Pi vPi '
/ 1 p-iAs long as Ci is less than unity, it follows that — must likewise he less than unity 
and positive. The net effect of the tariff-weighting term, therefore, is to reduce the 
magnitude of the foreign marginal propensity to spend on exportables while leaving its
-L /
sign unchanged. Similarly, — —  reduces the magnitude of C2, scythat in each country theA P2
net effect of the tariff is to increase the probability of an adverse movement in the terms 
of trade of the paying country.
The effect of the tariff upon the direction of the shift in the terms of trade 
is the same in the multi-commodity case. This time the criterion is:
/
where A= l+\|r23(l-— ) and A/ = El)P2 Pi
Rewriting
(56.4)
P l  A  ~  E l  +  ^ 3 ( P l  _ ! )
Pi V1 VP1 '
it again follows that because \[r^3 is less than unity and negative, y.El must be less than. A Pi
1 Ppunity and positive. Similarly, — —  is less than unity and positive.A P 2
For the moment, let us continue to ignore the complex effects of transport costs 
in order that we may consider an attempt of Samuelson [36,280 ] to support the orthodox con­
tention that the terms of trade of the paying country would deteriorate in a two-commodity 
world. It is suggested that by a logical extension of the restrictive assumptions used 
by Samuelson, the multi-commodity case also can be brought within the orthodox fold.
In view of our ignorance concerning the magnitude of the parameters appearing 
in the two-commodity criterion Samuelson suggested assuming that identical tastes exist
in each country and that marginal and average propensities to consume are equal. In this
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manner, he was able to prove that the orthodox presumption in favour of an improvement in 
the terns of trade of the receiving country depended upon the presence of tariffs and that 
in their absence no presumption either way was possible.
Unfortunately, in a three-good world, these assumptions are not sufficiently 
restrictive. However, it appears logical to conclude that if we are ignorant concerning 
the different taste patterns in each country, we could be ignorant equally of the produc­
tion conditions. If then we assume that demand and supply elasticities as well as mar­
ginal propensities to spend are equal in each country, it is possible to conclude that in 
the absence of tariffs there can be no presumption either way concerning the direction of 
the shift in the terms of trade, for where
= a
s . = s 7 .
id id
/
ci = ci
our numerator - ^13-^23-1=0. Only the introduction of tariffs can turn the presumption 
in favour of the orthodox viewpoint.
Finally, our attention centres upon the general, multi-commodity case in which
both tariffs and transport costs are introduced explicitly to the model. The criterion is:
. • • (55.h ),./ Pi Pi 1 ,, P2 P2 1 I ,"*13 Pi Pi Ä t23 pi Ü  Ä ä 1
The influence of transport costs upon the criterion differs from that of tariffs because 
in the former case physical resources are actually consumed in the process of transporta­
tion. It should be recalled that we assumed that the transport of a commodity from one 
country to another would in the first instance absorb some of the exporting country's own 
exports and in the second instance absorb some of the exportable products of the importing
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country. From our criterion it is evident that the greater the proportion of transport
cost provided from the exportables of the importing country, i.e. the smaller 7^- and -§§• ,
Pi P2
the greater is the probability of an adverse terns of trade movement for the paying coun­
try. For instance, in the paying country the reduction in expenditure upon imports would 
reduce the demand for that part of the paying country's exportables which were used to 
provide transport for imports. In the receiving country, an increased expenditure upon 
imports would increase simultaneously the demand for exportables. As long as some of 
the cost of transport was incurred in the exportable good of the importing country, trans­
port costs would increase the probability of an adverse terms of trade movement for the 
paying country. This case contrasts with that postulated by Samuelson, in which each 
country provides all the transport for its own exports from its exportable commodity. In
this event 1^ - and Ir2- would go to unity and transport costs would have no effect upon the Pi P2
criterion expressed in terms of marginal propensities to spend; income in each country 
would be the same as for the case of zero transport costs since the cost of transport 
would be merely an export for the exporting country. Apart from this case, if use is 
made of the restrictive assumptions made above, namely equal marginal propensities to spend 
and the same supply and demand elasticities, a presumption can be established in favour 
of the orthodox case.
This completes our analysis of the effects of a transfer upon the direction of 
shift in the terms of trade. Table Two, below, summarizes our results for the multi-com­
modity case and compares them with the tentative conclusions established by Samuelson in 
the second of his celebrated articles upon the transfer problem.
D. CONCLUSIONS
We shall conclude this chapter with a few comments upon the relative value of
the conclusions established above.
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1. It is contended that the use of either pseudo general equilibrium two-commodity
analysis or partial equilibrium analysis is inadequate for a study6f the effect of a trans­
fer upon the direction of shift in the terms of trade. On the one hand, if there is a
postulated world in which only two-commodities exist the problem of qualitatively, to say 
nothing of quantitatively, assessing the magnitude of parameters such as marginal propen­
sities to spend on importables and exportables is encountered. Without a knowledge of 
the complex substitution relationships introduced by the presence of a non-traded commo­
dity, it is difficult to see how these concepts could be ever identifiable or analytically 
useful. Thus while the correctness of the two-commodity result is not disputed, its use­
fulness for purposes of prediction is. On the other hand, the partial equilibrium ap­
proach, in which all relationships between traded and non-traded commodities are ignored, 
is vulnerable to the grave objection that these non-traded/traded relationships could af­
fect decisively, as we have seen, the direction of shift in the terms of trade.
Table Two. Summary of Transfer Effects upon the Terms of Trade in a
multi-commodity world
Marginal propensities
Zero Impediments Tariffs Transport Costs to spend equal; demand
and supply elasticities 
the same
Orthodox view fav­
oured provided:
1 . Cx,C3, and C2,
C3 are small re­
lative to C2 and Ci 
respectively.
ii. Domestic goods 
are more competi­
tive on the produc­
tion and con sumpti.cn 
side with export­
ables than with im­
portables .
As for zero-impe­
diments case ex­
cept that the pro­
bability of the 
orthodox effect 
appearing is in­
creased.
As for the tariff 
case, as long as 
transport costs 
are not incurred 
entirely in the 
good of the ex­
porting country.
Samuelson1s result
Orthodox view favoured, provided domestic goods are ’more 
competitive on the production side' with exports than with 
import goods.
i_.In the absence of trade 
impediments there exists a 
presumption that the terms 
of trade movement would be 
favourable to the receiv­
ing country. This presump­
tion disappears when aver­
age propensities to con­
sume differ between the two 
trading areas.
ii.If either tariffs and/ 
or transport costs exist 
the terms of trade will 
change in favour of the 
receiving country._________
This case not considered.
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2. Further, it is emphasised that Samuelson’s tentative conclusion that the problem
of the terms of trade shift in a multi-commodity world would be resolved by the production 
substitution possibilities in the system is only a part of the answer; substitution possi­
bilities on the side of demand could be of equal or greater importance.
3- For those who will accept equiprobability type arguments it has been shown that
in the three-commodity, as opposed to the two-commodity zero-impediments case, a presumption 
can be established in favour of the orthodox conclusion that the terms of trade would im­
prove for the receiving country. This presumption cannot be sustained, however, unless 
average propensities to spend (among other things) are equal in the two countries.
4. Additionally, it is argued that not only the direction but also the magnitude of 
the shift in the terms of trade and, consequently, the real income effect of a transfer, 
would be affected markedly by non-traded/traded commodity relationships. Any attempt to 
assess the real income effect of a transfer must have, therefore, some knowledge, either 
qualitative or quantitative, concerning these parameters.
5. Finally, and perhaps most important, a proof is given that the price level of 
non-traded commodities in the paying country would fall normally relative to an index of 
the prices of the internationally traded commodities. A corresponding rise in the price 
of non-traded commodities relative to an index of the price of the international goods 
would occur in the receiving country. This conclusion qualifies the Viner-Wilson hypo­
thesis, which tends to neglect the indirect effect of the terms of trade shift in stating 
that the prices of the traded commodities would fall in the paying country relative to 
the non-traded price level and rise in the receiving country relative to the non-traded 
price level. The significance of this conclusion concerns the mechanism of adjustment
in the international system, for it may well be that the adjustment to equilibrium secured
by means of a terms of trade shift is small compared with the adjustment secured by the 
shift in the non-traded/traded commodity price ratios.
105.
5- TARIFFS AND THE DOMESTIC PRICE RATIO OF 
________________TRADED GOODS1______________
A. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter the effect of a tariff upon the domestic prices of importables 
and exportables in the tariff-imposing country is examined. First, the relevant liter­
ature is reviewed briefly and the more important assumptions and practical implications 
of established theorems are discussed. Secondly, a general four-commodity model is de­
veloped in which are included two classes of non-traded commodities and a criterion is 
derived for the effect of a tariff upon the domestic traded goods price ratio of the 
tariff-imposing country. Thirdly, the problem is analysed within the context of a 
classical, two-commodity, two-country model, which not only provides us with a sound 
foundation for the analysis of the more complex multi-commodity case, but also enables 
us to contrast the traditional result expressed in terms of ’total’ elasticities with a 
two-good answer in which all of the relevant parameters are detailed explicitly. Finally, 
the multi-commodity criterion is analysed and compared with the two-good result.
B. THE ARGUMENT
Traditionally, the analysis of the effect of a tariff on the terms of trade 
and on the distribution of income within the taxing country were contained in separate 
economic boxes. Recent analysis,however, has demonstrated that both the magnitude and 
the direction of the latter are intimately associated with the size of the terms of trade 
movement, the critical factor being the direction of the change in the domestic traded 
goods price ratio.
The fact that a tariff might improve the terms of trade was recognised gene-
1 The contents of this chapter form the basis of two articles written by myself and 
published recently [ 100;102 ] .
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rally by the classical economists; it is logically implicit in John Stuart Mill's theory 
of reciprocal demand and even such exponents of orthodoxy as Alfred Marshall and Frank W. 
Taussig acknowledge begrudgingly its theoretical possibility. At the same time, the 
classicists and neo-classieists ignored and, indeed, even rejected any idea that tariffs 
might influence the distribution of income within the taxing country. Taussig, for in­
stance, was of the opinion that the factors determining income distribution "lie quite 
outside the tariff controversy ... " [29>5^ -]* Their inability to deal with the income 
distribution question follows from the assumption of a single factor of production, labour, 
and from the then undeveloped theory of distribution. They assumed that the reward of 
each and every factor depended on the productivity of the entire economy.
expense of another could raise the absolute share in the national income of the factor 
employed relatively more intensively in the expanding industry [30,05]. It was 
Heckscher [31] and Ohlin [22], however, who prepared the ground for a rigorous treatment 
by Stolper and Samuelson [32] of the effect of a tariff upon the distribution of the na­
tional income. As our concern is only the antecedents of the theorem which describes 
the effect of a tariff upon the domestic traded goods price ratio, no explicit account
Stolper and Samuelson. It suffices to say that the latter demonstrated rigorously 
(subject to limiting conditions) that a tariff would increase the absolute as well as 
the relative share in the national income of the factor of production used relatively 
more intensively in the import-competing industry. Whereas the classicists, however, 
had ignored the income redistribution effects of a tariff and concentrated instead upon 
the terms of trade effect, Stolper and Samuelson reversed this procedure by assuming
Pigou first suggested that an increase in the output of one industry at the
is given of the Heckscher-Ohlin model nor from it by
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explicitly that the terms of trade did not change.
Metzler [l6], in a recent -well-known article, has integrated these different
theorems to demonstrate that a terns of trade effect could cancel, or even reverse, the
income redistribution effect postulated by Stolper and Samuelson. Our interest centres
not in this qualification of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem,2 however, but in a surprising
consequence of it. The criterion Metzler developed showed that the Stolper-Samuelson
conclusion would be reversed if the domestic price of importables fell relative to the
domestic price of exportables. This, however, is precisely the condition for a tariff
to fail to protect! More specifically, his formula purports to show that:
when the foreign demand for a country's exports is inelastic 
... a tariff far from protecting industries competing with 
exports at the expense of the export trades, may actually be­
nefit the latter at the expense of the former [l6,19]•
He points out that the traditional analysis ignores the indirect effects that would follow
the change in the terms of trade as the result of a tariff. An artificial restriction
of demand for imports in the home country would cause an excess supply of the rest of
the world's exports (i.e. imports) and a fall in their price. This would tend to raise
the price of the home country's exports relative to that of its imports. If the latter
terns of trade effect were sufficiently strong, the initial movement in the domestic price 
the
ratio (due to/tariff) could be not only arrested, but reversed, and a reduction in the 
domestic price of importables relative to the domestic price of exportables would occur.
In this case, resources would flow from the 'protected' import-competing to the exportable 
goods industries. The policy of protection would be not only ineffective but also actu­
ally harmful to those industries it sought to protect.
2 This theorem, with its severe limiting assumptions,already has been criticized exten­
sively and any proof of the invalidity of Metzler's qualification of it would be point­
less. The reader is referred to [£ y &S.-7&J where most of the literature on
the subject is listed.
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Metzler continued to criticize the conclusions of the well-known Australian 
tariff enquiry that was published in 1929 [33] . As the findings of this report have con­
tinued to provide the theoretical justification of Australian tariff policy they are enu­
merated briefly below. The authors of the report were of the opinion that a tariff re­
duction would have:
1. affected unfavourably the Australian terms of trade;
2. reduced real wages and increased rents by lessening the relative scarcity of labour;
3- reduced the diversity of occupations and opportunities and decreased the stability
of the national income by making it more dependent upon the seasons and upon the 
vagaries of the overseas markets;
4. reduced the standard of living of the existing population;
5« tended to eliminate certain strategic industries;
6. prevented the development of Australian industry and the attendant economies of 
scale.
Metzler argued that the first two conclusions were inconsistent. He maintained 
that the adverse terms of trade movement following a reduction in the tariff might protect 
industry and, if this were so, that the remaining conclusions also are inconsistent.
Though most of the above arguments are founded on particular Australian condi­
tions, the infant industry one is not. Economists, normally, have taken for granted that
An import duty ... will increase the marginal efficiency of invest­
ment in industries producing goods identical with or similar to 
those hit by the duty; it will diminish the marginal efficiency 
of investment in industries that make use of such goods and that 
produce goods complementary to them [34,/c>7 ].
As the Metzler argument has been commented upon uncritically in recent tariff literature
[V/,/6] <cU> l(o-7^ 'HO, 7^ -7f\, though more frequently in connection with income distribution
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than with trade protection, it seems a worthwhile task to attempt a reconciliation of 
these two divergent viewpoints. Our conclusion, reached below, is that Metzler failed 
to carry his analysis sufficiently far and that the likelihood of the appearance of his 
perverse case is remote in practice.
C. DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODEL
Basically, our assumptions are the same as those set out in the free trade 
model of chapter three, except that they are modified to account for the presence of an 
existing tariff levied upon the domestic country's imports (commodity two). The more 
important of these assumptions are: perfect competition; two countries; four commodi­
ties, of which two are non-traded goods excluded from international trade by transport 
costs, etc.; increasing costs; and a balanced balance of trade. Except for the pre­
sence of a prior tariff, and non-traded commodities in each country, these assumptions 
are identical to those used by Metzler. When comparing our criterion with his, however, 
it is possible to abstract from the complications introduced by the last two assumptions.
The equilibrium equations of the model are:
><! H II O H Xi = Xi - Oi • • (1-5)
x2 = X2 - 02 - 02 - X2 - - - (2.5)
0 = x 3 - 03 - - - (3-5)
0  = X3 - 03 ■ - - b-5)
M  = PiOi + P2O2 + P3O3 + (P2"P2)x 2 • - - (5-5)
M 7 = V 1O 1
/ / f t
+ P2O2 + P3O3 . - - (6.5)
where X = X^.(p!,p2,P3,M)
= 0j (p]_, P2jp3).and
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The presence of the tariff is reflected by the addition first, of an extra price, p2, which 
is less than the domestic price of good two by the amount of the tariff and, secondly, by 
an additional term in the domestic country's income equation equal to the tariff revenue, 
(P2_P2)X2- Since M= Z p.X., one of the supply-demand equations is not independent, and
j j j
a balanced balance of trade is implied:
Pixi = p2x2 • • • (7-5)
We choose to drop the supply-demand equations involving the foreign country's importables
and to use as numeraire the foreign prjce of the domestic country's importables, p2 . Once
again, we adopt the convention, without loss of generality, of choosing quantity units 
/ /such that P]_ = p2 = P3 = P3 = 1.
Eefore proceeding with the development of the model it may be of assistance to
the reader, for comparative purposes, if we obtain Metzler's two-commodity criterion.
Take the balance of payments equation (7*5) and rearrange it so that
P^ = X2 
P2 X1
Differentiating totally (logarithmically) with respect to a change in the tariff, p2, we
/have, where Pi = p2 = 1^
dpi = P2 _ dx^ P2
dp2 dp2 x2 dp2 xx . . .  (8 -5)
Wow, where p2 = 1 = Pi,
d(pi/p2) dP2
pi/pT  “ dPl '
so that
dPi = d(Pl/P2) P2 + 1 
dP2 P1/P2 dP2 (9-5)
Substituting in (8.5) for p2 we havedpxdp2
d(Pl/P2) P2 
P1/P2 dP2_
dX2 P2
dp2 x2
dxi P2 
dp2 Xx 1 (10.5)
The left-hand side of equation (10.5) is our measure of the rate of change in
the domestic price ratio of the internationally traded goods. If the domestic price
ratio is to remain unaltered following a change in the tariff d(pg/pi)
P2/P1
must equal zero and the right-hand side of equation (10.5) likewise must he zero.
It is possible to derive Metzler’s criterion directly from this equation. His 
formula refers to the intermediate case in which the protective and terms of trade ef­
fects of the tariff just cancel out - equality of the foreign elasticity of demand for 
exports with unity minus the domestic marginal propensity to spend on importables; if 
the elasticity is less than this critical value, the perverse case can result.3
As P2/P2 = P2/P1 j V 2./V1-) it follows that at the critical point where 
the proportionate change in P2/P2 must equal the reciprocal of the proportionate change 
in P2/Pi• Thus, in equation (10.5), the second term on the right-hand side can be inter­
preted as the foreign elasticity of demand for imports and the first term as the home 
country's elasticity of demand for imports. If the domestic price ratio does not change, 
the domestic elasticity of demand is all income effect and reduces to the marginal propen­
sity to spend on importables, C2 . Hence, equation (10.5) may be rewritten as
E n  = 1 - C2 ...
/ dxi Ppwhere E n  is the foreign elasticity of demand for imports, — - , to which, in theXi ap2
conventional Marshallian manner, a positive sign has been given. This is the Metzler 
criterion.
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One might interpret the elasticity of the above criterion in two ways: first,
as Metzler himself chose to do [16,18], as a partial elasticity measuring the proportionate 
change in the quantity of imports demanded as the result of a proportionate
TT Metzler assumes implicitly a stable international market.
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change in their price, all other prices and money income being held constant; secondly, 
as the elasticity of the foreign reciprocal demand curve from which Metzler derived it 
originally [l6,8]. The first interpretation is valid in a multi-commodity model only if 
the good is independent of other commodities in consumption and production. Such an 
assumption, however, is difficult to justify, for it is extremely unlikely that all other 
sectional price levels would he unaffected by a shift in the import price level. Thus, 
even if an accurate estimate of the foreign elasticity and of the domestic marginal pro­
pensity were available, any prediction formed on the basis of them could be seriously mis­
leading. Furthermore, even in the two-good case postulated by Metzler, a partial inter- 
/pretation of E u  as the foreign elasticity of demand for imports must assume also that all 
supply reactions are negligible - an assumption which it is difficult to sustain having 
regard to the problem studied. Nor can the total interpretation (which measures the 
change in quantity due to the change in price when all of the repercussions of general 
equilibrium adjustment have worked themselves out) be considered as satisfactory, for this 
concept is not independent of the problem under review. A total elasticity of foreign 
demand for imports assessed after a devaluation is an entirely different concept from a 
total elasticity of foreign demand for imports measured ex post facto in the event of a 
tariff increase. Both measure the ultimate response of import demand to changing and 
different sets of circumstances. To use one for the prediction of the other normally 
would be quite wrong. Such elasticities are of historical value only. Nor, if one de­
sired to predict the effect of a tariff on the domestic price ratio of the tariff-impos­
ing country, could we use a total elasticity describing the previous response of the com­
modity concerned to a tariff change, for it is only reasonable to assume that autonomous 
influences, if not the previous tariff itself, would have affected the positions of supply 
and demand schedules and the level of income throughout the economy.
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Only a prior knowledge of the partial elasticity components of the total elas­
ticity affords a sufficient basis for prediction, these components being independent of 
the particular problem studied - measuring the rate of change in a variable in response 
to a price change, all other prices and income constant. This definition remains the 
same whatever the problem. We turn, therefore, to an analysis of the components of the 
terms of equation (10.5).
First, let us differentiate the set of equilibrium equations (2.5) to (6.5) 
making use of the fact that in a perfectly competitive world Zp^dCb=0. Writing
dX.
Xij= 5p7 and 1VL = , we have
dX.l
dX2 = (X2i~02i)dp1 + (X22-O22) d-P2 + (X2 3 "0 2 3 ) ^P3 + F^dM 
dX2 = -(X21-O21) dp! - (X2 3 “0 2 s ) bp3 “ M2CIM 
0 = ( X 3 i~ 0 3 i)d p 1 + (X 32“0 3 2 )d p 2  + (X 3 3 ~ 0 3 3 )d p 3 + M3CIM 
o = (X31 -03 i)dp1 + (X33-O33) dp3 + M3CIM
dM = Oxdp! + 02dp2 + C>3dp3 + (p2- l ) d x 2  + x2dp2
/ / f t
dM = Cqdpx + Osdp3
(12-5)
(13-5)
(1^-5)
(15.5)
(16.5)
(IT-5)
Next,
i. substitute (16.5) and(l7»5) into the remaining four equations;
ii. substitute into the results for X. .-0. .=K. .-X.M., 
demand-supply substitution effect? 1'^  ^ 1
iii. for the terms (X -0.) which occur after these substitutions, substitute the 
appropriate x1,1X2^or zero as indicated by the equilibrium equations; and
iv. cancel and collect terms wherever possible.
Then,
(K2i+x1M2)dp1 + K23dp3 + [M2(p2“l)-l]dx2 = -K22dp2
(K2i-x1M2)dp1 + K23dp3 + dx2 = 0
(18.5)
(19.5)
ilk.
(K31+x1M3 )cip1 + K33dp3 + M3 (p 2 - l ) d x 2 = -K32dp2 . . .  (20 -5 )
(K3i ~Xi M3)dp ! + K33dp3 = 0  . . .  (2 1 .5 )
Our m easure f o r  th e  e f f e c t  o f  a t a r i f f  upon th e  ta r i f f - im p o s in g  c o u n try ’ s do­
m e s tic  t r a d e d  goods p r ic e  r a t i o ,  —  , i s  g iv en  in  e q u a tio n  (9 *5 ):
P2
d ( P i /p 2 ) _P2 
P l/P 2  dP2
dPl
dp2P2 - 1
w here dp2/p 2 i s  th e  p ro p o r t io n a te  change in  th e  t a r i f f .  
Or,
S o lv in g  f o r d P idp2
dP.i
dp2
d (P 2 /P l) P2 1 _ dE l
P2/P 1 dp2 dP2
o b ta in , a f t e r r e a r ra n g in g  th e  o rd e r  c
k22 K2 3 0 m2 (p 2 - i ) -1
k32 K33 0 Ms(P2“l )
0 0 K2 3 1
0 0 K33 0
(= | A | )
K21+X]_M2 K23 0 M2 (p2
K3i +Xi M3 K33 0 M3 (p2
K21 -X]_M2 0 K23 1
K31- xxM3 0 K33 0
(= |B | )
A L a p la c ia n  ex pansion  o f  jA| from  th e  f i r s t  two columns g iv e s
|A| K 3 3
K22 K2 3
K32 K33
two rows c
(2 2 .5  )
(2 3 -5a)
added to  column one and u se  h as  been made o f  th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  Zp.K. .=0, g iv e s
J 13
|B| ~ K 33
_ P 2 K 2 2 + X 1 M2  K2 3
"P2K32+Xi M3 K33
K23 M2 (p 2 “l ) -1 
K33 M3 (p 2 -1)
-K22 “X2_M2 K23
~K32- x1M3 K33
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Dividing top and bottom by K33.K33
K 2 2
K 3 2
^23
K 3 3
dpi
dp2 (23.5)
Let us pause for a moment to establish two propositions which will enable us to 
convert (25*5) into a more convenient form.
From the theory of demand we know, in a four-commodity world in which each 
country consumes and produces three commodities, that
piMi + PA  + pjMj = 1;
that
PiKii+ PkKik+ PjKij 0 '
piKki+ pkKkk+ ^ k j "  ° '
p .K..+ p K + p .K. .= 0 , 1 Ji k. jk jj
and that
Kij Kji (i,j,k=l,2,3).
As long as prices are unity initially it can be shown easily by using these 
relationships that
i
and
ii.
•n>•H•H NL -1 k %
[,1 KJJ M.3 Kjj
Kjj
Kii ij K. 1 kk
Mi K 33 K.vjk
K. . 
33 MJ
ll6.
Making use of these results in (23«5)
K 22 K 23
K 3 2  K 3 3
d p i
dp2
K 33
K22 k23
K32 K33
Xl
2^ K23
M3 K33
K23 M2(p2-1)-1
K33 M3(p2-1)
K h  kP
K31 K33
xi
m P i k '31
M3 K33
K33 K33 K33 K33 K33
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ^23  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
P 2 ^ 2 3  + X!023 + y((j)i3 + x1^13 + Xj)
where
and 7
Lii
ji
j j
1 - (M2-M3
ji
j j
K 23
K 3 3 ) ( P 2 “ 1 ) •
On conversion to elasticities and marginal propensities to spend (remembering 
that p2^l) equation (24.5) reads:
dfd _ _ 1 _ _____ 1^ 23_____
dp2 P2 1 + T|j23 + \|r23 + A(lfl3+^13)
where
and
ij
x i  ° *  s  + r  X i
11 11 v X  1 J
ij -ci + )J jj sjj
1 +  + 23(1 "  )P2
h
xi
°ji ' Sji 
0jj ' SJj
)
(24.5)
(25-5)
Substituting into (22-5) for this result we obtain
ä(pg/Pi) P2
P2/P1 dP2
1 - ______$£3____1 + 1|J23 + ^23 + M$13+^13)
1  + ^ 23 + A($13+^13)
1 + $23 + ^23 + A(U13+ll/13)
(26
which is an expression for the rate of change in the domestic price ratio p2/pi due to 
a tariff.
By setting all terms which involve the non-traded commodity to zero in (26.5),
an analogous two-commodity criterion is obtained:
n . f*'
d(P2/Pi) P2 1 + d u  -f3. -‘Xi
/
where 7\- 1-C2+C2 —  • P2
X,
^  Six) - C2Xi
P2/Pl dps 1 + sh) + ( J  cr22-C2- 52 S22)
(27
D. TWO - COMMODITY ANALYSIS
In this section the arguments for and against the appearance of Metzler's per­
verse case are examined with respect to a two-commodity world. First, his argument is 
examined and rejected on both a priori and probability grounds. Next, for the benefit 
of those readers who will not accept probability type arguments, an attempt is made to 
test empirically the conclusion reached by Metzler concerning the Australian case. Among 
other things, this emphasizes the practical difficulty of testing empirically theorems 
derived from two-commodity studies and leads to the analysis, in the next section, of the 
more complex, four-commodity result in which non-traded goods are included explicitly.
Consider the equation (27-5). As the proportionate change in p2/p2 is posi­
tive for a tariff increase, a positive movement in p2/pi, P2 rising relative to px, means 
that both sides of equation (27.5) must be positive. The absolute change in the domestic 
price ratio can be obtained by multiplying through by the proportionate change in p2/p2 .
As in other applications of the model, our international system is assumed to
he stähle. The only complication introduced hy the tariff is the term A whose influence 
upon the sign of the denominator can he neglected because, except for a very large tariff, 
it approximates to unity in magnitude. Since this term arises because of the assumption 
of a prior tariff, and since Metzler assumed free trade initially, its effect is ignored 
in the following comparison of the two formulae.
Given that the stability requirement is fulfilled, the direction of the move­
ment in the domestic price ratio depends upon the sign of the numerator. An adverse pro­
tective effect, p! rising relative to p2, requires that
—  e r f .  +  —  s '  +  c £  <  1xi ii x^  ii - C;
It can he seen that the left-hand side of this condition is the breakdown of the total 
interpretation of Metzler’s elasticity of demand for imports and that it comprises, in a 
two-good model, the sum of two substitution elasticities and a marginal propensity to 
spend on importables. Using the fact that the sum of the home country’s marginal pro­
pensities to spend must equal unity, the criterion for the case in which the tariff fails 
to protect is x7 o'i / i / /
r1 an +r1 sn  < Li ' Cl (27
For purposes of discussion, this requirement is considered most conveniently 
in two stages: the requirement that the domestic marginal propensity to spend on export­
ables exceeds the foreign, and the requirement that the excess be larger than the sum of
the foreign substitution terms.
The first requirement, which has been investigated exhaustively in the recent 
literature on the transfer problem [35;36;37]j is the traditional one for a transfer
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(e.g. a reparations payment) to turn the terms of trade against the paying country. The 
outcome of that investigation has been the conclusion that in a two-good model in which 
tariffs and transport costs are absent initially, there is no presumption that one marginal 
propensity will exceed the other; in conjunction with the fact that the foreign substi­
tution term must be positive, this would argue on a priori probability against the appear­
ance of the perverse case.
The second requirement seems unlikely to be met for three reasons:
1. the difference between the marginal propensities must be a fraction, whereas the sub­
stitution elasticities can range from zero to infinity;
2. the weights attached to the substitution terms must exceed unity in the case of the
demand elasticity and may do so in the case of the supply elasticity (particularly as 
the foreign country represents the rest of the world);
3. if the foreign substitution terms are small, high complementarity and joint supply are
indicated and it is improbable, in a two-commodity world, that these conditions would 
not extend to the other country. In turn, this implies a similarity of tastes in 
each country which reduces the difference between the marginal propensities.
The above analysis would seem to tell heavily against the likelihood of the per­
verse case appearing, yet this is not entirely satisfactory because we are arguing in ig­
norance of the real magnitudes involved. Though the odds against the Metzler effect ap­
pearing in practice are exceedingly high, the facts in a particular case could be as re­
quired: low substitutability, and a preference for its own exportables by the domestic
country. We shall digress, therefore, to examine the available facts in the Australian 
case.
Extensive use is made of the survey of international trade propensities and 
elasticities compiled recently by Hong Seng Cheng [38]• As this survey does not pretend
120.
to be exhaustive, it is possible that some relevant estimates are excluded.
For the perverse effect to operate, the rest of the -world's substitution elas­
ticities of supply of and demand for Australian exportables together must be less than 
the Australian marginal propensity to spend on exportables minus the foreign marginal pro­
pensity to spend on the same good. Table Three sets out the available data concerning 
two of these parameters, no estimates having been found for the rest of the world's sub­
stitution elasticity of supply of Australian exportables nor for its marginal propensity
to spend on these commodities. 
TABLE THREE
Estimates TimePeriod
Australian 
Marginal 
Propensity 
to Import
World Substitution 
Elasticity of Demand 
for Australian Exports
Polak [2] 1920's 0.49 -0.48
1930's 0.23 -
Tse Chun Chang [39] 1924-38 0.35 -0.66
Clark and 1920's 0.21 -
Crawford [44] 1930’s 0.25 -
Tinbergen[40] 1924-37 - -1.06*
Horner [4l] 1936-38 -2.2 (wool) 64$
-5.9 (wheat) of Australian
-3.2 (butter) Exports
Brown [43] 1954-58 - -I.69*
* As explained in the text, these estimates are derived from 
the work of Tinbergen and Brown who have no responsibility 
for this use, or misuse, of their original coefficients.
In our assessment of the probable sizes of the relevant marginal propensities
we must confront the formidable fact that marginal propensities to spend on Australian
exportables, not exports, are required. Any attempt to compute the parameters of the
criterion, which holds strictly for a two-commodity world, depends among other things on
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the extent to which non-traded commodities are classified as exportables or importables.
On a priori grounds, one might argue that the Australian marginal propensity to spend on 
its own export good is low because the majority of its exports consists of the four commo­
dities: wool, wheat, butter and meat. Yet it was to avoid such an argument from ignor­
ance that we turned to the available facts in the Australian case.
Fortunately, data is available concerning the Australian marginal propensity to 
spend on imports and, as we are arguing against the appearance of the Metzler effect in 
practice, it appears permissible to accept the most reliable estimate of the marginal pro­
pensity to spend on imports as the lover limit to the marginal propensity to spend on 
importables.
Of the estimates given, the first figure of Polak is suspect. Had he excluded 
the 1930/31 figures from his calculations, the value of the propensity would have fallen 
to approximately 0.29 [45; 1^ -]• We select the medial value of 0.25 as the lower limit to 
the Australian marginal propensity to spend on importables, which yields an upper limit 
of 0.75 tor the Australian marginal propensity to spend on exportables. Polak [2,/56yfäÜt fae^tß 
has estimated for the inter-war period a rest-of-the-world marginal propensity to allocate 
export expenditure on Australian products of 0.015. It follows from the composition of 
the Australian ’export basket’ that the rest-of-the-world’s marginal propensity to spend 
its income on the type of goods which Australia exports must be negligible. For prac­
tical purposes it is assumed zero.
The difference between the marginal propensities, therefore, has an upper limit 
of 0.75; though one would expect its actual value to be considerably below this figure.
Because of the paucity of data concerning the marginal propensities, an argu­
ment against the practical appearance of the Metzler effect must depend upon reliable
estimates of the aggregate substitution term. Unfortunately, no data are available con-
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cerning that part of it which comprises the rest-of-the-world’s supply elasticity and 
there is no alternative, in our ignorance, hut to allocate it an assumed lower limit of 
zero.
Of the estimated substitution elasticities of demand given in Table Three, those 
of Polak and Chang have attracted the most criticism. A review of the ’elasticity pessi­
mism’ of the thirties, however, would serve no useful purpose. Instead, the reader is
referred to Orcutt’s masterly article in which he provides conclusive evidence that early 
empirical studies often severely biased their estimates toward zero [46,ll8]. Typical 
of the general awareness of this bias, is a recent comment by Warren L. Smith: "it has
become increasingly apparent that studies of the international adjustment mechanism uti­
lizing time series data for the 1930's...resulted in too pessimistic a view of the price 
sensitivity of both imports and exports" [47,S 127]• Polak himself placed little con­
fidence in either his own or Chang’s estimates. Of his own he wrote, "The weakness of 
many of the price coefficients found must be acknowledged... Conclusions on the effects 
of changes in relative prices... cannot safely be drawn from the data presented." [2,65]. 
His comment on the findings of Chang was that "recent studies...make it probable that 
Chang’s findings cannot be taken as highly reliable estimates...and may be biased in the 
direction of zero." [48,20].
The estimate appearing opposite Tinbergen’s name was originally a substitution
flus fra I• t\ to total
elasticity, defined as the change in the ratio of the volume of exports caused by a change 
in the export/import price ratio. It has been turned into an export elasticity of demand 
by the application of an ingenious method first used by Harberger [42,513-16]. Though 
Polak severely criticized Tinbergen’s results by showing that income changes could account 
for a large part of what was apparently pure substitution effect, he also admitted that 
due allowance for income effects in countries exporting primary produce could increase
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the estimate because 1) the income elasticity of demand for food and raw materials is less 
than for manufactured commodities, and 2) the elasticity of supply of foodstuffs and raw 
materials is smaller than for manufactured goods L 4#, ■
Nevertheless, with no evidence to support it, Tinbergen’s estimate provides a 
precarious basis for prediction.
The work of Horner represents a more realistic attempt to come to grips with the 
problems involved. Harberger was of the opinion that Horner’s technique deserved a much 
wider recognition and, since then, V.W. Maluch has applied a similar technique to obtain 
estimates of Canadian price elasticities of export demandCSO], Working from the fact that 
demand for Australian exports is the difference between the rest of the world's demand for 
and supply of exportables, Horner estimated the separate supply and demand elasticities 
for the rest of the world. From these the price elasticity of demand for Australian ex­
ports was obtained. The reason for his method yielding individual commodity estimates so 
much higher than the aggregative estimates of Chang and Polak is due primarily to his ex­
plicit acknowledgement of, and provision for, the fact that where
the exporting country supplies a more than negligible 
part of its export market, it can be readily seen that 
the price elasticity of demand for its own product will 
be greater than the price elasticity of demand on the 
export market for the commodity in general by an amount 
dependent on the proportion of that market it supplies. 
[41,326].
This fact is also reflected in the quantity weights which appear before the elasticities 
in our formula.
Evidence in support of one of Horner* s estimates is provided by Stone [28] who
a It is noteworthy that the estimates he has derived from post-war data suggest far 
higher elasticities for Canadian exports (though admittedly only for a 35°]o sample) 
than indicated by the work of Chang.
1 2 4 .
o b ta in e d  a  p r ic e  e l a s t i c i t y  o f  demand o f  - 0 .4 l  f o r  b u t t e r  in  th e  U n ited  Kingdom in  th e  
in te r -w a r  p e r io d .  When t h i s  i s  w eig h ted  by th e  q u a n t i ty  consumed in  th e  e x p o rt m arket 
d iv id e d  by th e  q u a n t i ty  e x p o rte d  by A u s t r a l i a  f o r  th e  th r e e  y e a rs  end ing  1938* an e s tim a te  
s im i la r  to  H orner1s i s  o b ta in e d .
F i n a l l y T a b l e  Four sum m arizes a crude a t te m p t to  compute a  low er l i m i t  to  th e  
p o s t-w a r  a g g re g a te  e x p o r t e l a s t i c i t y  o f  demand f o r  A u s t r a l ia n  e x p o r ts .  E x ten s iv e  u se  i s  
made o f  e s t im a te s  g iv en  in  a  r e c e n t  a r t i c l e  by J .A .C . Brown [43] and o f  th e  te c h n iq u e  e s ­
ta b l i s h e d  by H orner.
TABLE FOUR. LOWER LIMIT FOR A DERIVED AUSTRALIAN ELASTICITY OF EXPORT DEMAND
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Commodity Time
P e rio d
U .K .Sub­
s titu t icn 
ElashcLIy 
o f Demand
R a tio  o f
U .K .
E x p o r t * , -
Australian
E xport
Demand
ELasfcLdiy
o f  Aus - 
t r a l i a n  
E x p o rts  
sold in  UK
°Jo Share o f 
t o t a l  Aus­
t r a l i a n  
E x p o rts
W eighted E la s ­
t i c i t i e s  o f 
A u s t r a l ia n  Ex­
p o r t  Demand4
B eef and 
V eal
1 9 5 U 5 8 -1 .4 8.07 11.29 81 3-6 - .41 (- .6 5 )
Lamb and 
M utton
n -1 .7 io .4 o 17.68 80 1.2 - .22 (■■33)
B u tte r 1! -O.59 5.51 3.25 85 2 .9 - .0 9 ( - . I k )
Wheat !! 2 .521 2.872 7.7 - .22 (-•35)
Wool n 3-391 1-592 V7.3 -•75 ( -1-19)
T o ta l o th e r  " O3 o3 37.3 O3
T o ta l 100.0 - I .6 9 5 (-2 .66 )
1 R a tio  o f  r e s t - o f - th e - w o r ld 's  ( i . e .  th e  f r e e  w o rld  m ark e t) consum ption to  
A u s t r a l ia n  e x p o r ts  -fo r th e  p e r io d  1936-38.
2 P r ic e  e l a s t i c i t y  o f  demand computed by H orner f o r  th e  p e r io d  1936-38.
3 Assumed.
4 Column (8) i s  d e r iv e d  by m u l t ip ly in g  column (3) by column (7) and d iv id in g  
by 100.
5 The low er l i m i t  to  th e  w o rld  e x p o rt e l a s t i c i t y  o f  demand f o r  A u s t r a l ia n  
E x p o r ts .
All figures relate to 1954-50 data except the price elasticities of export de­
mand for wheat and wool which are quoted directly from Horner’s results. It is probable 
that these have altered, though in the case of wheat there is no apparent reason why such 
a shift would be significant in either direction. The wool estimate, on the other hand, 
if it were to be brought up to date, would reflect almost certainly the appearance of 
synthetic substitutes in the textile field in the post-war period. It would appear to 
be a safe lower limit.
For the first three products the world market is assumed to be the United King­
dom. Hence, for these commodities, the estimates in column five were derived by multi­
plying column three by column four for reasons indicated above. Columns six and seven 
are self explanatory but the last column requires some comment. To obtain a single 
lower limit for an export elasticity of demand some method of aggregation was necessary. 
This was done by
1. Assuming that the remaining 37*3$> of exports had a zero demand elasticity
2. Multiplying column five by column seven and dividing by one hundred.4
4 This method of obtaining an aggregate elasticity depends on the assumption that all 
export prices move proportionately to the selected export price index.
Apart from the proportionality assumption, however, the method is open to the more 
serious objection that no account is taken of cross elasticities. Obviously, where 
two commodities are close substitutes and have high elasticities of demand the two 
facts are not unrelated. For instance, if the elasticities of demand for both lamb 
and beef were known to be large, it would be tempting to conclude that the aggregate 
elasticity of demand for meat in general was also large. In fact, the high elasticity 
of demand for beef could arise from its high substitutability for lamb, i.e. the cross 
elasticity of demand for beef with respect to the price of lamb could be high and vice 
versa. In such a case the combined elasticity would be less than either of the indivi­
dual estimates. The true elasticity would be given by a determinant comprised of the
different elasticities involved.
Despite the above objections it should be noted that the only close substitutes among 
the export commodities selected are lamb and mutton, and beef for which the cross elas­
ticity of demand given by Brown [43] is only of the order of 0.3* This would not ser­
iously affect our estimates.
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The aggregated estimate of -I.69 can he taken as a lower limit to the elasticity 
of world demand for Australian exports. One might contend that this elasticity would he 
considerably larger because
1. it is certain that there would he some elasticity of supply, especially where
long term elasticities were involved. In the case of wool and wheat Horner 
assumed these to he 0 .56 and 2.33 respectively. However, as we are concerned 
with only a lower limit, they are best set at zero;
2. as stated above, it is probable that Horner’s wool estimate would be larger if
more recent data were available;
3. in Table Four the United Kingdom has been considered as the world market for the
first three commodities. If this simplifying assumption is relaxed, the size 
of the free world market for these commodities, especially the meat products, 
would be increased considerably. This would increase the size of the weights 
and, accordingly, the elasticities;
4. finally, it is apparent that the world's demand for the remaining 371° of Aus­
tralian exports would yield some elasticity coefficient. As a portion of them 
are manufactures, it would be surprising if their average elasticity were not 
greater than that of the agricultural group. If the weighted elasticities are 
derived for only the five products listed, i.e. if in Table Four column five is 
multiplied by column seven and divided by 63, the elasticity estimates appearing 
in the brackets are obtained and these sum to an elasticity of export demand of 
-2.66 for these products.
Table Five below summarizes our results. In each case, if the sum of the 
substitution elasticity terms appearing in column one is greater than the difference bet­
ween the Australian and the rest-of-the-world's marginal propensities to consume export-
nöt
ables (column two) the perverse effect couldAoperate (column three).
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1
Table Five
2 3
Estimated. World 
Substitution 
Elasticities 
for Australian 
Exportables____
Marginal Pro- Estimates
pensities to Favour
Consume 
Australian
Exportables______  _________
Demand Supply Aust. World’s
-0.48 (Polak) + 0 is less than 0.75 - 0 Metzler
-0.66 (Chang) + 0 is less than 0.75 - 0 Metzler
-1.06 (Tinbergen) + 0 is greater than 0.75 - 0 Orthodox
-2.20 (Horner)* + 0 is greater than 0.75 - 0 Orthodox
-1.69 (Brown) + 0 is greater than 0.75 - 0 Orthodox
* Horner's lowest individual commodity estimate.
Only the estimates of Polak and Chang indicate that a tariff might fail to pro­
tect the import-competing industries of Australia. Yet these estimates are the most 
dubious, the fact that they contain a bias toward zero being no longer disputed. More­
over, 0-75 is an extreme, even ridiculously high upper limit for the Australian marginal 
propensity to spend on exportables, which is certain to be reduced considerably in prac­
tice. Further, one must remember that the rest of the world's elasticity of supply of 
exportables and marginal propensity to consume these goods, in the absence of quantitative 
knowledge, have been set at zero. These facts, in conjunction with the evidence of our 
other estimates and the earlier a priori argument, suggest that the possibility of the 
appearance in Australia of the Metzler effect is remote.
E. FOUR-COMMODITY ANALYSIS
Not only does our empirical analysis support the a priori conclusion that the
Metzler effect is unlikely to appear in practice, but also it serves to emphasize the
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inappropriateness of two-commodity analysis in a multi-commodity world. Apart from the 
fact that possibly vital relationships between traded and non-traded commodities are ob­
scured, it is difficult to see what meaning can be given to the important concept of the 
marginal propensity to spend on importables or exportables. The purpose of this section 
is to derive a result for the effect of a tariff on the domestic traded goods price ratio 
when non-traded goods are included in the model. It is emphasized, however, that this 
is merely a step towards reality; the problems that remain of aggregation and of economic 
dynamics are considerable.
quires both sides of (26.5) to be positive. Or, if the protective effect of a tariff 
is to be cancelled out exactly by a favourable terms of trade effect, both sides must 
be equal to zero.
As in the two-good case it is assumed that the international system is stable. 
This means that the denominator is negative. The direction of the change in the do­
mestic traded goods price ratio p2/px is dependent, therefore, upon the sign of the 
numerator. Ignore, for the moment, the effect of A which occurs because we have assumed 
a prior tariff to exist and which, in any case, would approximate to unity. If the per­
verse case is to occur the numerator must be positive, which requires
Let us now examine the multi-commodity criterion given in equation (26.5):
The reader will recall that the left-hand side of (26.5) can be interpreted as
the rate of change in the domestic price ratio p2/pi due to the tariff and that, as 
dp2/p2 is positive for a tariff increase, a positive movement in d(p2/p!)/(p2/p1) re­
/ /
-(fl3 + ^13) < 1 + 2^3
/ /
and, since ^13+^3 = -1, this also requires
/ /
"^13  <  ^13  “ ^13 (.27.5b)
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For purposes of discussion, this requirement is considered most conveniently 
in two stages: the requirement that the weighted sum of the domestic marginal propen­
sities to spend on exportables and non-traded goods exceed the corresponding weighted 
sum of the foreign propensities; and the requirement that the excess be greater than the 
sum of the quantity weighted foreign substitution terms.
The first requirement is identical to that needed, in the case of a transfer, 
to turn the terms of trade against the paying country when non-traded goods are allowed 
for explicitly (see page 71 above). Generally, \(r13 is the more likely to exceed \|r{3 
the greater in the domestic and the smaller in the foreign country are the respective 
marginal propensities to consume commodity one (domestic exportables) and commodity 
three (non-traded goods). Ignore, for the moment, all price substitution effects of 
the tariff and concentrate upon the induced shift in expenditure from the foreign to
the domestic country. To the extent that Ci plus C3 exceeds Ci plus C3, C2 will be
less than C2 . This means that the expenditure-reducing country (the foreign country) 
reduces its consumption of commodity two by a greater amount than the expenditure- 
increasing country (the domestic country) increases its consumption of the same com­
modity. This will tend to aggravate further the excess supply of foreign exportables 
(commodity two) due to the tariff and, consequently, to induce a further improvement 
in the domestic country's terms of trade.
Unfortunately, one cannot neglect the effects of the substitution terms.
Though it is conceivable that the increase in expenditure in the domestic country might
scarcely raise the prices of commodity one (exportables) and two (importables) the excess 
demand for them at constant prices being eliminated, in the first case, by a diversion of 
exports to the home market, and in the second case, by an increased flow of imports - it
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is impossible that the increased expenditure on commodity three could fail to increase its 
price unless complete satiety existed or there were infinite substitution possibilities 
between the non-traded and one of the other commodities (in which case they would cease 
to be separate commodities) . Similarly, in the foreign country, the reduction in expend­
iture must reduce the price of non-traded commodities.
The reader will recall that our marginal propensities to spend measure a country1s 
rate of change in expenditure upon a commodity due to a change in income, all prices being 
held constant. We have shown, however, that the price of non-traded goods must change 
relative to those of the traded goods, thus inducing a change in the magnitudes of the mar­
ginal propensities to spend. This fact explains the presence of the substitution elasti­
city weights that appear before the marginal propensity terms and leads us to the further 
conclusion that \|r13 will be the more likely to exceed \|/i3 the greater in both countries 
are the substitution possibilities between each country1s exportables and non-traded goods 
relative to those existing between each country’s importables and non-traded commodities. 
Assume, for Example, that these conditions do exist. In the domestic country consumers 
will substitute out of non-traded and into exportable rather than importable goods, thus 
increasing the marginal propensity to spend on exportables rather than the marginal pro­
pensity to spend on importables. At the same time, resources will flow to the non-traded 
goods industry from the exportable rather than from the import-competing sector, thereby in­
creasing the price of exportables. Conversely, in the foreign country, where the price 
of non-traded commodities has fallen, the marginal propensity to spend on foreign export­
ables would tend to decrease more than the marginal propensity to spend on importables 
and resources would flow to the exportable rather than to the import-competing sector.
The net effect would be an aggravated world excess supply of foreign d^portables and an 
increase in the price adjustment necessary to restore equilibrium, i.e. an augmented
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favourable movement in the terms of trade of the taxing country.
The second requirement, that the excess of the domestic marginal propensity term 
over the foreign marginal propensity term should exceed the foreign coefficient of sensi­
tivity (ljJi3) is best considered in two stages. First, conditions for a low foreign coef­
ficient of sensitivity would be ensured if:
1. the foreign own substitution elasticities of demand for and supply of importables
were low. In this case, the magnitude of the other elasticities could not affect 
materially the size of ljJi3 . Thus the rise in the world price of foreign import­
ables relative to foreign exportables as a result of the tariff would induce only 
a small transference of demand out of importables, and of resources into the im­
port-competing industry. Both of these effects would increase the size of the 
movement in the terms of trade needed to restore equilibrium. At the same time, 
it is necessary that
2. the amounts of importables consumed and produced in the foreign country approximate
in size to the volume of imports.
A priori considerations suggest that it is unlikely that the above two necessary
conditions will be fulfilled in practice. When aii and are small, it can be shown
that all three classes of goods must be complementary to one another and subject to joint
supply, a most unlikely event in a three-commodity system. For instance, if aii is very
small it means that commodity one cannot be substituted for either goods two or three, i.e. 
commodities one, two, and three
/are all consumed in fixed proportions. (An exception to this occurs where the demand for 
commodity one is completely satiated; an improbable situation in a three-commodity system.) 
Similarly, if Sii is small, commodities one, two and three will be supplied jointly. Now 
if such a strong pattern of complementarity and joint supply exists in the one country in 
a four-commodity world, it is exceedingly improbable that these conditions would not be found
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also in the other country. Yet, if this were the case, it is just the situation in which 
l+^23+^i3 would, tend to unity.5 Thus the smaller the foreign coefficient of sensitivity, 
the smaller is the difference between the domestic and the foreign marginal propensity 
terms Moreover, given that substitution possibilities are small, there is still the 
effect of the quantity weights and Oi, which are multiples of xx, to be considered and, 
as the foreign country represents the rest of the world, it is improbable that these would 
be other than large, save where the domestic country’s production of exportables consti­
tutes an exceedingly high proportion of total world output of the commodity.
Nevertheless, though the practical possibility of the appearance of the perverse 
effect seems remote, it could be less improbable than in the two-good case because, at 
the critical point, the size of the terms of trade effect needed to restore equilibrium 
is increased by the addition of non-traded commodities in the foreign country,6 the extent
5 This may be explained by looking at the two-good analogue of the situation, i.e. where 
l+'I'i3+^23 is equivalent to 1-Ci-C2, which, since Ci+C2=l in each country in a two-good 
model, equals C2-C2 . With identical tastes, C2=C2; and so C2-C2=0, and, similarly, 
1-Ci-C2=0 . In the four-good case Ci+C2+C3=l and so -\|/i3-\|/23=l; with demand and produc­
tion conditions identical -\|/i3=-i|fi3 and, therefore, l-hl/i3+\|/23=0 .
6 The reader should note that this does not mean that the introduction of non-traded 
commodities will result in a net increase in the terms of trade movement. It will be 
shown in the next chapter that in the case of the domestic country, the introduction of 
non-traded goods would tend to reduce the magnitude of the terms of trade movement. The 
net effect would depend on many factors. At the critical position, however, where the 
effect of the tariff is just cancelled out, domestic substitution possibilities do not 
influence matters. This is borne out in equation (9 -5) where, at the critical point, 
the rate of change in the terms of trade,dpx/p!, is equivalent to the rate of change in 
the tariff dp2/p2, the magnitude of the domestic coefficient of sensitivity having no 
effect whatsoever, though the domestic substitution possibilities do affect the domestic 
marginal propensity term (see p 7U* above). Generally, it can be said that the more 
^13+^13+^23 tends to minus unity (and this is the more likely the smaller ljJi3) the less 
is the effect of the domestic coefficient of sensitivity on the terms of trade. This 
point is discussed in the next chapter.
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of this reduction depending upon the degree of substitutability between the traded commo­
dities themselves and between each traded good and the non-traded commodity. In the for­
eign country, when there are only two goods, the rise in the price of importables relative 
to the price of exportables, diverts demand towards the exportable goods industry and 
diverts resources towards the import-competing industry, both of which effects reduce the 
excess supply of foreign exportables and the size of the shift in the terns of trade re­
quired to establish equilibrium. When non-traded goods are introduced, however, some of 
the transference of demand from the importable industry is absorbed in the non-traded 
goods sector, thus reducing the extent of the recovery in price of foreign exportables. 
Similarly, some of the flow of resources to the foreign import-competing industry, would 
be diverted to the non-traded goods sector, thereby enhancing the rise in price of foreign 
importables. Hence, the increase in the demand for and the decrease in the supply of 
foreign exportables would not be as noticeable as in the two-good case, with the result 
that the movement in the terms of trade would increase accordingly, increasing in turn 
the probability of the Metzler effect.
This leads us, secondly, to an interesting case in which the Metzler effect 
might operate despite high values for the foreign own substitution elasticities of demand 
for and supply of importables. The effect of these could be cancelled, or markedly re­
duced, by the presence of high foreign substitution possibilities in consumption and pro­
duction between non-traded and importable goods relative to those between importable and 
exportable goods on the one hand, and to those between exportable and non-traded goods 
on the other. A rise in the price of foreign importables due to the excess demand for 
them resulting from the tariff, could see a transference of demand to the non-traded 
rather than to the exportable sector, while resources might flow to the import-competing
industry from the non-traded rather than from the exportable sector. If these effects 
were sufficiently strong (^13 being small despite high values for (Xi/xi)oii and 
(Oi/xi) Six) the adverse shift in the terms of trade of the foreign country would be aug­
mented accordingly.
It should be noted, however, that one of the necessary conditions for a low 
foreign coefficient of sensitivity when the foreign own elasticity*of demand for and sup­
ply of importables are large, is that non-traded goods should be relatively more substi­
tutable in consumption and production with importables than with exportables, i.e. a£i 
and S32. should be large relative to 032 and S32 respectively. This condition, however, 
would increase the size of ^ 3  (see page 7J+~) and, therefore, reduce the difference bet­
ween the marginal propensity terms. Thus, even in this case, it appears extremely impro­
bable that all of the necessary conditions for the appearance of the perverse case would 
be fulfilled simultaneously in practice.
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6. TARIFFS AND THE TERMS OF TRADE WHEN NON-TRADED 
______________COMMODITIES ARE PRESENT____________
A. INTRODUCTION
Since the time of John Stuart Mill it has been generally accepted by economists 
that a tariff would improve the international terms of trade of the tariff-imposing coun­
try. This opinion is subject to the assumptions of the traditional neo-classical model
from which the result derives, and when they are relaxed considerable disagreement exists 
in the literature. In the next three chapters, it is our intention to examine the ef­
fects of a tariff on the terms of trade when
1. non-traded commodities are introduced into the classical model;
2. the government is assumed to spend the tariff revenue, and private consumption
is dependent upon the amount of this expenditure, government and private tastes 
differing;
3- there exist two representative individuals whose tastes and incomes differ, i.e. 
a disaggregated private sector.
In the last two cases the traditional conclusion regarding the direction of the 
terms of trade movement is modified, though on a priori grounds one would assume it to be 
favourable normally to the taxing country. Case (l) developed in this chapter, endorses 
the traditional result. It should be noted that until the question of an optimum tariff 
is considered the problem of equity, which involves the effects of redistributed income 
on welfare, is ignored. Our concern at present is with the direction of the shift in 
the terms of trade and not with its welfare implications.
B. THE ARGUMENT
The idea that a tariff might improve the taxing country's terms of trade was 
known to Ricardo [52,555] but was first formulated explicitly by John Stuart Mill [53;27].
1'36 .
Though Mill discounted its practical significance, this was because of real income losses 
due to decreased specialization and not, as in the case of Marshall later, due to the sup­
position that foreign elasticities would be so high as to make the improvement negligible 
[ 1 2 , .  The classicists argued that the tariff would increase the world supply of for­
eign exportables, thereby depressing the price and improving the foreign country’s terms 
of trade. Subject to their assumptions, namely two countries and two commodities and 
identical government and private tastes, this conclusion has remained unchanged.
In a recent article, however, J. de V. Graaf claimed that the traditional con­
clusion is ambiguous when additional commodities are added to the model for
In a multi-commodity world ... it does not seem possible to 
generalise about the direction of the movement in the terms 
of trade ... The crucial factors turn out to be the relations 
of complementarity and substitution existing between traded 
goods. They can turn the terms of trade in either direction[67,5« •
In support of this contention, Graaf cites Mosak [24,65'r7|whose conclusion, however, be­
cause it depends upon the manner in which the government spends the tariff revenue, does 
not prove that the classical proposition is invalid in a multi-commodity world. We turn, 
therefore, to an anlysis of this problem, proceeding from the traditional two-commodity 
case to a four-commodity model in which non-traded goods appear in each country.
C. TWO-COMMODITY ANALYSIS
The assumptions on which the classical model is based are identical with those 
given in chapter three, if due modifications are made for the presence of the non-traded 
commodities. The most important are: perfect competition and profit maximisation; two
countries and two commodities; full employment without inflation; the balance of trade 
maintained in equilibrium by the price mechanism; zero transport costs; an initial tariff 
is levied by country one, but there are no tariffs in the foreign country; either the
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tariff revenue is redistributed by the government in the form of a subsidy to a single 
representative consumer, or government and private tastes are identical.
First, in this chapter, the traditional two-commodity result is examined. 
Equation (27-5) provides us with a ready-made criterion for the rate of change in the 
terms of trade of the tariff-imposing country (country 1) if we substitute for ^ p ^ p 1 ^ 
from equation (22-5):
lPi Pi = 
dp2 p2 (1 .6)
where A=l+C2(p2/p2)-C2 and px is the international price ratio (with zero transport costs 
and no tariffs in the foreign country and p2=l). A favourable movement in the terms of 
trade means that px (the foreign price of exportables) must rise relative to p2 (the for­
eign price of importables). As the proportionate change in P2/P2 Is positive for a 
tariff increase, the left-hand side of equation (1.6) must be positive for a favourable 
movement in the terms of trade. In turn, this means that the numerator and denominator 
on the right-hand side must be of identical sign. Now, the numerator is negative unam­
biguously. Given that the international market is stable (that the denominator is nega­
tive) this means ,therefore, that the terms of trade movement must be zero or favourable 
for the taxing country. It follows that the magnitude of the movement in the terms of 
trade would be the greater:
1. the larger are the domestic substitution possibilities both in consumption and pro­
duction. Thus in the domestic country, a rise in the price of commodity two will 
see a large shift in demand to the exportable commodity and a heavy flow of re­
sources from the exportable to the import-competing industry, both of which move­
ments would increase the excess supply of commodity two and the favourable shift
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in the terms of trade;
2. the larger are the marginal propensities to consume exportables in either country.
In the foreign country, the decrease in expenditure would fall most heavily upon 
foreign exportables, thereby failing to relieve the excess supply of commodity two; 
in the domestic country, the increase in expenditure would be spent proportionately 
more upon good one, increasing both its price and the shift in the terms of trade;
3« the smaller are the foreign elasticities of demand and supply. This would reduce 
the transfer of demand from the import-competing industry whose product price has 
risen relatively due to the excess supply of foreign exportables, and decrease the 
flow of resources from the exportable to the import-competing industry. The adverse 
movement in the foreign country's terms of trade wou3.d be aggravated accordingly;
4. finally, the greater in the domestic country are the ratios of consumption and pro­
duction of importables to imports and the smaller are the same ratios in the for­
eign country. In each case, this reflects the importance of the relative size of 
the market in determining the value of the elasticities.
Consider the effect of 7\, the weight due to the assumption of initial tariffs. 
When a prior tariff exists, this term reflects the influence of the reduction in domestic 
imports upon tariff revenue and, consequently, on the magnitude of the shift in the terns 
of trade. To the extent that the increased domestic price of importables due to the 
tariff reduces the demand for them, tariff revenue levied at the initial rate will tend 
to fall. In turn, since we assume the redistribution of this tariff revenue to the pri­
vate sector, this reduction in revenue receipts will reduce further the demand for import­
ables, increasing the excess supply of them, and the subsequent shift in the terms of 
trade necessary to restore equilibrium to our international system. With no initial
tariffs,A becomes unity.
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D. FOUR - COMMODITY ANALYSIS
Consider next the addition of non-traded commodities to the model. A slight 
rearrangement of equation (25-5) gives us the necessary criterion:
ÜEl Ea = ,., taa _____ ,p ,
dp2 Pi 1 + A(l|li3+^i3) + (^23+^23) '
in which \} tJjs3_, ljji3, ^23 and ^13 are all defined as in equation (25*5) and in which the 
left-hand side is our expression for the rate of change in the terms of trade due to a 
tariff. Once more, assuming stability in the international market, it is evident that 
the movement in the terms of trade must be favourable to the taxing country, as the domes­
tic coefficient of sensitivity (^ 23) is negative,by the stability oondition-». This result 
is quite unambiguous, it supports the traditional, two-commodity conclusion while contra­
dicting Graaf* 1 2s statement that the result would be indeterminate because of complex sub­
stitution possibilities. The magnitude of the result, however, does depend upon the latter.
Of the conditions set out below for a large movement in the terms of trade of the 
tariff-imposing country, 1., 2., and k. or 5* are both necessary and sufficient.
1. That the domestic own elasticities of demand for and supply of importables should be
high. Reasons for this condition were outlined above in connection with the two- 
commodity result.
2. Additionally, in the taxing country, there must exist low substitution possibilities
between non-traded commodities and importables relative to those existing between 
non-traded commodities and exportables, and high substitutability between the 
traded commodities. These conditions would ensure that the transfer of demand 
away from importables would be to the exportable good industry and not to the non- 
traded sector where its favourable influence on the terms of trade would be less 
noticeable. Furthermore, resources would be attracted to the import-competing
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industry from the exportable rather than from the non-traded goods sector which 
would further increase the price of exportables, and at the same time add to the 
excess supply of domestic importables in the foreigninarket.
3« A further important, but not essential requirement for a large terms of trade ef­
fect is that the domestic ratios of consumption and production of importables to 
imports be high. This condition, which would be fulfilled if the domestic coun­
try consumed a large part of its production of importables, is a reflection of the 
influence of the relative size of the market upon the relevant elasticities.
4. The other necessary and essential condition for a large terms of trade effect is
that the foreign own substitution elasticities should be very small. Reasons for 
this are given above in connection with the two-good model.
5. Should these own elasticities be large, however, their effects would be modified if
the relative degree of competitiveness between non-traded and importable commodi­
ties exceeded considerably that existing between non-traded and exportable commo­
dities. In this event, resources leaving the foreign country's exportable good 
industry would flow to the non-traded sector rather than to the import-competing 
sector, and similarly, purchasing power would transfer to exportables from the non- 
traded commodity rather than from the import-competing product. The net effect 
would be reflected in a small foreign coefficient of sensitivity.
6. As in the case of the domestic country, the quantity weights could play an import­
ant though not vital role in determining the size of the terms of trade movement. 
Generally, the smaller the ratio of foreign production of importables to imports, 
the greater would be the movement in the terms of trade.
7. Finally, the reader should note the effect of the marginal propensity terms, \|/23
and \|/i3 and of the tariff weight, A- Their combined effect would not be important
in the case of a large terms of trade movement as their individual magnitudes cannot
exceed unity unless exceptional demand and supply conditions exist. Ignoring 
the movement in the terns of trade will he greater the smaller is the sum of \|/i3 
and \J/23 which means
i. the greater is the foreign marginal propensity to consume exportables_, C2,
relative to the other foreign propensities, Ci and C3; and the greater is 
the domestic marginal propensity to consume exportables, Ci, relative to the 
other propensities, C2 and C3;
ii. the greater are the substitution possibilities between exportables and non- 
traded goods relative to those existing between importables and non-traded 
commodities.
The conditions upon the marginal propensities are explained: in the expenditure-
reducing country (the foreign country) the reduction in purchasing power, given 
i. above, will fall most upon the exportable good industry while in the expendi­
ture-increasing country (the domestic country) the increase in expenditure is con­
centrated similarly upon the exportable good industry. Both effects tend to in­
crease the disparity in the international price ratio. The influence of the sub­
stitution weights upon the marginal propensity terms reflects the effect of a 
change in expenditure upon non-traded commodity prices and, via the latter, upon 
the size of the marginal propensities (see page 7U  for a full discussion of this 
point) .
Finally, it can be shown that the effect of the substitution weights in theA term 
reflects similarly the influence of a change in expenditure upon non-traded com­
modity prices and, as a result, upon the propensities themselves. Apart from 
this, the effect of A is analogous to its influence in the two-good case examined
earlier.
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D. CONCLUSIONS1
1. Our analysis, contrary to Graaf' s, confirms the traditional conclusion that the terms
of trade of the tariff-imposing country 'will improve when non-traded commodities are 
allowed for explicitly in the classical model.
2. At the same time, any assessment of the possible magnitude of the movement could not
afford to ignore the vital role played by these non-traded commodities as they will 
always reduce the value of the coefficient of sensitivity to less than the value of 
the weighted own substitution elasticities of demand for and supply of the traded com­
modity concerned and in certain specifiable conditions they could reduce this value 
drastically.
3* Even so, the explicit recognition of the effects of the quantity weights and the break­
ing up of the elasticities suggests that the magnitudes of the coefficients of sensi­
tivity need not be small.
4. The effect of the prior tariff is to increase, if only slightly, the magnitude of the
favourable movement in the terms of trade.
5. Finally, the presence of non-traded commodities would affect the size of the marginal
propensities depending upon the degree of competitiveness existing between importables 
and exportable commodities.
T Of the conclusions listed, 1. and 3* are contained in a joint paper submitted for 
publication recently [51]•
7. GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE, THE TERMS OF TRADE 
AND THE DOMESTIC PRICE RATIO
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines the effect of a tariff upon the terms of trade and upon 
the domestic price ratio of the tariff-imposing country when the government spends the 
tariff revenue instead of either returning it as a subsidy to the private sector or re­
mitting an equivalent amount of some other taxation. Because of the large number of 
variables involved a two-commodity model is developed. The sole justification for this 
is that it enables us to extend, if only slightlyour knowledge concerning the above 
problems. Obviously, the next desirable step would be to include a class of non-traded 
commodities.
Two cases are examined: first, where the government spends the tariff revenue
and neither the amount nor the form of this expenditure is a datum in private utility 
functions; secondly, where the amount of government expenditure does affect individual 
utility functions and, therefore, private demand for imports.
Where private demand is independent of the amount of government expenditure, 
the traditional conclusion is that the tariff-imposing country's terms of trade will de­
teriorate if the government's marginal propensity to consume importables exceeds that of 
the private sector by more than the amount of the aggregate private supply-demand substi­
tution elasticity for importables (considered as a total) [98, ; 64,67-8; 99.? 231]•
Furthermore, should the government marginal propensity to consume exportables 
exceed the foreign aggregate supply-demand substitution elasticity for exportables the 
tariff could reduce the domestic price of importables relative to the domestic price of 
exportables [98, ; 99^2^7]• It is my intention to question the probability of the
occurrence of these reversals in the normal terms of trade effect.
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Throughout this chapter it is assumed that only two commodities are produced 
and consumed, though where private demand is influenced by government expenditure, this 
expenditure enters private utility functions as a third commodity.
Notation is the same as in previous applications of the model except that wher­
ever confusion could arise, the public and private sectors are distinguished by the sub­
scripts G and T respectively.
B. INDEPENDENCE OF PRIVATE DEMAND
1. Where the Government Purchases its Importables in the Foreign Market 
The equilibrium equations of our model are:
equations which state that in equilibrium the world supply and demand for each commodity 
must be equal. (1.7) states that the exports of the taxing country are equal either to 
the local supply of them less government and private consumption, or to the foreign con­
sumption of domestic exportables less the foreign supply of them. Similarly, (2-7) de­
fines domestic imports as equal to the foreign supply of the good less foreign consump­
tion, or as equal to private plus government imports, while (3*7) states that private
xi = ox - xG1- xT1 = xi - 0(
X 2  =  O 2  - X 2  =  x ^ +  x G 2
*T2 = XT2 " °2 
XG2 = XG2
Mrji = O1P1 + O2P2
(l-T)
(2.7)
(3.7) 
(^•7) 
(5-7) 
(6-7) 
(7-7) 
(8-7)
M — 0]_pi + O2P2
The first four of the above equilibrium equations are our basic supply-demand
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domestic imports are equal to the private consumption of importables less the domestic 
supply of them, it being assumed that there is no government supply of importables nor 
any government consumption of domestically produced importables. Obviously, as shown in 
(4.7)j the government’s consumption of importables is equal to government imports. Next, 
there are the three expenditure-income equations (5*7) to (7*7) which define respectively 
private income in the domestic country as equal to the value of domestic production; 
government income in the domestic country as equal to tariff revenue, there being no 
tariff levied on government imports; and income in the foreign country as equal to the 
value of foreign production. It should be noted that there is no government section in 
the foreign country. Finally, equation (8-7) defines the tariff, t, as equal to the 
difference between the domestic and foreign price of importables.
As M = E p.X., one of the supply-demand equations is not independent. We choose j J J
to drop the xx equation and to use the price of domestic exportables, p2, as numeraire.
By a suitable choice of quantity units all prices except p2 (the tariff inclusive price) 
are set, initially, to unity. Thus Pi = P2 = 1.
We now proceed to differentiate totally the equations (2.7) to (^.7) remember­
ing that (P2 jNjj)j that 0 =0^(p2) and, more particularly, that it
being assumed that the government's demand for importables is a function of the price of 
exportables (our numeraire), of the foreign price of importables and of government income. 
This means that the government acts in a ’rational’ manner and purchases its importables 
in the cheaper foreign market. We have:
d*2 = dxT2+ ' ' ‘ (9*7)
dx2 = -(X22-022)dp2 - M2dM' ... (10.7)
dxT2= (XT22‘0aa)dp2 + MT2dMT ••• (H-T)
dxG2= (xG22)dp2 + MG2dMG (12.7)
d ^
dJYL
02dp2
tdxT2 + dt(xT2) 
02dp2/dM
dt = dp2 - dp2
The reader should note that to simplify the three income-expenditure equations 
use has been made of the fact that the Z p .dO . = 0. Next.
j J J
1. substitute in equations (10.7) to (12.7) for the expenditure equations 
(13.7) to (15.7) and into the resulting three equations
2. substitute ( X ^ ^ n ) = K -X^ IVL (remem^erfnS thatK^j w -^*- have no supply 
term), and for the terms (X -0 ) which arise after these substitutions, substitute the 
appropriate x^ or zero, as indicated by the equilibrium equations;
3- substitute into (10.7) for dx2 from (9-7) and into the result substitute for 
cb£g from (12.7) and for dx^2 from (1 1 .7 ); finally,
cancel and collect terms wherever possible.
After rearranging,
(13-T)
(14.7) 
(15-7)
(16.7)
(KQ22 -y-GaMc2) dp^+( K22+X2M2 ) dp2+( l+MG2t) ( K ^ 22 -xt 2Hi2 ) dps ’MG2xT2dt
dp2 - dp2
(17.7)
(18.7)
Our solution for the change in the terms of trade, dp2, due to a tariff is:
dp2
-M x G2 T2 (l+MG2t)(Ky22-xT2MT2) 
1
(KQ22 _XG2MG2 ^ + ^ )
-1
(1+MG2t) ( ^ 2 2  ~x T2MT2 ) 
1 (=|A|)
-(1+MG2t)(KT22"XT2MT2^ “ MG2XT2
(K22+x2M2) + (Kq22_XG2MG2^  + 1^+MG2t^ KT22~XT2MT2^
which, when converted into elasticities; yields
lVf.
dt
1 P2 /Xg A pj Vx2
where A= 1+CG2(p 2~P2) > 1 •
As dt is positive when the tariff increases; it is evident that the numerator 
and denominator of the right-hand side must he opposite in sign if the terms of trade are
previous applications of the model; the denominator is assumed to he negative; i.e. sta­
bility exists in the international market. The movement in the terms of trade; therefore; 
depends upon the sign of the numerator and; from inspection; our analysis appears to sup­
port the traditional conclusion that the terms of trade movement could he adverse for the 
protecting country only if the government's marginal propensity to spend on importables 
exceeds that of the private sector by more than the aggregate private supply-demand sub­
stitution elasticity. The traditional analysis; however, obscures important weighting
effects. Furthermore; the use of aggregate elasticities fails to stress the fact that
XT2two quantity weighted elasticities are involved. Moreover; the weight --- ; which must
be less than unity; would reduce the difference between the propensities.
The effect of the tariff is to increase the possibility of an adverse
If there were zero substitution possibilities in the domestic country; the con­
ditions for an adverse terms of trade movement would be:
to move favourably for the tariff-imposing country (px rising relative to p2 )• As in
terms of trade movement because A is less than P2 /P2 as long as C _ is less than unity.
VJ T  d
AC.'T2
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As A is less than p2/p2, it follows that the presence of a tariff means
that the traditional requirement that the government’s marginal propensity to spend on 
importables exceed that of the private sector, is no longer a necessary condition for 
an adverse terms of trade movement. Nevertheless, it is still essential that the govern­
ment’ s marginal propensity to consume importables should exceed the private sector’s mar­
ginal propensity to consume the same good, i.e. Mq2 > Only if the tariff rate were
high could an adverse terms of trade movement occur when the sum of the weighted substi­
tution elasticities was greater than unity. We conclude, therefore, that the possibility 
of an adverse terms of trade movement is negligible when the government purchases its im­
portables in the foreign market.
2. Where the Government Purchases its Importables in the Domestic Market
Governments do not, however, always act upon rational economic motives. For 
instance, if the tariff is intended to protect local industry, the government may give a 
lead to its own policy by purchasing its importable goods requirements from the local 
manufacturers at the tariff-inclusive domestic price.
In this case the equilibrium equations are (if we omit the xi equations):
X2 =  O2 - x2 = x,
M1 ±IJ I 11 0 H H + 02P2
m g
-P01XII
m ' II 0 H >
» 
H + C*2P2
t = P2 -
/
P2
The reader should note that private and total imports are now identical. Furthermore, 
in the domestic country, imports are defined as the difference between private plus govern­
ment consumption of importables less the domestic supply of them.
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Differentiating these equations totally and proceeding as above, a formula for 
the effect of a tariff upon the terms of trade is obtained:
dt
(XT2^ ° T 2 2 ' °2r, XG2'X2 \ 1^ 2 2 +  Xg CT2 ) ^ ÜG22+ CG2
K
(20.7)
where A (which reflects the effect of the prior tariff) = 1 - M 0t < 1 and, apart from 
minor considerations, K is defined as the denominator of (19-7)*
The principal difference between (19-7) and (20-7) is the appearance, in the 
numerator, of the quantity weighted government demand substitution elasticity and an 
additional income effect. These reflect the fact that the government's purchase of
importables is now reduced as a consequence of their tariff-induced increase in price.
At first sight it may appear that, if the domestic supply of exceeds the pri­
vate demand for importables (i.e. Xr,n > Xg), the net result of the private income effect 
may be to increase private demand for importables. A moment's reflection, however, 
indicates that this is impossible as long as the income of the government is derived 
solely from tariff receipts. We may conclude, therefore, that an adverse movement in 
the terms of trade of the tariff-imposing country is most unlikely when the government 
purchases its importable requirements in its own domestic market.
Irrespective of where the government spends its tariff revenue, the terms of 
trade, if they are to deteriorate, must do so as the result of an excess world demand for
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importables. In the first case examined, the excess demand for (or supply of) import­
ables is the net result of two effects: first, the effect of the change in tariff revenue
(the net effect of a higher rate and a reduced volume) on government demand for importables; 
secondly, the reduction in imports demanded by the private sector due to the increase in 
their domestic price. In the second case, where the government purchases its importables 
in the domestic market, the effect of an increase in the price of importables upon the 
government’s purchase of them reduces further any tendency towards an excess world demand 
for importables.
3. Effects on the Domestic Price Ratio
A criterion for the effect of a tariff upon the domestic price ratio, P2, of 
the tariff-imposing country, can be obtained also from the equations (17.T) and (18.7):
dps
dt
(KG22-xG2MG2)
+(K22+x2M2)
-M x G2T2
-1
|A|
On expanding this solution and converting it to elasticities we have:
dps
dt
P2
P2 aG22 " CG2
P2|A|
(21.7)
IAI we know to be negative and so, if the domestic price ratio is to move in a perverse 
manner, the sum of the weighted foreign substitution elasticities and the government's 
weighted demand substitution elasticity must be less than the difference between the 
government’s marginal propensity to spend on importables and the foreign marginal pro­
pensity to spend upon the same good.
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The impact effect of a tariff is to create a -world, excess supply of the domestic 
country's importables. This is caused, in the case under consideration, by the reduction 
in domestic demands as consumers substitute out of importables, by the increase in domestic 
production, and by the reduced demand for importables arising from the reduction in real 
income due to their increase in price. This excess supply of importables can be elimin­
ated only by a decrease in their price, or the same thing, by an improvement in the terms 
of trade of the taxing country. Now, a perverse movement in the domestic price ratio re­
quires a terms of trade effect which is sufficiently strong, i.e. a fall in p2 relative 
to Pi which is sufficiently strong, to eliminate the initial effect of the tariff upon 
the domestic price ratio. The determinants of the strength of this terms of trade move­
ment appear in our denominator. First, there is the foreign demand and supply substitu­
tion elasticities which reflect the extent to which a small rise in the price of domestic 
exportables (or fall in the price of importables) will induce a substitution by foreign 
consumers from domestic exportables to importables and by foreign producers from the ex­
portable to the import-competing sector. If these effects are strong the terms of trade 
shift will be small, i.e. a small shift in price will eliminate the initial excess supply 
of importables, and the likelihood of a perverse price effect will be small. In a simi­
lar fashion, though there are no supply reactions, the government's demand substitution 
elasticity will help determine the extent of the necessary terms of trade movement. Ob­
viously, its presence will reduce the size of the shift in the international price ratio 
compared with the conventional case in which the effect of the government sector is ignored. 
Secondly, there are income effects to be considered. These are three in number. There 
is the foreign income effect which arises because of the fall in price of good two: for­
eign producers real income falls and less of good two is purchased thus tending to add to 
the excess supply of the commodity and to increase the magnitude of the necessary shift
1 .^
in the terms of trade. Next, there is an income effect whereby the government's real 
income rises as the result of the fall in the price of good two. Finally, there is a 
further government income effect arising from the additional revenue derived from the 
tariff increase. This will increase further the government's consumption of commodity 
two. Both of these last effects tend to reduce the necessary terms of trade movement.
To summarize: this case, in which the role of the government is treated expli­
citly, differs from the traditional one because the government's spending of the tariff 
revenue in the world market tends to decrease the terms of trade movement and, corres­
pondingly, the possibility of the perverse case.
Where the government operates entirely in the domestic market the effect of a 
tariff upon the domestic price ratio is given by:
i E ^ f \x |ro ^
A P2 \s x2ZT CT22- - p  S22+C2 x 2_______ x2
p s |a |
(22.7)
where A=l-C (l - “ ) < 1. G2X P2
As one would expect, both the government's demand substitution elasticity and 
its income effect which arises from the fall in price of commodity two in the foreign mar­
ket, disappear from our numerator. Instead, the government is affected by the domestic
H e  f.ce oF expenditure to
tariff induced rise in importables, switching part of its/exportables, and thereby increas-
/N
ing the shift in the terms of trade.
C. DEPENDENCE OF PRIVATE DEMAND
We consider next a case in which the amount of government expenditure is a 
datum in private utility functions. Normally, one would expect the private demand for 
commodities to be influenced by not only the amount but also by the type of government 
expenditure. For instance, the demand for a commodity would be affected differently de-
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pending on whether the government’s service was complementary to or substitutable for it.
We shall assume that the composition of the government’s "consumption basket" is deter­
mined, like that of the private consumer, by relative prices. It follows that both the 
amount and the type of government consumption (or service to the community) are deter­
mined simultaneously.
Our equilibrium equations are identical to those set out for the traditional 
case (equations (1.7) to (8.7)). Once again we select px as our numeraire and omit the 
supply-demand equation involving the exportable good of the taxing country.
This time, when differentiating (totally) our initial set of equations, we obtain 
a set of equations which is identical to those given in the set (9*7) to (16.7) except 
that (II.7) now reads:
< ^ 2  = (XT22-022)dp2 + + T2<Mq (11-7)
where T2 = (cfcX^ /cflyh) is the rate of change in the private consumption of importables as- 
sociated with a change in the amount of government expenditure.
We now proceed to
1. substitute for (13.7), (l4.7), and (15-7) in (12.7); (10-7) and (11.7);
2 . substitute (9-7) into the resulting equation for (10.7) and, into this, for (12.7);
3. substitute in the remaining equations for (X. .-0 . .) = (K. .-X.M.) and, for the termsr j  a j i j  J i
(X^-0 .^) which arise after these substitutions, substitute the appropriate x^ as 
indicated by the equilibrium equations;
4-. rearrange, and cancel and collect terms wherever possible.
Then,
dxT2[l+MG2(p2-p2)]+(KG22-xG2MG2)dp2+(K22+x2M2)dp2 = -xT2MG2dt
dxT2[1-T2(p2-P2)]-(KT22-xT2MT2)dp2 = ^ 2 dt } **• 
dp2 - dp2 = dt
(23.7)
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Our solution for the rate of change in the terms of trade due to a tariff is
/
dps
dt
H-MG2(p2-p2) 0
1 -T2 ( p2 -P2) - ( -XT2MT2)
0 1
-x M T2G2
xT2T2
1
l+M^p2-p2) 0 (KG22-xG2MG2)+(K22+x2M2)
l-T2(p2-p2) ~(KT22_XT2MT2^ °
0 1 -1
H AD
On expanding these determinants from the first row, dividing top and bottom by l-T2(p2-p2) 
and converting to elasticities,we obtain:
dp2
where D2=T2p2=(dXT2/dM(0 p 2 and A=[l+CGp(p2-p2) ] /[1-D2(l-^-) ] which is > 1 as long as D2 
is positive, i.e. as long as government services are not substitutable in consumption 
for good two.
Where initial free trade exists, the criterion for the terms of trade movement, 
assuming a stable international market, is
XT2
x2
oT22 c- -- O;x2 - 0^ 2'
XT2
x2 ( d2 + cG2)
XT2
x2
The criterion differs from that developed in the case of independence (19*7) because an 
adverse movement in the terms of trade no longer requires the sum of the two weighted 
substitution elasticities plus the private marginal propensity to spend on importables 
to exceed unity: an adverse terms of trade movement could follow if government services
were complementary with importables in private consumption. However, substitution
(24.7)
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possibilities would need to be abnormally small. It is no longer possible to generalise 
about the effect of A for if government services were substitutable in consumption for 
commodity two, A could be less than unity. In magnitude, however, it would still ap­
proximate to unity.
A similar criterion, in the dependence case, for the effect of a tariff upon 
the taxing country’s domestic price ratio can be obtained from the set of equations (25*7):
1+MG2(p2-p4) "XT2MG2 (Kq22"XG2MG2)+(k22+^2M2)
1-T2(P2"P2) XT2Ts 0
0 1 -1
dt |A|
where jA| is defined as in the terms of trade solution (24.7)• An expansion of these
determinants from the first row gives, upon conversion to elasticities,
dp2
dt
x£ /
022" ^ 2 2 + 0 ^  + —  D2 24 AX2 / Xg ^ P2 (25.7)
^  |A|P2 ' '
where A is defined as in (24.7). In this case, given initial free trade (A=l), if 
importables are substitutable for government services in private consumption (D<0), a 
tariff increase could result in a perverse movement in the domestic price ratio, even 
when the difference between the foreign and the government marginal propensities to 
spend on exportables is less than the sum of the foreign substitution elasticities and 
the government’s demand substitution elasticity. If, however, an increase in government 
expenditure indirectly increases the private demand for importables (D>0), the case 
against the perverse effect holds a fortiori: the increased private demand for import­
ables accompanying government expenditure mitigating those forces which make for a strong
favourable movement in the terms of trade.
In conclusion, a comment is offered upon a recent article by R. Baldwin
[64,69-71] in which he concludes that even where the private demand for commodities is 
partly dependent upon government expenditure, the criterion for the effect of a tariff 
on the terms of trade is the same as in the traditional, independent case. In fact, the 
case analysed by Baldwin assumes a different type of dependence from our own: he assumes
that the government redistributes the tariff proceeds in kind. Given that this redistri­
bution is random with respect to tastes the effect of the ’dependence' disappears. Our 
dependence, on the other hand, stems from the fact that consumers are influenced by the 
type and amount of government consumption itself. The two concepts are thus quite dif­
ferent .
8. DISAGGREGATION OF PRIVATE DEMAND AND SUPPLY,
THE TERMS OF TRADE AND THE DOMESTIC PRICE RATIO
A. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter an attempt is made to examine the effects of a tariff on the 
terms of trade and on the domestic price ratio of the taxing country when the private 
sector of the economy no longer can be regarded as a homogeneous unit. As in the pre­
vious chapter, a two-commodity world is postulated but there are two different represen­
tative individuals. It is assumed that individual one specialises in the production of 
exportables; and that his consumption of importables comprises his own production, the 
total amount of the country's private imports, and a quantity of importables purchased 
from individual two. It follows that individual two supplies all of his own importable 
requirements. Throughout, one bar denotes individual one; two bars individual two. 
Thus,
02 — T^p2 - "^ 12
states that individual one's supply of importables, 02, is equal to his consumption, 
minus his imports, x^. It should be noted that individual one's imports, x^2, can be 
subdivided into his imports from abroad, x^, (which are equal to the country’s total 
private imports) and into the amount of importables purchased from his fellow citizen, 
xT2, Similarly,
Ö2 = X2 + x^2
states that individual two's supply of importables is equal to his consumption of them 
plus the quantity supplied to individual one. In other words, the import-competing sec 
tor of the economy does not contribute to the country's demand for imports.
E. DEPENDENCE OF PRIVATE DEMAND
The more complex case in which private demands are related functionally to the 
amount of government expenditure is considered first.
The equilibrium set of equations are:
x2 = o4 - X2 = xT2 + xQ2 (1.8)
^ 2 = XT2 " °2 (2.8)
xrp2— ^2 - (3.8)
XT2= XT2_ XT2 (1.8)
XG2 = XG2 (5-8)
xi = xi - xi - XG1 (6.8)
xi = - XT2 (7.8)
xi = ^T1 " ^T1 (8.8)
xi = xi - °i (9-8)
t = p2 - P2 (10.8)
Mrp = ÖiPi + Ö2p2 (11.8)
MT = 5lPl + ö2p2 (12.8)
MG = tXT2 (15-8)
M 7 = OiP! + 02p2 (11.8)
These are identical to the set of equations (1.7) to (8*7) if due allowance is 
made for the fact that there are now two representative individuals. This time, the 
price of the taxing country’s exportable commodity, px, is selected arbitrarily as numer­
aire and we choose to drop the supply-demand equations involving good one. If we remem­
ber that our demand functions for the taxing country are of the form =X^(p2,M^,MG), a 
total differentiation of the equations (1.8) to (5*8) and (10.8) to (l4.8) gives
= dxT2 + dxQ2 (15.8)
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dX2 — ~(X22“022)lP2 _ M2IM
(^T22 2 2 ) ^ 2  + Hp2d^T + ^ >dM,
c^ -T2 = - (X,T22-0ai)lp2 - HjgdM.j, - T2u .q,dM
^ 2
dx„„
dx. ^ 2
XG22dp2 + MG2dMG
dp2 - dp2
dMj = Ö2dp2
dS^ = 52dp2
dMQ = tdxT2 + x^dt
dM7 = 02dp2
(16.8) 
(IT-8) 
(18.8) 
(19.8) 
(20.8) 
(21.8) 
(22.8) 
(23.8)
(24.8)
(25.8)
where T and T are defined as in the last chapter.
We now proceed to:
1 . Substitute in (l6.8) for (15.8) and into the result for dx _ from(20.8);\J<d
2. Subtract equation (l8.8) from (17.8) and to substitute in the result for (dx^-dx 2)
from 0 19.8).
T h is  g iv e s :
dxT2+XG22dp^ +MG2dMG = _ ^X^2 " ° ^ 2 ^dp^ ' M^ dM/ • • •  (2 6 .8 )
dxrp2 = (XT22-0 2 2 )dp2+MT2c3MT+T2dMG+ (^ T22-^ 2 2 ) d p s + i ^ d M ^ f s ^  . . .  (2 7 -8 )
d t  = dp2 - dp2 . . .  (2 8 .8 )
^  =  Ö2dp2 . . .  ( 2 9 .8 )
dMrp = 0 2dp2 . . .  (3 0 .8 )
<3MQ = td x T2 + XT2d t  (3 1 -8 )
dM/ 1= 0^dp2 . . .  (3 2 .8 )
Finally, substitute for (29*8) to (32.8) in (26.8) and (27.8) and, into the 
resulting equations, for(X. .-0. .) = (K. ,-X.M;) and for the terms (X.-0.) which arise
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after these substitutions, the appropriate or zero as indicated by the equilibrium
equations. Rearranging, and cancelling or collecting terms wherever possible, we have
dxT2 + (KG22“XG2MG2^dp^ + MG2tdxT2 + (K22+X2M2)dP2 = _xT2MG2dt
dxrp2_ (KT22+^T22"XT23^r2+XT2^T2^dp2"t^ 2+^2^dxT2 = (Ts+f^x^dt
dp2 - dp2 = dt
/Our solution for the change in the terns of trade, p2, is
0 "xT2MG2
l-(T2+f2)(p2-p2) -(^22+^22 "xT2Hr2+xT2^T2^ (T2+^2)xt2
, / 0 1 1 dps
dt
(33-8)
!+MG2(p2“p2)
(3^-8)
1+MG2^P2_P2) (Kg22 ~XG2MG2 ^+ ^k22+xsM2)
1-(T2+T2)(P2-P2) ■(KT22+KiT22'"xt2MT2+XT2MT2) 0 H A D
0 1 -1 
An expansion of these determinants from the first row yields, after division of the expan­
sion by l-(f2+?2)(P2-P2):
1+MG2^P2"P2) 
1-(t2+T2)(P2-P2)
[ ^ ^22^^^22~xiji2^ iji2"^xiji2Plj-i2’*"('i'2“'“li'2) xip2  ^_xip2^ G2
1+MG2^P2 P 2 )
[KT22+KT22"XT2^T2+XT2MT2 ^ + ( KG22"XG2MG2 ^+ ( K22+x2M2)1-(t2+T2)(P2-P2)
On conversion to elasticities and marginal propensities to spend we obtain:
c[P2;
dt
- A ^T2« _ £2- 02=oT22 ~~^ T22~ „ S22_ Z^22~ -y UT2X2________Xp________ Xp____ X2______ Xp ~LC~
+ + (Cp+Bp )^2 )- ^ 2
Cmo+ x2 CT2
x2
where A=
—  j - i_ —  02~ O20
®122+^ r aT22- ^ 2 2 "  — S22
b:
x2 / x2 G2^ (35.8)
T2_ ,^T2
x2
T2€^ij2+
1+Cg2(P2_P2)
i-(d2+B2)(i-E£)
x2 -  x2 -  x2^ )  + ^ (®G22-Mg2)^|^c'^2- ^ S^+Cs^f
is positive in sign and either slightly in excess of or less
than unity(depending upon the sign of f>2 and D2).
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Disaggregation of the private sector in the tariff-imposing country introduces 
new complications. If as a result of income or taste factors the marginal propensities 
to consume importables of our two individuals differ, an alteration in the domestic price 
of importables will affect the real income distribution between them. Furthermore, each 
of our representative consumers is also a representative producer who owns a collection 
of the factors of production. Unless each producer holds these factors in the same pro­
portions, the change in relative factor prices that follows the product price change must 
affect the income earned by each individual.
It is assumed that individual two (double-barred) owns a greater proportion of 
the factors engaged intensively in the import-competing industry and that his imports are 
zero. It follows that the net effect on his real income must be positive, the losses in 
consumption being more than compensated by the gains in production. If it should hap= 
pen that he has a larger marginal propensity to spend on importables than does individual 
one, the total income effect may be positive; the necessary condition for this being 
that individual two* s consumption of importables should exceed that of individual one by 
more than the amount of the country's private imports.
If the total income effect were positive it could exceed the negative sum of 
the elasticities, thereby causing an adverse movement in the terms of trade. Our for­
mula confirms this line of reasoning. Ignore for the moment all the D terms, which re­
flect the government's influence on the private demand for importables, and our A term 
which reflects part of the influence of the prior tariff . It is no longer necessary 
that the government's marginal propensity to consume importables should exceed that of 
the private sector for an adverse movement in the terms of trade to occur, this could hap­
pen even where both of the private propensities exceed the public one as long as the in­
dividual with the highest marginal propensity to consume importables is also a net supplier
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of these commodities to the other individual. Once again, there is ambiguity concerning 
the effect of the prior tariff. If government services were substitutable for importables 
in consumption, A could be less than unity.
When allowance is made for the partial dependence of private demand on public 
expenditure the D terns also must be considered. Their appearance could reduce the im­
probability of an adverse terms of trade movement (except in the case of strong comple­
mentarity between private consumption of importables and government services) but other­
wise no modifications of our analysis are necessary.
A solution for the effect of a tariff upon the domestic price ratio of the tax­
ing country, p2, can be obtained also from the set of equations (33*8):
l+MG(p2-P2) "xT2MG2 (^ G22-XG2MG2 )+ ( K22+X2M2)
1-(T2+T2)(P2-P2) (T2+T2)xT2 0
, 0 1 d-P2 = ________________________
dt
|A|
where jAj is defined as in (3^.8). On expansion and conversion to elasticities, this 
yields, when the presence of the A term is ignored,
(37.8)
where K is the denominator in (35-8) which is negative. The shift in the domestic price
ratio is governed, assuming stability, by the sign of the numerator. Imagine, for the
moment, that the demand of the private sector is uninfluenced by government expenditure, 
the D terns equalling zero. In this case the criterion is identical to that given for 
the aggregated case by the numerator of equation (21.J ) , the reason for this being that 
that the domestic distribution of income would be unaltered as long as the domestic price
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of importables were unchanged. Some modifications appear when allowance is made for the 
fact that government expenditure can influence private demands. For instance, if govern­
ment services are substitutable for importables in the consumption of both individuals, 
the case for a perverse effect would be strengthened, the increased demand for exportables, 
as a consequence of government expenditure, increasing the favourable movement in the terms 
of trade of the taxing country.
C. IEDEPEFIENCE OF PRIVATE DEMAND
Let us consider next the effects of disaggregation when the government redis­
tributes the tariff revenue as a subsidy, or where an equivalent amount of taxation is re­
mitted elsewhere in the economy and the government’s substitution demand elasticity and 
marginal propensity to spend on importables are identical to a weighted average of those 
of the private sectors.
Once more, individual two is a net supplier of importables which means that in­
dividual one is responsible for all of the country's imports. Thus we examine the case 
in which the import-competing sector of the economy is more than self-sufficient with 
respect to the goods it produces.
The equilibrium of our system is described by the following equations:
XX = Xjl-X! = 0(-Xi (39.8)
Xi = 0± -Xi. (4o.8)
Xi = Xi-Cq (Ui.8)
X2 = 0 2 “X 2  = X2”X2 (42.8)
X2 = X 2 “0 2 (43.8)
x 2 = O 2 - X 2 (44.8)
M = Ö 1p 1 + 5 2P 2 + K t X 2 (45.8)
M = 01p1+02P2+Ktx2 (46.8)
m ' = 0(p!+02p2 (47.8)
t = p2 - p2 (47.8a)
The reader should note first, that the constants K and K refer to the propor­
tions of tariff revenue redistributed to individuals one and two respectively and, 
secondly, that the subscript T;which was used to denote the private sectoryis no longer 
necessary as the government sector is not included explicitly.
As one of the two supply-demand equations is implied by the fact that Z p JL=M,
i
we choose to omit the equations involving the taxing country's exportable commodity.
Pi is selected arbitrarily as numeraire. Differentiating the remaining independent 
equations totally we obtain:
dx2 = -(X22-022)dp2-M2dM (48.8)
dx2 = dx2 - dx2 (49.8)
dx2 = (X22-522)dp2+M2dM (50.8)
dx2 = -(X22-022)dp2-M2dM (51.8)
dM = Ö2dp2+Kx2dt+Ktdx2 (52.8)
al = Ö2dp2+Kx2dt+Ktdx2 (55-8)
<M' = 02dp2 (54.8)
dt = dp2 - dp^ (55.8)
Next,
1. substitute for (52.8) to (54.8) in (48.8), (50.8) and (51.8);
2. substitute for dx2 and dx2 in (49.8);
3. substitute (K. .-X.M.) =(X. .-0..);ij 3 i 13 iJ
4. substitute for the terms (X^-0^) the appropriate x^ or zero; 
5- cancel and collect terms wherever possible.
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Then we have:
) dp2 = 0
dx2-(K22+K22-X2M2+X2M2) dp2“ (KM2+KM2) (t dx2) — (KM2 KM2) (x2dt) 
dp2 - dp4 = dt
The solution for the change in the terms of trade, p 2 , is:
1 0 0
1 “(P2“P2)(KM2 +KM2 ) -  ( K22”*"K22 “X2M2+X2M2 ) x 2 ( KM2 +KM2 )
dps 0 1 1
dt 1 0 K22"tX2M2
1- (P2 -P2)(KM2 +KM2 ) -  (K22'^‘K 2 2 ”X2M2'tX2M2) 0
0 1 -1
H A I)
(56.8)
(57.8)
On expanding these determinants and converting the result to elasticities and marginal 
propensities to spend we have:
dp^
dt
- ( ^ 022+ ^ Ü 22- \X2 X2 ^  X2
 ^2a X2 n , ^  ri22“  b22“  ~ l2+  “ U2 x2X2 23X2 (kc2 + KC2)
^ 2 S +  ^ O S S -  ^ § 2 2 -  ^ S 22- ^ C 2+ ^ 02x2 X2 jfs22+c^
P2
P2
(58.8)
where A=1-(KC2+KC2)(l-— ) is less than unity.P2
As one would expect, the manner in which the tariff revenue is redistributed 
influences the demand for importables when the private marginal propensities to consume 
importables differ. If, in the special case considered, individual two, who is a net 
supplier of importables, has the larger propensity to consume and receives the larger 
share of redistributed tariff proceeds, the traditional conclusion that the terms of trade 
must move in favour of the tariff-imposing country is valid no longer, i.e.
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^ C 2- ^ C 2 - icc2 - KC2 could, be I 0 . x2 x2
Furthermore, if individual two is not a net supplier of importables_, both in­
dividuals consuming imports, the traditional conclusion still could be reversed if the 
individual with the higher marginal propensity to spend on importables finds that his 
share of the tariff proceeds is larger than the proportion of the initial quantity of im­
ports that he consumes.
Finally, the solution for the effect of a tariff upon the domestic price ratio 
of the tariff-imposing country is obtained from the set of equations (56.8):
1 0 
i-(p2-p2) (km2+km2) x2(KM2+KM2) 0
0 1 - 1dpg
dt
|A|
where |Aj is defined as in (57-8). Expanding these determinants and converting the so­
lution into elasticity form (but ignoring the effect of the prior tariff) we have:
c7) - (KC2+SC2)
K22+x2M2
dps
dt (59.8)
where K is the same as the denominator in equation (58.8). In this case, the possibility 
of a perverse movement in the domestic price ratio would be increased if the individual 
with the smaller marginal propensity to spend on importables received the larger portion 
of the redistributed tariff proceeds as this would increase the demand for Exportables 
and augment the terns of trade movement.
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9« THE PROBLEM OF AN OPTIMUM TARIFF 
A. INTRODUCTION
The notion of an optimum welfare tariff has received considerable attention in 
literature dealing with the pure theory of international trade. It is possible, though 
in a somewhat arbitrary manner, to isolate three separate strands of thought. First, 
there is the problem of defining an optimum ’welfare’ tariff with its attendant problems 
of equity and of impaired efficiency in resource allocation. Next, if one accepts the 
notion of an optimum tariff the problem arises of possible retaliation by the other coun­
try. Finally, there is the much debated speculative question concerning its probable 
size.
Inevitably, these issues overlap but for purposes of discussion an attempt is 
made to review them briefly and separately in Section B. Priority is given to the last 
aspect because our subsequent analysis provides a priori evidence which modifies Kahn's 
recent conclusion "that the optimum tariff will often be far from being 'small'" [11, 
17-18]• It should be noted that our argument against his belief in a large optimum tar­
iff is a theoretical one which contrasts with the more practical objections of Little 
[55] and Graaf [6l] who, for the most part, did not seek to refute Kahn's statement but 
rather to show the practical problems that an optimum tariff policy would encounter. 
Section C develops, for the two and four-commodity cases, alternative optimum tariff cri­
teria in which the explicit appearance and definition of all variables is seen as a con­
siderable improvement upon other formulations. In Section D the analysis extends to the 
more complex four-commodity world which includes a class of goods in each country that 
does not enter into international trade. Finally, in Section E ,the model is compared 
with the traditional Kahn-type formula.
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B. A REVIEW OF SOME ASPECTS OF OPTIMUM TARIFF THEORY 
1. The Notion of an Optimum Tariff
So far no attempt has been made to discuss the possible welfare effects of a 
shift in the terms of trade as the result of a tariff, the analysis in chapter six estab­
lishing merely the direction of this shift. Two separate income distribution effects 
are discernible. First, an import tax will affect favourably the terms of trade of the 
tariff-imposing country thereby effecting a distribution of real income from the foreign 
to the domestic country. Secondly, by its effect upon the demand conditions for each 
country's produce, a tariff may alter the distribution of real income as between one group 
of citizens and another within the taxing country; similarly, in the foreign country. 
Generally, the notion of an optimum 'welfare' tariff has excluded this second category of 
real income effects from consideration by assuming that each country follows a definite 
social welfare policy, i.e. maximizes a given social welfare function. Thus its prepar­
edness to trade under different conditions is represented by a pattern of community indif­
ference curves (or surfaces) which is assumed to have the properties of convexity and non­
intersection.
We consider first the redistribution of income between countries.
a . Redistribution of World Income
Ignoring the redistribution of income as between different economic groups in 
the taxing country, one can discern two effects, one favourable to, the other unfavour­
able to the welfare of the country. On the one hand, the volume of trade is reduced 
normally, and gains from the international division of labour are sacrificed. These 
losses appear both in consumption and production where misallocation effects arise from 
the disparity in the domestic and international prices of the imported commodity. On the 
other hand, the country benefits from the improved ratio of exchange. When the gain
derived from a small increase in the tariff is offset by the losses incurred, the tariff 
is at an optimum. In terms of the familiar offer curve analysis this is the point where 
the foreign offer curve touches the highest indifference curve of the tariff-imposing 
country.
More precisely, in a two-commodity world, this is where the marginal rate of 
transformation of one commodity into the other, through international trade, is equival­
ent to the marginal rate of substitution between the two commodities in the domestic mar­
ket. Since the latter is equal also to the domestic exchange ratio, it follows that 
the optimum tariff will be where the marginal rate of transformation of one commodity into 
another, through foreign trade, is equal to the domestic exchange ratio [5^,273-78] •
b . Redistribution of National Income
Consideration of the effects of income redistribution within the tariff-imposing 
country introduces the thorny problem of equity and the concept of an optimum tariff loses 
its precision and ceases to be an operational concept. The alteration in domestic re­
lative prices and in the distribution of the tariff revenue causes different individuals, 
as producers or consumers, to incur a loss or a gain in real income and the problem arises 
of comparing one person's loss with another's gain.
Kaldor was the first to acknowledge this difficulty [56]. He admitted that 
positions of constant real income for the community as a whole need not imply that the 
real income of each individual be unchanged. Nevertheless, he argued that one might con­
sider the real income of the community constant if those who benefited from the change 
could compensate exactly those who lost, leaving aggregate real income unchanged. In the 
event of a surplus gain, the tariff couldbe regarded as efficient from the national view­
point .
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Compensation being unpaid, however, it is conceivable that the community might 
suffer a real income loss in the post-tariff situation [5.^ ; 71-79]• To meet this criti­
cism of the Kaldor criterion, Scitovsky added the additional requirement that it should 
not be possible for the potential losers to bribe the potential gainers into remaining in 
the free trade position, without thereby losing more than they would in the post-tariff 
situation [3^ -]• Little [55] objected strongly to this amended version of the Kaldor cri­
terion, emphasising that potential gains and losses were not proper measures of the ade­
quacy of a tariff. One should compare the actual post-tariff distribution of income 
with that of the pre-tariff situation and select the more 'beneficial' of the two. In 
fact, this is what a government attempts to do. At this juncture, however, the econo­
mist can proceed no further and must await the decision of the politician on the aspect 
of equity. Meade [54;77-79] points out a further difficulty. Given that the post-tariff 
situation with compensation to be paid appears as the most desirable both on equity and 
efficiency grounds, can we be certain that the method of achieving the compensation will 
not itself lead to inefficiencies which would make the pre-tariff position the preferable 
one? Unfortunately, there is no clear-cut answer to this question - it would depend upon 
the particular circumstances of each situation.
2. Retaliation
As no contribution is made in this chapter to the theory of tariff retaliation, 
only a brief account of the principal conclusions is given. Kaldor [56,377-00] first 
acknowledged the possibility of a country gaining from the imposition of a tariff even 
when retaliation occurred. Despite this acknowledgment, however, economists continued 
to assume that all countries would lose unambiguously in the event of a tariff war [3^ ; 
50,272-3; 59;195] • Recently, this argument was challenged first, by Marsh [60,320] and
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later, more elaborately, by Johnson [17,31-61] who demonstrated that under certain condi­
tions a country could gain from the imposition of a tariff even in the event of retaliation.
This conclusion has important practical implications. Scitovsky, in his cele­
brated article [3^ -] contended, on the basis of the optimum tariff argument, that world 
free trade would not follow automatically as the result of economic self-interest but that 
it would need to be enforced by international agreement. In an enlightened world, there­
fore, in which every country suffered from trade restriction, one might expect interna­
tional accord to be forthcoming readily. But, given that certain countries might gain 
real income despite retaliation, some incentive would need to be offered them in the way 
of a real income transfer before they would consent to a re-adoption of the free trade 
situation.
3. The Probable Size of the Optimum Tariff
That a tariff might improve the terms of trade of the tariff-imposing country 
was conceded even by such an arch-priest of orthodoxy as Ricardo [52,556]. The practical 
importance of this possibility, however, was discounted severely. As price effects were 
considered to be large, it was believed generally that losses due to decreased specialisa­
tion would all but cancel any limited gains arising from the slightly improved ratio of 
exchange. First Mill and later Marshall were to add their support to this opinion of 
Ricardo [53^27; 12, ^ 4&] thereby indicating that the optimum tariff would be a small one.
Of the neo-classicists only Edgeworth and Bicksrdike sounded a warning note. Though both 
believed that the optimum tariff would normally be small, each hinted that it could be 
large. Edgeworth was inclined to treat this as a theoretical rather than a practical 
possibility [15,3^3] but Bickerdike was once of the opinion that “rather strong asumptions 
have to be made as to the elasticity of foreign supply and demand if the rate of tax 
affording maximum advantage is to come below ten per cent" [57>101].
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A recent article by Kahn seeks to revive this conclusion of Bickerdike. Into 
the criterion which he develops, he substitutes assumed numerical estimates of the para­
meters, concluding 'that the optimum tariff will often be far from being "small", and in 
the case of some countries (large countries and countries which are idiosyncratic in the 
nature of their exports or imports) the optimum tariff will be surprisingly great' [11,17-18]. 
The remainder of this chapter is concerned with this statement and with the methodological 
implications of the analysis from which it derives.
It should be noted that whereas we dispute the fact that the optimum tariff 
need normally be large, others have indicated the practical difficulties of applying a 
large tariff. They do not, however, query the a priori reasoning which led Kahn to his 
conclusion. Little [55] points out that the elasticity coefficients of the formula are 
themselves related functionally to the tariff. Thus, though a large tariff might be in­
dicated, this element of uncertainty could lead to the imposition of too large a tariff 
and to a decrease in real income. Hence, Little counselled a small rather than a large 
tariff because of the uncertainty of the result. That the potential gain could be negli­
gible despite the size of the tariff emphasises his advice.
Graaf [6l], on the other hand, argued that a correlation might be expected bet­
ween the incidence of the tariff and the existence of monopolistic elements in the eco­
nomy, in which case the mal-effects of impaired resource allocation would need to be de­
ducted from the potential gain.
We turn now to the development of alternative optimum tariff criteria.
C. ALTERNATIVE OPTIMUM TARIFF CRITERIA
In this section alternative optimum tariff criteria are developed for two and 
four-commodity cases in which the usual assumptions apply: full employment, perfect com­
petition, a balanced balance of trade, each country maximizing a given social welfare
173.
function, the government redistributing the tariff revenue to the private sector so that
the distribution is random with respect to tastes, etc.
We shall develop first the four-commodity criterion. Consider the set of
equations (1.5) to (6.5) which are the basic equilibrium equations of the model. Since
M = Z p .X . a balance of payments equation is implied:
J J
P1X1 = P2X2 ... (1.9)
As in other applications of the model quantity units are selected so that Pi=p£=P3=p£=l 
and P2 is chosen arbitrarily as the numeraire. Bearing this in mind, let us differen­
tiate (totally) equation (l.9) with respect to a change in the tariff, t:
dpi dx-
it + it
dX2
dt (2.9)
From our assumptions, it follows that this equation must be satisfied at all times.
Wow, a necessary condition for the optimum tariff is that welfare (given a de­
finite social welfare policy which assumes the maximisation of a social welfare function) 
should be maximised. This will occur when the marginal rate of substitution between 
goods in domestic consumption is equivalent to their marginal rate of transformation into 
one another as the result of foreign trade. As these two points must lie concurrently 
on the foreign offer curve (or surface) it follows that both will be equal to the slope 
of the tangent to the curve at that point. Moreover, as the domestic exchange ratio 
between the commodities is also equivalent to the marginal rate of substitution between 
them, it must also equal their marginal rate of substitution into one another through 
foreign trade. Thus, at the optimum point, the sum of the domestic prices times the 
change in quantities of imports and exports respectively must cancel out:
g - - P, I* - <P.D ■■■ (3.9)
where t=(p2-P2) = (P2~l) is the tariff.
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Substituting for (3-9) in (2.9) we obtain:
v +n+t^22. =1 dt '1+t)dt dt
from which it follows that:
t = dpi/dt 1dx2/dt
If the tariff is to be at an optimum this condition must be satisfied. From the deve­
lopment of the model in chapter five, in which pg was used as numeraire, it is possible 
to substitute for the expressions dpi/dt and dx2/dt, solutions in terms of elasticities 
and marginal propensities to spend. — i ( = is given in equation (25-5) but it is
necessary to obtain the solution for (= -r-^=-) from the set of equations (18.5) toat ap^
(21.5):
dx2
K 2 1 + X 1 M 2
K 3 1 + x l M 3
K 2 1 - X 1 M 2
K31-X1M3
d
K23
K33
0
0
K23
K33
“ k 22 
- k 32 
0 
0
Hh)
dt
|B|
where |b | is defined as in (23-5a)- We now proceed to:
1 . add column two and column three to column one in |A| and |b | respectively and to make
use of the fact that Z p.K..=0 to simplify the resulting expressions;
j J 1J
2 . interchange columns two and four in |A|;
3- expand j A | and j B | from the first two rows according to Laplace;
4. divide top and bottom by K33K33 and convert the resulting expressions into quantity-
(^•9 )
weighted elasticities and marginal propensities to spend.
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Then,
Ixg _ ^23(^23-^23)________
P2 ^ 2 3 _t~t23+A(llJ23-^23)
/
where A= l+\|/2 3(l- — ) .P2
Making use of the fact that l|J23=tjJi3 and that ^23=“l“^i.3 we can rewrite (5*9):
(5-9)
1X2 = 2^ 2 1T23 (^13+1+^13)
dt P2 l+^23+ 2^3+A(l}Ji 3+^ia) (6-9)
Substituting for (6 .9) and (25*5) in (4.9) provides us with a four-commodity criterion 
for the optimum tariff, expressed in terms of quantity weighted elasticities and marginal 
propensities to spend:
- f i 3  - ^ 1 3  - 1 (7*9)
If all terms involving non-traded commodities are set to zero an equivalent two-commodity 
criterion is obtained:
1 ____________
- ^ ü i i +  ^ 6 £ i + Ci - 1Xi X!
(8-9)
For the remainder of this section we shall analyse this more simple criterion.
The optimum tariff is indicated by the quantity weighted magnitude of the elas­
ticities and the marginal propensity to spend. For example, at the optimum point if the 
value of these were two, p2 must be twice the size of P2 and the tariff would be one hund­
red per cent. Table Six relates different hypothetical values of the weighted partial 
elasticities and the marginal propensity to spend to corresponding optimum ad valorem
tariffs. These results may be checked by substituting into the formula.
TABLE SIX
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TARIFF RATES AND THE CORRESPONDING ELASTICITY VALUES REQUIRED
Aggregate value of the weighted Tariff
partial elasticities and propen­
sity to consume________________
1.50 200
2.00 100
3-00 50
5-00 25
7.66 15
11.00 10
21.00 5
If, on the one hand, the value of the existing tariff should he less than the 
value of the right-hand side of the formula, an increase in the tariff would he the cor­
rect policy. As the elasticities and the amounts traded would not necessarily remain 
constant following the change in the tariff, a recalculation of the elasticities and an 
adjustment in the tariff would he necessary.1 The larger the initial values of the elas­
ticities, the smaller the optimum tariff and the smaller would be the probable change in 
the elasticities and the adjustment required. On the other hand, where the Idft-hand
side of our formula sums to more than the value of the reciprocal of the elasticities and 
the marginal propensity to consume minus one, a decrease in the tariff would he the ap­
propriate policy.
i--------
This point is relevant to the criticism of Little and Graaf [55>70^6l,56-7] that as 
the elasticities of the optimum tariff formula are related functionally to the height of 
the tariff only the roughest of approximations would he yielded by such a formula. Hence, 
they argued that as too large a tariff could decrease welfare, a small tariff would he 
preferable. Assuming, however, that demand functions were reasonably continuous, a good 
approximation would he given - even in the case of a large tariff. In fact, there seems 
to he no reason why a few minor adjustments would not give a close approximation to the 
optimum position, more especially because each successive adjustment would mean smaller 
and smaller second order differences. It is conceded, however, that one might generally 
expect demand elasticity to vary inversely with price thus causing a series of oscilla­
tions from high to low tariffs dampening to the optimum tariff.
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It should be noted that Johnson [IT,58] has derived ingeniously from the foreign
offer curve an optimum tariff formula that is similar to our own: namely that the tariff
will be at an optimum when the tariff rate (p2~l) is equivalent to the reciprocal of the
exp tesseU
foreign total elasticity of demand for imports^as a function of the barter terms of trade cue.
This total foreign elasticity of demand is derived from the elasticity of the foreign 
country’s offer curve.2 Our result may be derived roughly from this formula for, in a 
two-commodity world, Johnson’s total foreign elasticity of demand for exports comprises 
substitution elasticities of demand and supply and a propensity to consume.
There are several reasons why we have not derived our criterion by an extension 
of this apparently more simple technique. First, the answer is not intuitively obvious 
nor does it follow logically from geometric exposition. In particular, the effect of 
the quantity weights is obscured unless the more tedious algebraic method is used. Secondly, 
and most important, is the fact that even the most careful dissection of an offer curve 
(or surface) would fail to yield the complex four-commodity result presented in the next 
section. Finally, in its total form, the Johnson formula is vulnerable to the criticism 
that it is expressed in terms of parameters which are not independent of the problem studied 
and about which there is no knowledge either qualitative or quantitative.
D. FOUR-COMMODITY ANALYSIS
Consider the criterion:
t 1
" fl3 - ^13 ~ 1
(7-9)
From the formula it can be seen that if the foreign coefficient of sensitivity and ^ 3  
are small, the optimum tariff will be large:
2 This relationship states that the elasticity of a reciprocal demand curve is equal to 
to the total foreign elasticity of demand divided by itself minus one.
2
1 1 2.
1
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for a 100$ tariff; when they are large, the optimum tariff will he small:
1-05 , = 1
1.00 2 1 - 1
for a 5$ tariff.
The close analogy between the two and four-commodity results is apparent; they 
have the same properties of sign and an identical number of terms, the foreign coefficient 
of sensitivity being the aggregate quantity weighted substitution term which compares with 
the sum of the quantity weighted independent supply and demand elasticities of the two- 
commodity result.
It is possible to specify the precise conditions under which the optimum tariff 
would be small; namely;when the foreign coefficient of sensitivity (^13) and the foreign 
marginal propensity term (^13) are large. Conditions for a large ljji3 are:
1 . that the foreign own elasticities of supply of and demand for importables should be
high - the higher the better. Thus, the rise in the price of importables would see 
a large transfer of demand away from imports to the other sectors in the economy, and 
at the same time, a large shift in resources from the rest of the economy to the im­
port-competing sector, both of which effects would reduce the size of the necessary 
adjustment in the terms of trade. This requirement is the same as for the two good 
case, but while it is still a necessary condition it is not sufficient to ensure a 
large foreign coefficient of sensitivity, the other vital determinant being
2 . that the degree of competitiveness between non-traded and exportable goods, both in
supply and demand, should be considerably greater than the degree of competition 
between non-traded and importable goods. Q-iven the do conditions in the foreign, 
country,— it is certain that the-price of non-traded commodities would fall relative
For example,with low substitution possibilities between good one 
and the non-traded commodity but high values for the own elasticit­
ies of demand for and supply of importables,there would be a large 
transfer of resources from the exportable to the import-competing 
sector,rather than from the non-traded to the import-competing sector, 
and a large shift in demand away from importables to the exportable 
goods industry rather than to the non-traded sector*
All of these price effects would reduce the size of the nec­
essary shift in the terms of trade.lt can be seen how important are 
these complex relationships which exist between the traded and non- 
traded commodities.Should the above conditions concerning the cross­
elasticities not be fulfilled,the foreign coefficient of sensitivity 
could be small despite high values for the foreign own elasticities 
of supply of and demand for importables.This would augment the adverse 
movement in the terms of trade and increase the size of the optimum 
tariff.
Finally,it is important but not essential if is to be large
3* that the foreign ratios of consumption and production of import­
ables to imports be high.This would be ensured if the foreign country 
produced a large share of its consumption of importables.In this case, 
the effects of the domestic country^ trade policies would have a 
relatively small effect upon the foreign(or international) prices 
of the commodities traded.
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Let us examine the other component of our formula, \|a3, the foreign marginal 
propensity term. Generally, ^{3 will he large, and the optimum tariff small:
1. the greater are the foreign marginal propensities to consume non-traded and importable
commodities relative to the marginal propensity to consume exportables. A small C2 
in the expenditure - reducing (foreign) country will mean a relatively smaller reduc­
tion in expenditure upon exportables at constant prices and, consequently, a smaller 
adverse movement in the foreign country’s terms of trade;
2. the greater the degree of substitutability in production and consumption between non-
traded and importable commodities relative to that existing between non-traded and 
exportable commodities. An explanation of this condition, which conflicts with 2. 
above, already has been given in detail (see pages 129-131)- As its non-fulfilment 
would have only a minor effect upon the magnitude of ^13, reducing it in the extreme 
case approximately to the size of the foreign marginal propensity to consume export­
ables, Ci, its effect can be ignored.
We turn now to a comparison of our own and the traditional formula.
E. A COMPARISON WITH THE TRADITIONAL FOEMULA 
In this section we seek to prove that the value of the traditional formula is 
exceedingly dubious when a meaningful interpretation is given to the elasticity concepts 
in terms of which it is expressed. Further, it is contended that these improperly defined 
elasticity coefficients obscure vital relationships.
For purposes of comparison Kahn’s derivation of the traditional formula is set 
out below. Our equations (2.9) and (3-9) are formally identical to those appearing in 
his paper [11,15-16, equations (l) and (2)] except that he uses a different numeraire, 
thus giving an additional term in pg when (2.9) is differentiated totally.
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Rearranging equations (2.9) and (3-9) and including all prices even though they 
they are unity, we obtain:
and
Pidxi(l+ xidpi\ Pidxi; p2dx2(l+ p2dx2' (9-9)
(10.9)
where t = (P2/P2-I)•
Denoting a 'foreign elasticity of demand for exports' by
P = dxi Pi 
dpi XX
and a 'foreign elasticity of supply of imports' by
dx2 p2
T) = -T~T- —dp2 x2
it follows from equations (9*9) and (10.9) that the optimum tariff requires that:
1
e
e
which is the Kahn formula that has app: eared so frequently in optimum tariff literature
[17,60; 61; 15; 55; 62; 63; 1.
Trouble has been taken to derive the Kahn criterion in this manner because it 
enables us to link it the more readily with our own result and, at the same time, it fa­
cilitates an assessment of the elasticity coefficients.
It is difficult to be sure of Kahn's intention in his working of the problem 
as at no stage does he define clearly what is meant by his concept of elasticity.
Johnson has commented:
This formula must be interpreted with care, since the elasticities 
are defined in terms of the partial differentials of quantities 
with respect to prices, not in terms of partial derivatives as
the conventional price elasticities are. The two definitions of 
elasticity are only identical when the good is independent of 
other goods in both consumption and production, otherwise, the 
elasticities of the formula must be interpreted as measures of 
the response of quantities to prices when all the repercussions 
of general equilibrium adjustment have been worked out [17,61].
In other words, Johnson would interpret the elasticities of the formula either 
as independent partials or as total elasticities which embody “all repercussions of gene­
ral equilibrium adjustment“.
Let us consider the total interpretation. Of the two elasticities enumerated 
above, one disappears completely from the final formula when care is taken to develop it 
further, i.e. if the terms dxi/xi and dx2/X2 are broken into their component substitution 
elasticities and marginal propensities. The supply elasticity of the traditional formula 
(derived from &X2/X2) is in fact a redundant term. This fact is borne out by Table Seven 
below in which the numerical examples given are the same as those used in the text of 
Kahn's original paper and upon which he based his claim that the optimum tariff might norm­
ally be large. The reader should note that only where the supply term goes to the reci­
procal of infinity and vanishes do the two formulae coincide.
TABLE SEVEN
COMPARISON OF THE TWO FORMULAE WHEN THE TRADITIONAL 
ELASTICITIES ARE CONSIDERED AS TOTAL ELASTICITIES
Values of the elasticities °Jo Tariff <f> Tariff
Demand Supply Kahn Formula Our Formula
5 («0 * 00 25 25 (0)
20 (00) * 00 , 5 5 (approx),(0)
5 5 50 25
20 5 25 5
* As explained in the text these estimates 
are my own.
In this table it is assumed that the first termfin the denominator of the
right-hand side of equation (7*9) QW equivalent to Kahn's 'foreign elasticity of demand
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for exports' (derived from dxi/xi) when this elasticity is considered as a total. As the 
total foreign elasticity of supply of exports (derived from dxg/xg) is eliminated from our 
formula, the size of the elasticities in column two does not affect our optimum tariff.
It should he noted that if either total elasticity has a value of infinity, the 
other elasticity likewise must he infinite. In such a case, the optimum tariff would he 
zero (as shown hy the bracketed figures). This, of course, is the classical case in which 
a tariff would fail to benefit the tariff-imposing country.
Generally, economists have interpreted the elasticities of the conventional form­
ula as independent of other goods both in consumption and in production, i.e. as partial 
elasticities measuring the response of a commodity to a change in its own price, all other 
prices and money spending being held constant. More will be said concerning the poten­
tial dangers of such an approach. The point we are concerned with here is that the tra­
ditional formula is seriously misleading even when this interpretation is adopted. Graaf 
[ 6l] was of the opinion that the traditional formula was correct if one considered all 
cross elasticities (and all terms involving the non-traded commodities) to vanish identic­
ally. If in our multi-commodity formula, however, all such terms are cancelled out, we 
are left with the two-commodity result (equation (8.9)). The reader is invited to try 
this experiment.
Table Eight presents the results of a comparison between the two formulae when 
the traditional elasticities are treated as independent partials. In our own formula 
(8.9) —^tJii+Ci is considered to be the partial elasticity of demand and —  is the par-Xi X!
tial elasticity supply. (Though —^Sii refers to importables and the traditional elas-xi
ticity refers to exportables, the two are not unrelated, for in a four-good world in which
o' q /
all elasticities involving the non-traded good vanish identically, -^11= — ^ 2 2  (see pagesXl x 2
115-116)).
TABLE EIGHT
COMPARISON OF THE TWO FORMULAE WHEN THE 
TRADITIONAL ELASTICITIES ARE CONSIDERED 
AS MARSHALLIAN PARTIALS
Values of the elasticities °!o Tariff <jo Tariff
Demand Supply Kahn Formula Our Formula
5 00 25 0
20 00 5 0
5 5 50 11 (approx.)
20 5 25 A
Once again we have substituted. Kahn's numerical examples into our own formula 
and it is evident that his result is generally misleading. Our formula shows that a 
zero tariff would be the optimum tariff when one of the elasticities is infinite, and 
confirms the classical conclusion that a tariff would fail to improve the terms of trade 
of the tariff-imposing country when the world's offer curve was infinitely elastic (as 
it must be when any of the partial elasticities are infinite).
It is emphasised that the formal validity of the traditional criterion is not 
disputed. Rather, an attempt has been made above to show that it is incorrect when the 
terms in which it is expressed are meaningfully interpreted. Its usefulness must be 
highly suspect as it provides us with little more than a tautology. Moreover, the elas­
ticities which appear in it cannot be interpreted as parameters that are independent of 
the problem studied nor is anything known concerning them either of a qualitative or a 
quantitative nature. Finally, even if the assumption of vanishing cross elasticities were 
correct, to ignore them in the context of the present problem is unjustifiable. This 
leads us to another point concerning the probable size of the optimum tariff.
It is evident that only a rash prediction could be made on the basis of the 
two-commodity result, even when this is expressed in terms of conceivably measurable con-
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cepts. The complex relationships between traded and non-traded commodities could and 
probably would play a vital role in any necessary adjustments to equilibrium. It has 
been shown in an earlier chapter that the magnitude of the foreign coefficient of sensi­
tivity will be less than the quantity weighted sum of the own elasticities of demand for 
and supply of importables in the foreign country. This does not mean, however, that it 
must be small. It could as conceivably be large as small and, at present, one can say 
no more.
In addition to the above reasons for not accepting the case for a large op­
timum tariff, one may query Kahn’s conclusion that we would be concerned with short-term 
elasticities only. He felt that where tariff policy was concerned a country would tend 
to concentrate on the more immediate future the more serious were its economic difficul­
ties. Today, however, tariffs normally are used to effect structural changes in an eco­
nomy and not for the solution of short-term balance of payments problems. Hence, it is 
probable that the elasticities of our formula would be long-term elasticities and that 
their value, therefore, would be correspondingly higher.
Finally, it is claimed that our multi-commodity result provides an insight into 
the question of negative tariffs (subsidies). Graaf's conclusion that the terms of trade 
could move in either direction [61,5 -^] led him to the further conclusion that the optimum 
tariff could be a subsidy. Discussing the four or n-commodity case, he expressed dis­
satisfaction with the traditional formula because:
... it obscures the fact that the optimum tariff is sometimes a 
subsidy. This fact is interesting because it throws light on the 
usual discussion of tariffs and the terns -‘of trade, in which the 
possibility of a subsidy on imports being required to turn the 
terms of trade in one's favour is seldom considered. [61,5 -^]
For a tariff to improve 'welfare', the terms of trade must move in favour of 
the tariff-imposing country. The optimum tariff will be a subsidy, i.e. a negative
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tariff, only if a tariff shifted the terms of trade in an adverse direction. In chapter 
six we saw that this would he the case in a four-commodity world only in exceptional if 
not impossible circumstances. It follows that it is highly improbable that the optimum 
tariff would ever be a subsidy.
The close analogy between the two- and four-commodity formulae has been remarked 
upon already. They have the same properties of sign and an identical number of terms; 
ljji3 being the aggregate, quantity-weighted substitution term which compares with the sum 
of the quantity-weighted supply and demand elasticities of the two-commodity result.
Two further important implications are apparent from our reformulated criterion 
which do not follow from the traditional result because of its ill-defined elasticities. 
First, when the sum of the elasticities is less than unity, it is not possible to bring 
the two sides of the formula to equality, i.e. a result is not possible. This, of course, 
is what we should expect. Since the point of departure for the derivation of the formula 
is the usual one of assuming the tariff-imposing country’s tariff to be at an optimum, it 
is not applicable to a situation where an optimum tariff cannot be defined. It is well 
known that when the foreign country’s elasticities are less than unity, a tariff will al­
ways improve welfare [3^ -]• In this situation the optimum tariff will appear to be infin­
itely large - until the elasticities change or until imports are nil. This may be ex­
plained more simply in terms of two-dimensional offer curve analysis. It can be shown
[12,336-7] that the offer curve will bend backwards when the elasticity of it is less than 
unity. In this situation it is not possible for the foreign offer curve to be tangential 
at any point along the inelastic part of the curve to the tariff-imposing country’s indif­
ference curves; their general direction of slope is diagonally opposed and they will, in 
fact, intersect. Thus, no point along this range of the offer curve would represent a
true equilibrium position.
1Ö7.
In an analogous fashion, if l|Ji3 and ^ 3  sum to less than unity, it is not poss­
ible to equate the two sides of the formula. If this situation prevailed the foreign 
offer surface would not be tangential to the tariff-imposing country's indifference sur­
faces; the two would always intersect.
In a particular situation of this type it is most probable that successive tar­
iff increases will reveal the position where the foreign elasticities change so that they 
cease to be less than unity. An optimum position then becomescfefinable.
Secondly, the role of the domestic elasticities in the determination of the op­
timum tariff is indicated clearly by the presence of the quantity weights in our formula. 
These reflect the ratios of foreign consumption and production of exportables to the quan­
tity of them imported, and as these amounts are dependent upon domestic as well as foreign 
elasticities, it follows that the optimum tariff is functionally related to the elastici­
ties of both countries.
F. CONCLUSIONS
Briefly, the principal conclusions of this chapter are:
1. that the traditional optimum tariff formula, because of its improperly defined elas­
ticity concepts, is definitely misleading and that it fails completely to provide a 
meaningful theorem concerning the optimum tariff;
2. that there are possibly fewer grounds for considering the optimum tariff to be large
than there are for considering it to be small;
3. that any formula dealing with the problem of an optimum tariff cannot afford to ignore
the relationships between traded and non-traded commodities;
4 . that the optimum tariff will never be a subsidy.
10. CONSUMPTION AND PRODUCTION TAXES
A. INTRODUCTION
That part of the theory of international trade which has dealt with the effect
of taxes upon the terms of trade has concentrated, as far as I am aware, almost entirely
upon the effect of a tax or subsidy on imports or exports. The effect of consumption 
and production taxes upon different economic magnitudes appears to have been neglected.
It is our purpose, therefore, in this chapter, to establish multi-commodity criteria for:
1. the effect upon (a) the international terms of trade and (b) the domestic price ratio
of traded goods of a consumption tax levied on importables; and
2. the effect upon (a) the taxing country’s terms of trade and (b) the taxing country's
traded goods factor price ratio of a production tax levied on importables.
These criteria enable qualitative answers to be given to such questions as 
whether the terms of trade necessarily need improve as the result of consumption tax and, 
if so, whether the extent of the improvement could reverse the initial shift in the tax­
ing country’s traded goods price ratio, etc. We consider now a general consumption tax
upon importables.
B. CONSUMPTION TAXES
1. Consumption Taxes and the Terms of Trade
The introduction of a general consumption tax upon importables necessitates a 
distinction between the price relevant to consumers and that relevant to producers. It
means that p2, the price of importables to consumers, exceeds p2, the international price 
which enters into the supply functions of the taxing country, by the amount of the tax 
per unit. The reader will note that again we adopt the convention of assuming the dom­
estic country to be the one which levies the tax.
The equilibrium, equations of the model are:
xi = 0X - Xx = x( - 0( ... (1.10)
x2 = X2 - 02 = 02 - X'2 ... (2.10) 
0 = X3 - 03 ... (3.10) 
0 = X3 - O3 ... (4.10) 
M = OiPi+02p2+03p3+(p2-p2)X2 = 01p1+02p2+03p3+(p2 -p2 )x2 ... (5-10) 
M = OiPi+02p2+03p3 ... (6.10)
These equations formally are the same as those for the model developed to study the ef­
fect of a tariff upon the terms of trade (see equations (1.5) to (6.5)). However, the 
difference in the supply functions in the two applications of the model is stressed. As 
before, X^=X (pi,p2,p3,M) where p2, the foreign price of importables, is selected as 
numeraire, and quantity units are chosen so that Pi=P2=P3=p3=l; but 0^=Ch (pi,p3), the 
foreign price of importables (which is a datum in the domestic supply functions) disap­
pearing because of its role as numeraire.
Bearing this in mind, we now proceed to differentiate the equations (2.10) to 
(6.10) - the equation (l.lO) being dropped because it is implied by the fact that M=£ p X,.
We have, after substituting for the differentiated income equations,
dx2=(X2i-02i)dp1+X22dp2+(X23-023)dp3+M2[0idp1+02dp2+03dp3+(p2-l)dx2+x2dp2] ... (7-10) 
dx2=-(X2i-021)dpi-(X23-023)dp3-M2(0idp!+03dp3) ... (8.10) 
0 =(X3l-03i)dpi+X32dp2+(X33-033)dp3+M3[01dpi+02dp2+03dp3+(p2-l)dx2+x2dp2] ... (9*10) 
0 =(X31 -03i) dpi+(X33-033) dp3+M3(0]_dpi+03dp3) ... (10.10)
Next,
1. substitute in the remaining equations for X_-0_=K_-X^.]VL, and for X_^ -0_^  the approp­
riate x. or zero: 1
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2. cancel and collect terms wherever possible; and 
3• rearrange the equations so that
(K2i+XiM2)dp1+K23dp3~ [1-(P2~1)M2] dXg - -0l22^-P2 
(Ksi+XxMs) dp1+K33dp3+M3(p2-l) dX2 = “Cl32|3P2
(K2l-X1M2)dp1+K23(iP3+dX2 = 0
(K3 1-X1M3 ) dpi+K33dp3 = 0
Our measure of the change in the terms of trade due to a consumption tax is dpx/dp, 
Solving for this we obtain:
-022 K23 0 -[1-M2(p2-1)]
“0132 K33 0 M3(p2-1)
0 0 K23 1
dpi 0 0 K33 0
dp2
K21+X1M2 K23 0 -[1-M2(P2-1)]
K31+X1M3 K33 0 M3(P2“1)
K21-X1M2 0 K23 1
K31-X1M3 0 K33 0
Making use of the fact 
the above solution:
that Z p .K
j J
. .=0, but 13 noting that Pi02i+P3023=-P2022^
dpi _ |A|
^P2 “P2a22+P2022+xlM2 K23 0 -[1-M2(p2-1)]
“P2a32+P2032+xlM3 ^33 0 M3(pa-1)
-K22“x1^2 0 K23 1
-K32“xlM3 0 K-33 0
(11.10)
p •
lA l)
rewrite
(12.10)
|B|)
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A Laplacian expansion from the first two rows gives:
a22 K23
*Pi
dp2
a32 ^33
(K33)
P2a22-P2^22“XiM2 K23
12a32”P2^32“X1M3 K33
(£33)+
K22+x^M2
K32+X!M3
K23
K^3
K23 M2(p2-1)-1
K33 M 3 (p2 -1 )
Finally,
1. divide top and bottom by x2(K33.K33);
2. expand the resulting determinants; and
3- convert the result into quantity weighted substitution elasticities and mar­
ginal propensities to spend (remembering first, that because free trade prices are unity, 
xi=x2j and secondly, that -^23=1+ 1^3.> and ^23=^13) •
Then,
dpi pj
1 +  A * ( f i 3 + ^ 1 3 ) +  ^ 2 3  +  ^ 2 3 *
(13.10)
p/
where A*=1+^23*(l - — ) is normally positive and less than unity because
P2
.. * .. « . « 2(723-02023^23 - ~02 + 03^ 1’ \A3CJ33“U3D33
is negative and less than unity (except for the abnormal case where K23<0). Additionally,
^23 = 1^22-(1^23- ^623) --)' x2 x2 x2 033-^33
is the same as the coefficient of sensitivity, l}j23, from which all supply reactions in­
volving the change in price of the traded commodity are excluded. It follows that ljj23 
has the same sign property as its corresponding coefficient of sensitivity although its 
absolute value is less.
Equation (13.IO) is our formula for the rate of change in the terms of trade, p]_, 
due to a consumption tax levied upon importables. By setting to zero all terms which
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involve the non-traded commodity, we obtain a two-commodity result:
Xp
dpx p2 ___________ ^ 22______________________  ... (14.10)
dP2 Pl l + A ( ^ ! -  ^Sil-c0 + —^022” s^Z -C2X! -LJ- Xi ' X 2 X 2
where A=l-C2(l-— ).
P2
Let us first analyse the more simple two-commodity result. As a22 is negative, 
the sign of the formula is determinate, given that stability exists in the international 
market, i.e. that our denominator is negative. This means that px will rise relative 
to p2 when a general tax is put on the consumption of importables, the terms of trade im­
proving unambiguously for the taxing country.
This result confirms one’s intuitive expectation that a tax upon the consumption 
of importables would shift demand in the domestic country into exportables, thereby creat­
ing a world excess supply of the commodity and a subsequent improvement in the terms of 
trade.
The non-appearance of supply reactions in the numerator is explained by the 
fact that our numerator registers only impact effects. The change in the tax alters the 
relative price structure facing consumers, but leaves unaffected the relative prices which 
concern producers. The latter will alter only in response to a change in the terms of 
trade, the magnitude of the movement of which they partly determine. Hence their appear­
ance in the denominator. A tariff, on the other hand, affects both consumers and pro­
ducers, its direct effect being to reduce the demand for importables and to increase the 
supply of them. It follows that the excess demand generated by a consumption tax, which 
is determined by consumer reactions only, must be less than the excess demand generated 
by an equivalent tariff that affects producers as well as consumers. A consumption tax, 
therefore, creates a smaller excess world supply of importables and, as a result, needs a 
smaller shift in the terms of trade to restore equilibrium.
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While one might derive intuitively the two-commodity result, it is difficult to 
see how the four-commodity case could he handled without recourse to the more complex ana­
lysis that we have used. There are several significant points both of similarity and of 
contrast between the four and the two-commodity formulae. In the first place, and most
important, the result is qualitatively the same, being negative by the stability con­
ditions. This result is analogous to the conclusion that a tariff would improve the 
terms of trade of the taxing country in a four-commodity world (see equation (2.6)). 
Secondly, the more complex result differs from the two-commodity conclusion in that sup­
ply elasticities appear in the numerator as determinants of the direction of the shift in 
the terms of trade. Again, this is analogous to the four-commodity terms of trade result 
except that in the case of the consumption tax there are no supply reactions with respect 
to a change in the domestic price of good two, p2 . This reflects the fact that produc­
tion of commodity two is responsive to the tax-exclusive and not the tax-inclusive price 
of the good, and that the former can shift only if the terms of trade are affected. 
Finally, as in the two-good case, the fact that ljj2 3 is less in absolute value than ljl2 3  
indicates that a consumption tax would generate a smaller excess supply of importables 
than would an equivalent tariff and, consequently, that it would require a relatively 
smaller corrective movement in the terms of trade. This conclusion would be mitigated 
if substitution possibilities are low generally in production relative to demand.
It is difficult, in the case of a consumption tax upon importables, to gene­
ralise about the effect of non-traded commodities upon the magnitude of the shift in the 
terms of trade for, as we have seen in our study of the tariff question, while the mag­
nitude of each coefficient of sensitivity would tend to be less than the magnitude of 
the two-commodity term it replaces, there is no a priori reason for expecting the dif­
ference between the propensity terms in the formula to exceed or be less than their
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counterparts in a two-good result. This conclusion is subject to the qualification that 
where the coefficients of sensitivity are high, one might expect them to increase the mag­
nitude of the terms of trade movement indicated by the two-commodity result because, in 
this case, the effect upon the final result of the propensity terms, which individually 
cannot exceed unity, is small.
2 . Consumption Taxes aid the Domestic Price Ratio of Traded Goods
Next, let us examine the effect of a general consumption tax on importables upon the market 
price ratio of the internationally traded goods in the domestic country. We ask whether 
a consumption tax upon importables could actually cause the market price of importables 
to fall relative to that of exportables. The problem is analogous to the Metzler argument 
considered earlier, which concluded that a tariff conceivably might result in a fall in 
the taxing country's market price of importables relative to its market price for export­
ables .
Our measure of the rate of change in the market price ratio of the internation­
ally traded commodities in the taxing country is d(p2/p1)/(p2/pi)• As Pi=P2=l.>
a(p2/pi) = dp? _ dpi 
P2/P1 P2 Pi
or
d(p2/Pi) P2 _ 2_ _ dpi P2 
P2/P1 dP2 dP2 Pi
Substituting for 22 fr0m (13.IO) and ignoring the effect of A*, 'which arises because dp2 Pi
of a prior tariff, we have:
d(Pg/Pl) P2 
P2/P1 dP2
1+1Jl 3+^23+^^13+^23*
1+1*13+^13+1 ^23+^23*
(15.10)
^ 2 3 O2 o x2 ( ^ 2 3" ^ 2 3) x2 x2
( -^32 \
K033~^33J
where
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is the same as the coefficient of sensitivity, l|j23, from which are excluded all demand 
reactions involving the change in the price of the traded good. Like ljj23, ^23 bas the 
same properties of sign as its corresponding coefficient of sensitivity hut is less in 
absolute magnitude. It follows that Ip23+^23=^23j and that ^23<^23>^23•
A two-commodity result can he obtained by setting to zero all the terms in
(l5 .1 0) which involve the non-traded commodities
]P2/Pl) P2 
P2/P1 lP2
,/ / \ 1 ^ T i r -  ^ S i i -  ^ q22-C{-C2l(P2/Pl) _ X! X! X 2
l-^tril- ^ 61 1 + ^ 0 2 2 -  ^ S 2 2 - C i -C2Xi X! ■LX X 2 X 2 X
The condition under which a consumption tax on importables will increase the 
domestic market price of exportables relative to the price of importables is, given 
stability in the international market, that:
- ^ 13 ~ ^23 ^ 2 3  ^23*(^23= "1 -^1 3 )
(16.10)
(17.10)
Similarly, in the two-commodity case, the criterion is:
- ^*011+ “^611+ “ S22 < C2 - C2(C2=l-Ci)Xi Xi x2 (18.10)
A comparison of these criteria with the corresponding ones derived for an im­
port tax (equation (27.5a and b)) establishes the fact that a perverse movement in the 
domestic country's market price ratio is even less likely in the case of a consumption 
tax. The reason is obvious. In the tariff case, a perverse result depends upon a terms 
of trade effect sufficiently strong to reverse the initial tendency for the tariff to in­
crease the domestic price of importables relative to the price of exportables in the tax­
ing country. For reasons pointed out above, the magnitude of the terms of trade effect 
will be reduced where an equivalent consumption tax is used instead of a tariff. The 
argument against a consumption tax on importables having a perverse price effect holds,
196.
therefore, a fortiori. Thus, while it is true that if a tariff will cause the domestic 
price of importables to rise so too will a consumption tax, it is not true that in the un­
likely event of a tariff increasing the price of exportables relative to the price of im­
portables, a consumption tax upon importables necessarily will do likewise.
C. PRODUCTION TAXES
1. Production Taxes and the Terms of Trade
This time we seek criteria in the two and the multi-commodity cases for the 
effect upon the terms of trade of the taxing country of a production tax on importables. 
Once again, a distinction is necessary between the price ratios which confront consumers 
and producers; the price of importables, p2, which enters as a datum into the taxing 
country's supply functions, being less than the market price, p2, by the amount of the 
tax.
The equations which describe the equilibrium of our system are:
X! = 0l - Xi = xi - 0( ... (19.10) 
x2 = x2 - 02 = 02 - x4 ... (20.10)
0 = X3 - 03 ... (21.10) 
0 = X3 - O3 ... (22.10) 
M = 0xPi+02P2+03P3+(p2-P2)02 = 0!Pi+02P2+03P3 ••• (23*10) 
M7 = OiPi + 0^p4 + O3P3 ... (24.10)
These equations are the same as the set (l.lO) to (6.10) except that the domestic ex­
penditure equation now states that expenditure is equal to earned income plus the tax­
ation receipts which we assume to be redistributed among consumers.
We select as numeraire p2, the market price of importables, and choose to drop 
the supply-demand equation involving the taxing country's exportable commodity. Differ-
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entiating totally, making use of the fact that Z p^dCh=0, and substituting for dM and dM7
i
in the first four equations, we obtain:
dx2 = (X2i-02i)dp1-022dp2+(X23“023)lP3+M2(0idp1+03dp3) ...
dx2 =-(X2i“02l)dp1-(X23-023)lP3“M2(0idp1+03dp3) ...
0 = (X 31 - 0 3 i ) d p 1 -0 3 2 d p 2 + (X 3 3 -0 3 3 )d p 3 + M 3 (0 1 dp 1+ 03dp3 )
0 = (X^-Osi )dp1+(X33-033)dp3-HV[3(0idpi+03dp3) ...
Next, we proceed to
1. substitute in the remaining equations for (X. .-0. .)=(K. .-X.M.),and for X.-0. theij ij ij J i ”  i i
appropriate or zero;
2. cancel and collect terms wherever possible; and
3. rearrange the equations so that
(25-10)
(26.10)
(27-10)
(28.10)
(K2i+x1M2)dp1+K23dp3-dx2 = O22IP2
(K31+x1M3)dp1+K33dp3 = 032dp2
(K2i -XiM2)dpi+K23dp3+dx2 = 0
(K31-XiM3)dpi+K33dp3 - 0
Since p2=l is our numeraire, dp2 is our measure of the production tax. Solving for the
we have:
lPi
dp2
. of trade, lPi; whicl
022 K23 0 -1
°32 K33 0 0
0 0 K23 1
0 0 K33 0
( = |A|)
K21+X1M2 K23 0 -1
K31+X2.M3 K33 0 0
K21 "X3.M2 0 K23 1
K31-X1M3 0 K33 0
198 .
which,, i f  u se  i s  made o f  th e  r e l a t io n s h ip  t h a t  Z p.K . .=0 , g iv e s  u s :
J J 1J
dp i _ ________________ L I
■a22+p2022+xiM2 K 23 0 -1
-a  32+p2032+X]_M3 K 33 0 0
-K22- x iM2 0 K 23 1
-K32 -Xi M3 0 K 33 0
(=|B|)
A L a p la c ia n  ex p an sio n  o f  |A | and  | b [ from  th e  f i r s t  two rows y ie ld s :
dpi
- 022 K23
-032 K33
K33
dp2 a 22-p 2022-xiM2 K23
a 32“P2032-XiM3 K33
^ 33+
K22+Xi M2 K23
K32+Xi M3 K33
K33
F in a l ly ,
1 . d iv id e  to p  and  bo ttom  by K33.K33;
2 . expand th e  r e s u l t i n g  d e te rm h an ts ; and
3- c o n v e rt th e  r e s u l t  in to  q u a n t i ty  w eig h ted  s u b s t i t u t i o n  e l a s t i c i t i e s  and 
m a rg in a l p r o p e n s i t ie s  to  spend (rem em bering f i r s t ,  t h a t  b ecause  f r e e  
t r a d e  p r ic e s  a re  u n i ty ,  x i= x 2 ; and seco n d ly , t h a t  -^23=1+^13 and
^ 2 3 = ^ 1 3 ) '
Then,
dpi P2 = ^ 2 3 ________
dp2 P! l + ^ l 3+^13+^ 23+^23* ( 2 9 . 10)
wnere ljj23 i s  d e f in e d  a s  in  e q u a tio n  (15.IO) and 
and l e s s  th a n  u n i ty  u n le s s  K23 < 0 .
As in  th e  case  o f  th e  consum ption ta x ,
^23= -O2+O3P^ gg- 3~y;2q- '3 )w hich i s  n e g a tiv e
fl,A 3 a 3 3 “ u 3 b 3 3
th e  two-comm odity r e s u l t  can be o b ta in e d
by s e t t i n g  to  ze ro  a l l  te rm s w hich in v o lv e  a n o n - tra d e d  commodity. Thus,
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dpi P2 
dp2 Pi (30.10)
As dp2 is negative for an increase in the production tax, p2 falling relative to p2, it 
follows from the negative numerator in both criteria that, if stability is assumed in 
the international market, the terms of trade of the taxing country must deteriorate, p2 
rising relative to pi. This is the result that one would expect from a two-commodity 
analysis of the problem, the direct effect of the tax being to diminish the supply of im­
portables (the consumption of them remaining constant), thereby creating (at constant 
cost) a world excess demand for them and a consequent deterioration in the terms of trade.
This unambiguous conclusion is not, however, evident intuitively when non-traded 
commodities are present, for in the multi-commodity case the result does not depend en­
tirely upon the supply reactions of producers, consumers also being affected by the shift 
in relative prices which involve the non-traded commodity. Nevertheless, should all sup­
ply reactions be zero, there would be no change in the terms of trade and even if the tax­
ing country's own importable supply substitution elasticity, S22, is high, a negligible 
terms of trade movement could occur if substitution possibilities between importables and 
non-traded commodities are high compared with those existing between exportables and non- 
traded commodities and with those existing between the traded commodities.
In passing, it should be noted that the above criteria for the effect of a pro­
duction tax upon the terms of trade are converted readily into criteria for the effect of 
a subsidy upon the terms of trade, by remembering that, for a subsidy, dp2 will be positive. 
In this case, the terms of trade of the subsidising country would improve unambiguously.
2. Production Taxes and Relative Prices at Factor Cost
Finally, let us consider the effect of a production tax upon the factor cost
price ratio of traded goods in the taxing country. Our measure of the rate of change
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in this price ratio is d(p2/pi)/(p2/pi). As Pi=P2=l, we know that:
d[pp/pi)= dps _ dpi
P2/P1 P2 Pi 
or
^(Ps/Pi) P2 
P2/P1 d-P2
p _ <ÜEi P2 
dp2 Pi
Substituting for —  from (29*10) we obtain: ap2 Pi
1+1 J13+ll 3tl ^23+^23*
1+1 Jl3+^13+t J2 3+^23*
where Tjj^ s is defined as in equation (13.IO) and \|r23* as in equation (29*10).
Given stability in the international market, and making use of the fact that 
l+^i3=-^23> we have as a criterion for the rate of change in the domestic factor price 
ratio of the taxing country:
-  ljji3 -  ijj2 3  i - ^ 2 3  +  ^ 2 3 *  • • • ( 3 1 * 1 0 )
Similarly, making use of the relationship that l-C2=Ci, we have an 
analogous two-commodity criterion:
“ O'11+ “ Oil-"“^ 2 2  = 02 - C2 X1 X1
Xp
— cx2 (32.10)
In each case, if the difference between the propensity terms exceeds 
the afo-eetute value of the sum of the quantity weighted substitution elasticities, the dom- 
estic factor price ratio of the taxing country would shift so that the price of exportables 
would fall relative to the domestic factor price of importables. This, of course, would 
need a strong adverse movement in the terms of trade and for reasons advanced earlier in 
the cases of a tariff and of a consumption tax on importables, it is extremely unlikely 
that the necessary conditions would be fulfilled.
Finally, the analogy between equations (31*10) and (32.10), and (17.10) and
(l8.10) is pointed out; the only difference is that in the case of a consumption tax it 
is the additional supply reactions which decrease the probability of the perverse case, 
while in the case of a production tax, it is the addition of demand reactions which de­
creases such a probability.
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11. ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE TERMS OF TRADE 
A. INTRODUCTION
The inaugural lecture of J.R. Hicks [67] was based, on a model which would appear 
to have outlived the problem it purported to explain - namely, the post-war dollar gap.
His contention that the dollar shortage may have arisen because of the tendency, reflected 
in the shift in the terms of trade, for technological improvement in the United States to 
be concentrated in the import-competing sector, has been subjected to a considerable amount 
of criticism, in the course of which a valuable collection of literature has been added to 
international trade theory [72; 73; 7^ -; 71;512-19; 66; 70; 68; 69; 77; 78].
The effect of expanding productivity upon the international terms of trade had 
implications which extended beyond the immediate problem of the dollar gap. In particular, 
the answer to the question was of vital importance to the -well-being of the emerging, un­
derdeveloped areas of the world and it was with this point especially in mind that differ­
ent theoreticians commenced to refine and extend Hicks’ original stimulating contribution.
Today, a different aspect of the same problem concerns those primary producing 
nations whose economic interests are jeopardised by the impending entry of the United 
Kingdom to the European Common Market. Since the end of the war, no single group of coun­
tries has experienced increases in output comparable with the Common Market. Inevitably, 
Britain's entry to this expanding area would entail a closer economic association between 
it and the primary producing nations of the British Commonwealth. What, one might ask, 
would be the effect of continued economic expansion in Europe upon the terms of trade of 
these primary producers?
Having posed the problem let us be equally brief in stating that no solution to 
it will be offered here. Such a solution would involve, among other things, a detailed
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quantitative knowledge about existing tariff levels, demand and supply functions, etc., 
in each of these trading blocks. Moreover, not only do we lack the necessary quanti­
tative information but, additionally, any conclusion would need to be mere conjecture un­
til negotiationskave been finalised.
Given our abysmal ignorance concerning the magnitude of the relevant parameters, 
however, a further problem still exists. Is our theoretical analysis sufficiently ad­
vanced to warrant its useful application to the problem? In particular, are the conclu­
sions derived from the different models expressed in terms of parameters which are con­
ceivably measurable in practice? Should this not be the case, the theorems involved will 
have a limited degree of practical application; their primary function being to indicate 
what might happen if certain unknown parameters were of such and such a magnitude.
It is the purpose of this chapter first, to review briefly some of the existing 
literature concerning the effect of economic expansion on a country's terms of trade and, 
secondly, to develop a model with the modest intent of extending slightly the degree of 
generality possessed by earlier formulations. At the same time results are expressed in 
terms of parameters which are independent of the problem under review and, at least, mea­
surable conceivably. In this manner, a logical framework is provided within which a more 
comprehensive quantitative study of the problem might one day ensue.
Section B of this chapter reviews briefly some of the existing literature. This 
condensation is not intended to be comprehensive nor is it intended entirely as a review 
but rather to point out the reasons for the apparently contradictory results which derive 
from the two major approaches to the subject.
In Section C a four-commodity model is developed which provides criteria for 
the effect of an increase in productivity upon the expanding country’s terms of trade and 
upon its real income. Finally, in Section D, these results are analysed and compared
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with other two and quasi-three-commodity ones, our conclusion being that even where in 
other models a non-traded commodity has been postulated, its important influence upon both 
the magnitude and the direction of the shift in the terms of trade has not been emphasised 
sufficiently.
B. THE LITERATURE
In reviewing the original conclusions of Hicks and the developments which ensued, 
it is the purpose of this section to emphasise that the answers to the problems which he 
raised depend on the type of model used. Our interest centres upon the original problem: 
namely, the effect of economic expansion on the terms of trade; other effects of economic 
growth upon international trade are ignored, including a country's relative dependence upon 
trade.
The formal problem which concerned Hicks was the effect of increasing producti­
vity on a country's terms of trade when productivity in other countries remained static.
His model was a two-country one in which the balance of payments was always in equilibrium. 
Additionally, the increase in output was assumed due to improved productivity - the sup­
plies of the factors of production remaining constant. These assumptions are retained 
in this section.
His two principal conclusions were:
1. Should the productivity increase be uniformly distributed over all of the expanding 
country's industries, its terms of trade would most likely deteriorate.
2. Should the increase in output be concentrated entirely in the import-competing sector, 
the expanding country's terms of trade would improve. Moreover, this conclusion would 
still hold in the less extreme case in which growth occurred the more rapidly in the im­
port-competing industry.
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Subsequent analysis concentrated for the most part on four main types of model 
though, of course, an infinite variety of them is conceivable. That of Hicks envisaged 
three commodity groups comprising exportables, non-traded goods, and imports; the degree 
of substitutability between the latter two classes being less than infinite both in con­
sumption and production. Throughout, Hicks assumed the domestic industries (exportable 
and non-traded) to be operating subject to constant costs. For this reason he described 
his model as Ricardian and this nomenclature is retained in this paper.
A further type of model, used by Mishan [72], Corden [75] and Johnson [66], as­
sumes two countries and two commodities and may be described as of a 'Heckscher-Ohlin' 
variety, there being some production and consumption of both commodities in the expanding 
country, i.e. incomplete specialisation. It differs in two ways from the Ricardian model. 
In the first place, there are two instead of three commodities,1 there being perfect sub­
stitutability between imports and import-competing goods. In the second place, there 
are increasing and not constant costs, which means that if factors move from the import­
able to the exportable sector, exportable production costs must rise while those of the 
importable sector must fall. This type of model lends itself readily to both algebraic 
and geometric exposition, and developments of it along these lines have extended consider­
ably the theoretical literature on this topic.
The simplest model used might be described as ultra-Ricardian for it postulates 
the complete specialisation of each country in the production of its own export good. In 
relation to the Heckscher-Ohlin model this is the only modification. Again, this model 
has been most usefully developed by Johnson [66].
1 One writer has interpreted the Ricardian model used by Hicks as a four-good one which 
implies, of course, that similar conditions exist in the foreign country. We shall 
see later that the presence of an extra commodity in the other country, while it af­
fects the magnitude of the terms of trade movement, does not affect the direction of 
the shift in the terms of trade.
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A fourth variety of model has been used by Black [75] and is called Marshallian 
because of its use of independent elasticities of supply and demand for imports and ex­
ports. Though it includes conceptually a class of non-traded commodities, it is subject 
to such rigorous and implausible assumptions that any conclusions derived from it must be 
evaluated with the utmost caution. Among the problems which it assumes away are all 
interrelations between traded and non-traded markets, and real income effects upon the 
terms of trade. A good deal has been written already in this thesis about the merits 
and demerits of the partial equilibrium approach. In this chapter we shall not engage 
in further controversy, concentrating instead upon comparing the other models described 
above with the four-commodity one developed in the next section. We now proceed to ana­
lyse the different models commencing with the simplest of the three.
1. The Ultra-Ricardian Model
In this case the expanding country produces a single commodity or group of com­
modities. A productivity increase means that the domestic (expanding) country can pro­
duce more of its exportable commodity with its given supply of factors than it could 
before. Consequently, the real cost of exportables declines. Imagine that factor in­
comes are expanded so as to maintain a constant export price level. Provided only that 
some of the increase in factor incomes is spent on imports, it follows that the demand 
for exportables will have expanded less than, and the demand for imports more than, the 
supply of them. Given stability in the foreign exchange market, equilibrium can be re­
stored only by a deterioration in the terms of trade of the expanding country. The 
ultra-Ricardian model, therefore, supports the first contention of Hicks that a general 
productivity increase would affect unfavourably the terms of trade of the growing country.
2. The Ricardian Model
In the Ricardian model there are three commodities - exportables, non-traded
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goods, and imports, the latter being distinct from non-traded goods; and constant costs 
operate in all industries. Thus, a movement of factors from one industry to another 
will not affect their relative prices. Indeed, the assumption of constant costs infers
that the two commodities produced in the expanding country must be perfectly substitut­
able for one another on the production side; the reason that non-traded goods are not ex­
ported being the existence of transport costs.
Consider first the case of a uniform increase in productivity at constant prices 
in the non-traded and exportable good industries. Once again factor incomes are assumed 
to have expanded accordingly. As long as a portion of the increased expenditure is allo­
cated to imports, the terms of trade must deteriorate. This would be so even where an
initial excess demand for exportables was created by the pattern of allocation of the new 
expenditure. With constant costs the excess demand would be eliminated by a transfer of 
resources from the non-traded goods industry, a net excess demand for imports always re­
maining. To rectify this, the terms of trade would need to deteriorate.
Next, consider the case of an increase in productivity within the non-traded 
good industry. Because of the presence of constant costs one can assume no longer that 
factor incomes would expand in such a way that the price of the non-traded good would re­
main constant. Instead, initially, the price of the non-traded good must fall. Hicks, 
considering only the substitution effects that would follow, concluded that the terms of 
trade of the expanding country would improve. It was left to A. Asimakopulos to point 
out that the real income effect of the price change could invalidate this conclusion
[jk-, 228-33] * In other words, the final effect upon the terms of trade would depend 
and
upon the income/substitution effects of the change in the price of the non-traded commo­
dity.
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3• The Heckscher-Ohlin Model
Answers to the problems posed by Hicks have been obtained also within the con­
text of a model whose antecedents are those of the Heckscher-Ohlin type: two commodities,
two countries, some production of importables within each country, given supplies of the 
factors of production, increasing costs, etc. In each case, assuming stability in the 
international market and that productivity increases are not factor-biased,2 the conclu­
sions reached contradict those established by the Hicksian model:
1. where the increase in output is uniform in all industries, the direction of the shift
in the terms of trade will depend on the proportions in which the increased expendi­
ture is allocated to the consumption of either good; and
2. that when the increase in output occurs entirely in the importable good industry the
terms of trade must improve (excepting the case where exportables are considered as
inferior goods).
Consider the first conclusion. When productivity increases uniformly the pro­
portionate rise in output will be the same in both industries. If factor incomes are 
raised in proportion to the productivity increase the relative prices of the commodities 
will not change. In other words, there will be an unbiased expansion of output at con­
stant commodity prices.
What of the effect upon demand? Obviously the real income of the factors of 
production must have increased because of the rise in factor money earnings, the prices 
of the commodities beingheld constant. It is evident that if the increased supply of 
commodities is removed from the market at constant prices there can be no excess supply 
of or demand for either product and, consequently, no tendency for the terms of trade to 
change.
See p.2/tf where it is noted that a factor-biased productivity increase could alter the 
results.
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If the expansion of demand as the result of an increased expenditure is to he 
unbiased, the income elasticities of demand for both commodities must be unity - demand 
rising proportionately for each commodity. In such a case, the terns of trade must de­
teriorate unambiguously for, while the proportionate increases in the demand for and the 
supply of importables are equal, the absolute increase in demand must exceed the absolute 
increase in supply as long as domestic production is less than domestic consumption.
This conclusion is subject, of course, to the requirement that neither the foreign elas­
ticity of demand for nor supply of importables should be infinite.
It was Mishan [72] who pointed out first that a demand expansion biased suffi­
ciently towards exportables would require an improvement in the terms of trade, thus 
qualifying the original proposition of Hicks that an unbiased productivity increase 
need cause the terms of trade to deterioriate necessarily.
Where the productivity increase occurs solely in the importable good industry, 
the conclusion derived from the analysis of the Heckscher-Ohlin type model is that the 
terms of trade will generally improve. The argument, in brief, is as follows. On the
production side output in the importable sector rises while, initially, the level of in­
dustrial activity in the exportable good industry remains constant. Furthermore, the 
price of the importable commodity does not change, factor incomes expanding to take up 
the increase in productivity. This cannot be an equilibrium position, however, as per­
fect competition requires the same rate of return to factors in all industries. Factors 
would flow, therefore, from the exportable to the importable sector until increasing 
costs in the importable good industry and decreasing costs in the exportable good industry 
equated factor returns in the two sectors. This means that the output of importables 
would expand by more than the initial increase. It follows that if the marginal propen­
sity to spend output on importables is less than unity in the domestic country, an excess
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supply of importables must occur, with a subsequent improvement in the expanding coun­
try' s terms of trade.
A relaxation of the assumption that productivity increases are factor-neutral 
introduces an element of ambiguity into the above conclusions [77]• In fact, a product­
ivity increase could result in a factor bias as readily as in a productivity bias. If, 
given the prices of capital andlabour, the productivity increase raises the optimum ratio 
of capital to labour in the importable industry, the productivity increase may be termed 
capital-using in the importable sector. This means that labour becomes plentiful in re­
lation to capital which causes the price of capital to rise and the output of the capital- 
intensive industry to contract relative to the labour-intensive one. To determine the 
total bias on the production side at constant prices, both product and factor biases 
need to be evaluated. The final assessment of the effect upon the terms of trade would 
need to take account also of the degree of bias on the consumption side. 
k . Summary
There is much to be said for dealing with one problem at a time. Accordingly, 
we assume that a productivity increase will be factor-neutral. Subject to this assump­
tion, Table Nine below summarizes the characteristics and results of each model.
TABLE NINE
A SUMMARY OF THE EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC EXPANSION UPON THE TERMS OF TRADE
Model
Characteristics 
of the Model
Cost con- Number
ditions ofProducts
Uniform Pro­
ductivity In­
crease . Must 
terms of trade 
deteriorate?
Productivity in­
crease entirely 
in importable(non- 
traded)sector.Must 
terms of trade mpnove?
Ultra-Ricardian Constant Two Yes N.A.
Heckscher-Ohlin Increasing(at Two No Yes
least in one
industry)
Ricardian Constant Three Yes No
One need not search far to account for the conflicting results presented in 
the Table. Obviously, those derived from the ultra-Ricardian model can be attributed
to the assumption of complete specialisation. No one would contend that this is a re­
alistic assumption and we proceed without comment to the other more complex models. On 
the one hand, in the event of a uniform productivity increase, the conclusions differ 
not because of the extra commodity in the Ricardian model, but because of the differing 
cost assumptions. In the Ricardian model the relief of any excess demand in the 
g o m a r k e t  by the price mechanism is unnecessary, factors merely transferring under 
constant cost conditions to eliminate such an excess. On the other hand, where produc­
tivity increases entirely in the importable sector, it would appear that the difference 
in the results can be attributed to the number of commodities postulated in each model. 
This difference, however, is superficial rather than real,for the model used by Hicks is 
only two-commodity on the production side. The important point is that he assumes there 
is no domestic production of importables and that the adherents of the Heckseher-Ohlin 
type approach do. Obviously, an increase in productivity which is concentrated entirely 
in the import-competing sector will have vastly different results to one which is concen­
trated entirely in the non-traded good sector of an economy. The two problems are quite 
distinct and any comparison of the two models should bear this in mind.
An amalgam of the two approaches would appear to be a worthwhile task. 
Accordingly, in the next section, a general equilibrium model is developed in which 
there are three commodities consumed and produced in each country (there being a class of 
non-traded goods in each economy). The restrictive Hicksian assumption of constant costs 
is not retained but the specific inclusion of an import-competing as well as a non-traded 
industry enables the vital role of substitution and income effects to be emphasised fully.
We turn now to the development of this model.
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C. DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODEL
Throughout this section the convention of a foreign and a domestic country is 
adopted and no assumptions are made about the type of goods produced. The basic assump­
tions of the model; with one or two additions, are as set out in chapter three: two
countries and four commodities, each country producing an importable, an exportable and 
a non-traded commodity; perfect competition exists both in the factor and product mar­
kets of each country; full employment of resources and a balanced balance of trade are 
ensured at all times by the free working of the price mechanism. Additionally, it is 
assumed that capital, technology and labour are immobile as between countries - only goods 
moving internationally. The increase in output is assumed due to improved productivity. 
Finally, it should be noted that we assume any increase in output to occur at constant 
relative commodity prices - factor incomes being adjusted accordingly. For the moment, 
our interest centres upon the establishment of a general criterion for the effect of an 
equal absolute increase in output in each country upon the domestic country's interna-*
tional terms of trade.
The equilibrium equations of our model are:
XI = Oi - Xx = X( - Oi ... (1.11)
- Og = O2 - X3 ... (2.11)
0 = X3 - 03 ... (3-11)
0 = X3 - 04, ... (4.11)
M = O1P1 + O2P2 + O3P3 ... (5.11)
M7 = OiPx + O2P2 + 03p3 ... (6.11)
These equations are the same as the set of equations (7*3) to (12.3) which describe the 
equilibrium of our basic free trade model, there being no tariffs, transport costs, or
other impediments to trade.
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Since Ms 2 p.X.,
3 J J
one of the supply-demand equations is not independent and a
balanced balance of trade (p iX;l=P2X2) is implied. In our working of the problem the xx
equations are discarded and p2, the price of domestic importables, is used as numeraire.
By a suitable choice of quantity units all prices are set equal to unity initially,
This time, we must allow for the effect of a given equal absolute increase in
output in terms of the numeraire in each country upon the form of the supply and demand
functions. Thus X .=X .(Pi,P3,M,G) and 0 .=(pi,p3,G), where G is the given increase in out-J J J
put in the domestic country, which is zero initially. Similarly, in the foreign country,
X^=(pi;P3;M/,G/ )and g ' ) •J J
Differentiating the equations (2.11) to (6.11) totally we have, after using the
fact that the Z p^dCh=0 to reduce (5-11) and (6.11), 
i
dx2=(X2i ~02i) <^Pit(X23-023) dp3+(m.2_n2) dG+M2dM
dx2= -(X21“O21)dpi-(X23“023)dp3~(m2“H2)dG -M2dM
o ^(Xsi -O3 1) dp2.+(X33-033) dp3+(m3-n3) dG+MsdM
o =(X31 -O31 )dp1+(X33-033)dp3+(m3~n3) dG/+MsdM/ 
dM = Oxdpi' + 0sdp3
* » 1 *dM = Oxdpx + 03dp3
where n.=60./dG and m. = dX./dG .1 1  1 1
Next,
1. substitute in (7 .11) to (lO.ll) for dM and dM7;
2 . in the resulting equations substitute for X_^-0^ .=K_-X^jyL; and
3 . for the terms (X^-0 )^ which arise after these substitutions, substitute the approp­
riate X3., X2 or zero as indicated by the equilibrium equations; 
k. cancel and collect terms wherever possible; and
(7.11)
(8.11) 
(9.11)
(10.11)
(11.11)
(12.11)
5* rearrange the equations, so that
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(K2i+x1M2)dpi + K23(ip3 - dx2 = -(m2-n2)dG 
(K31+x1M3)dp1 + K33dp3 = -(m3-n3)dG 
(K2i -XiM^Jdp! + K23dp3 + dx2 = -(m^-n^dG7 
(K31-X1M3) dpx + K33dp3 = - (1113-113) dG7
(13.11)
Now; by assumption; dG=dG/ so that it does not matter whether the change in the 
terms of trade; dpi; is expressed with respect to dG or dG7. Solving; we have:
(= N )
-(m2 -n2 ) k 23 0 -1
-(m3 -n3 ) ^33 0 0
-(m2 -n2 ) 0 k23 1
dpi -(m3-n3) 0 w 0
3^ 03 0
dG K2i +X1M2 K23 0 -1
K 31+X1M 3 k33 0 0
K21 -X]lM 2 0 K23 1
K3!-XxM3 0 K33 0
which; if we make use of the fact that Z p .K. .=0, can be rewritten:
j J1J
dpj
dG
______________hi______________
-K22+x xM2 k 23 0 -1
-K32+x xM3 k 33 0 0
-K22-x xM2 0 k23 1
-K32-x 1M3 0 k 33 0
(= |B|)
Finally;
1. expand |A| and |b | from the first two rows according to Laplace;
2. divide top and bottom by K33.K33; and
3. convert the resulting expressions into quantity weighted substitution elasticities and
marginal propensities (remembering that all prices are unity; and because of this 
Xi = x2).
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Then,
äPiXi -V2.3 - V 2 3
dGp! ^23 + ^23 + ^23 “ ^23
where V = -(c -s ) + (c -s ) ,
1J 1 1  J J ajj" Jj
= pjn is the marginal propensity to spend an increase in output on the i 
good, and
(i4.ii)
th
s_^ = is the marginal propensity to produce the i " good out of a given in­
crease in output at constant prices.
If the increase in output should occur only in the domestic country V23 "would 
be zero so that
d-PiXj. = -V23__________  = H
dGp! ^23 + ^23 + 123 “ ^23
is our criterion for the effect of an increase in output, dG, expressed as a proportion 
of the value of trade,upon the terms of trade of the domestic (expanding) country. The 
corresponding formula for the foreign country is
I P l X l  =  - V 2 3 _________________________ =  T T /
dG Pi ^23 + ^23 + ^23 " ^23
From (i5.ll) and (l6.ll) it follows that if the change in output in each coun­
try expressed as a proportion of the value of trade should not be equal, the rate of 
change in the terms of trade is:
(15.11)
(l6.ll)
d-Pi = -V23(1G/x1) - VgaCl^Vx!) = H dG + ^dG/
Pi ^23 + ^23 + ^23 " ^ 3 Xx Xx
For all these formulae, corresponding two-commodity results can be obtained by 
setting/zero all terms which involve the non-traded commodities. Thus, where the rate 
of growth of output as a proportion of the value of trade is the same in each country, 
(l^.ll), we have,
(IT.11)
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dpi = (c2-s2) + (Cg-Sg) 
dG Pi E (18.11)
where
E Xp 02 xL,:T“0gg- °22+ r—Ü22--X-2 A 2  -a-2
O20 /---Dp; Cg + Cg .
If the increase in output is in the domestic country only (15.II),
d-Pl *1 _ C2 - S2 
dG Pi E
if in the foreign country only (l6.11),
d-Pi 2LL = c2 - S2 
dG7 p! E
(19.11)
(20.11)
Finally, for the general case where output expands at a different rate in
each country (i7.ll),
d-Pi *i 
dG p!
(cg-sg)~ +_______ Ai
E ( 2 ! .H )
Assuming that our system is stable, it follows that in any of the criteria (l4.11) to 
(2l.ll) the direction of shift in the terns of trade depends upon the sign of the numer­
ator, being favourable to the domestic country when it is negative and adverse for the
domestic country when it is positive.
D. ANALYSIS
1. The Terms of Trade, Two-Commodity Analysis
For purposes of discussion, let us concentrate upon the case in which the in­
crease in output occurs entirely in the domestic country. We commence with the two- 
commodity result (i9.ll). From inspection, it can be seen that the direction of the 
shift in the terms of trade is dependent, assuming stability in the international market, 
upon the sign of the numerator: being favourable (adverse) to the expanding country if
eg is less (more) than s2 .
If, in either a two or four-commodity world, the terms of trade are to he af­
fected by an expansion in the output of one of the countries at constant relative commo­
dity prices, an excess in the demand for or in the supply of one of the internationally 
traded commodities must he generated within the expanding country. Wow, when a coun­
try' s production is not completely specialised its demand for imports is equal to the 
difference between its total consumption and supply of the importable commodity. Hence, 
the net effect upon the demand for imports which follows an increase in output is deter­
mined first, by the amount of the increase in output which occurs in the import-competing 
industry and, secondly, upon the extent to which the increased income generated is spent, 
at constant prices, upon importables. Should the absolute increase in the demand for, 
exceed (be less than) the absolute increase in the supply of the commodity, an excess 
demand for (supply of) importables will arise in the expanding country. Given that equi 
librium in the balance of payments is maintained by the price mechanism, it follows that 
this excess demand (supply) can be eliminated only by a deterioration (improvement) in 
the terms of trade of the domestic country. More specifically, in the two-commodity 
case, this would be when its marginal propensity to spend output on the consumption of 
importables, c2, exceeds (is less than) its marginal propensity to produce importables, 
s2, when output expands at constant prices.
2. The Terms of Trade, Four-Commodity Analysis
Even when the presence of non-traded goods is allowed for explicitly (equation 
(i5.ll)), the terms of trade can only change if, as a consequence of growth, there is an 
excess demand for or supply of one of the internationally traded commodities. This 
time, however, internal price effects operate so as to alter the magnitude of the cri­
tical propensity terms. Imagine a situation in which the values of the two marginal pro 
pensities were equal, the increase in expenditure due to the increase in output being
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allocated in such a way as to cancel exactly the increase in output in the import-com­
peting industry. In a two-commodity world there would be no price change in either in­
dustry and no shift in the terms of trade. If non-traded commodities exist, however, 
it is reasonable to assume that some of the increase in expenditure would be allocated 
to them. Unless the marginal propensity to spend output on the consumption of non-traded 
goods, c3, is equal to the marginal propensity to produce these goods, s3, the price of 
non-traded commodities must be affected: rising (falling) if c3 (s3) is greater than s3 
(c3). The only exception, as long as c3 is not equal to s3, to the necessity of this 
shift in the non-traded good price, is where either the own elasticity of demand for, cr3 3 , 
or supply of, S33, the commodity is infinite (e.g. the special case of Hicks discussed 
above).
In the event of the price of the non-traded good rising (falling) demand would 
transfer away from (into) the non-traded good sector and resources would flow towards 
(away from) it, the direction of the shift in demand and supply depending upon the degree 
of substitutability existing, on the one hand, between non-traded and exportable commodi­
ties and, on the other hand, between non-traded and exportable goods. Inevitably, this 
shift in the consumption pattern and in the flow of resources would affect the size of 
the marginal propensity terms themselves, so as to reduce, cancel, or even outweigh the 
original difference between c2 and s2.
Generally, four cases can be distinguished.
1. Where c3 exceeds s3 and non-traded commodities are more substitutable (both 
in consumption and production) for exportables than for importables. In this case the 
rise in the price of the non-traded commodity due to the excess demand for it must result 
(excepting in all cases where infinite elasticities exist) in a proportionate flow of 
resources toward the non-traded sector that would come primarily from the exportable good
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industry. On the demand side, purchasing power would transfer, for the most part, from 
the non-traded to the exportable sector. The net effect of these two reactions to the 
increase in the price of non-traded commodities would be, therefore, to increase propor­
tionately the demand for exportables more than the demand for importables, at the same 
time as the proportionate reduction in the supply of exportables exceeded that of import­
ables. It follows that if c2 exceeded s2 initially, the difference could be reduced, 
cancelled or even outweighed and that the possibility of a favourable movement in the terms 
of trade of the expanding country would be improved.
2. Where c3 exceeds s3 but non-traded commodities are more substitutable for 
importables than for exportables. In this case the flow of resources towards, and of 
demand from, the non-traded sector would concern the importable more than the exportable 
good industry; the probability of a favourable movement in the terms of trade of the ex­
panding country being reduced accordingly.
3. Where c3 is less than s3 and non-traded commodities are more substitutable for 
exportables than for importables. This time the price of the non-traded commodity must 
fall as a result of the excess supply of it. As a consequence of the substitution bias, 
the flow of resources from and the transfer of demand to the non-traded sector would con­
cern the exportable more than the importable sector. The possibility of a favourable 
terms of trade movement for the expanding country would be decreased.
b. Finally, where C3 is less than s3 but non-traded commodities are more substi­
tutable for importables than for exportables. In this case, the fall in the price of 
the non-traded good would induce a proportionately heavier flow of resources from the non- 
traded to the import-competing than to the exportable sector, and a proportionately greater 
shift of demand from importables to non-traded goods than from exportables to non-traded 
goods. The possibility of a favourable movement in the terms of trade of the expanding
country would be increased.
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Table Ten summarizes these results:
TABLE TEN
INFLUENCE OF NON-TRADED COMMODITY ON THE MARGINAL PROPENSITIES
C3 greater than Non-traded goods relatively more substitutable with
or less than s3___________________Exportables________________________Importables
c3 greater than s3 Probability of expanding Probability of expanding
country’s terms of trade country's terms of trade
improving increased improving decreased
c3 less than s3 Probability of expanding Probability of expanding
country's terms of trade country's terms of trade
improving decreased. improving increased.
Though the above Table classifies in probability terns the different influences 
of the non-traded commodity upon the terms of trade, it does not enable us to determine 
whether or not its influence would be strong enough to reverse the effect of an initial 
difference in size between c2 and s2. What, for instance, can be said of a situation in
which c2 initially exceeds s2 but c3 is less than s3? We have seen that the result will 
depend upon the substitution possibilities in the system, but to what extent is this so? 
TableEQevm classifies the different cases which might exist in a four-commodity world; in 
some of these cases, the magnitude of the substitution possibilities could be decisive.
TABLE ELEVEN
SUMMARY OF CRITERIA FOR EXPANDING COUNTRY'S TERMS OF TRADE CHANGE 
Case Criteria Terms of trade effect on expanding country
1. c2 > s2 Adverse
c3 = s3
c2 + c3 > s2 + s3
2. c2 > s2 Adverse
c3 > s3
c2 + c3 > s2 + s3
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TABLE ELEVEN ^CONTIMJEP)
Case Criteria Terns of trade effect on expanding country
3- c2 > s2 Adverse
C3 < S3
c2 + C3 > s2 + S3
4. c2 > s2 Indeterminate. The result would depend
c3 < S3 on the substitution possibilities.
c2 + C3 < s2 + S3
5- c2 = s2 Zero terms of trade effect.
c3 = S3
C2 + C3 = s2 + S3
6. C2 = S2 Adverse
C3 > S3
C2 + C3 > s2 + S3
7- C2 = s2 Favourable
C3 < S3
C2 + C3 < s2 + S3
8. C2 < s2 Favourable
C3 = S3
C2 + C3 < s2 + s3
9. C2 < s2 Favourable
C3 < S3
C2 + c3 < s2 + S3
10. C2 < s2 Indeterminate. The result would depend
C3 > S3 upon the substitution possibilities.
C2 + C3 > s2 + S3
11. C2 < S2 Indeterminate. The result would depend
C3 > S3 upon the substitution possibilities.
C2 + C3 < s2 + S3
When comparing the two and four-commodity results it is important to he sure of 
an author's intentions when developing a two-commodity model. On the one hand, his re­
sult may refer to a world in which non-traded commodities are assumed absent. This is 
similar to the partial equilibrium approach which assumes that non-traded goods exist
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although their effects are negligible, i.e. that all substitution elasticities which in­
volve the non-traded commodity are zero. On the other hand, it is conceivable that non- 
traded commodities might be classified either as importables or exportables depending on
their relative degree of substitutability. It has been shown that this latter interpre- 
vital
tation obscures/relationships, so that no idea can be obtained about the manner in which 
the non-traded good affects the terms of trade reaction to economic expansion. More­
over, our results are incomparable - the parameters being defined differently in each 
case. The first interpretation, therefore, is favoured.
Of the eleven possible cases listed in the Table, numbers four, six, seven, ten 
and eleven all refer to situations in which the two-commodity criterion, namely, c2 I s2, 
is invalidated by the addition of a non-traded commodity to the model. Five of the 
eleven cases, however, are special ones which involve equalities between the propensities 
and they are ignored throughout the remainder of the chapter. Of the remaining six pos­
sibilities there are three in which the two-good criterion is no longer applicable; in 
which a conclusion founded upon the two-commodity criterion could be invalidated. In 
case four, for instance, c2 exceeds s2 initially and one would expect an excess demand 
for importables with a subsequent deterioration in the terms of trade to follow. It is 
conceivable, however, that a high degree of substitutability between importables and non- 
traded goods relative to that existing between exportables and non-traded goods could re­
sult in a transfer of resources to the importable good industry, and a flow of purchasing 
power away from importables, sufficiently large to cancel and even outweigh the original 
difference between c2 and s2 . The net effect of the non-traded commodity, therefore, 
would be to change an adverse into a favourable terms of trade movement.
The converse argument holds a fortiori in cases ten and eleven.
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What are the implications of our analysis concerning the two problems to which 
Hicks addressed himself? Consider first, the case of a uniform increase in productivity 
in all industries. Our conclusion agrees with the one derived from the Heckscher-Ohlin 
type rather than the Ricardian model: that the terns of trade need not necessarily de­
teriorate . In addition to pointing out the importance of the manner in which demand ex­
pands, however, it is also necessary to stress the role played by substitution possibi­
lities between non-traded and importable goods on the one hand, and between non-traded 
and exportable goods on the other. Their presence could enhance, diminish or even in­
validate the qualification made to the original Hicksian proposition by Mishan and others.
When productivity increases solely in the import-competing industry our analysis 
supports, with qualifications, the conclusion of the Heckscher-Ohlin type model that the 
terms of trade of the expanding country improve. Once again the expansion of output at 
constant prices requires that resources flow from the exportable and the non-traded com­
modity sectors to the import-competing sector. Production of importables, therefore, 
increases by more than the initial expansion in output. As long as the marginal propen­
sity to spend output on importables is less than unity it seems probable that the terms 
of trade would improve. To some extent, however, if non-traded goods were more substi­
tutable with importables than with exportables, this terms of trade effect could be 
mitigated - the rise in the price of non-traded goods increasing the demand for import­
ables and reducing the excess supply of them.
Finally, consider the case represented by equation (17-11) where both countries 
are expanding but the rate of growth in output is different in each country. The direc­
tion of the shift in the terms of trade would be determined by the following three factors. 
1. The difference in either country between, on the one hand, the marginal propensity to 
spend output on importables and the marginal propensity to produce importables; and
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on the other hand, between the marginal propensity to spend output on non-traded com­
modities and the marginal propensity to produce non-traded goods.
2. The degree of substitutability in each country, both in production and in consumption.
between non-traded goods and exportables on the one hand and non-traded goods and 
importables on the other.
3* The annual rate of growth of output in each country expressed as a proportion of the 
initial value of trade.
3. Real Income Effect
We now leave the question of the direction of the shift in the terms of trade 
and concentrate instead upon the magnitude of such a movement,which is a determinant of 
the real income effect of an expansion in output. Real income in the domestic country 
when it alone is expanding, will depend both on the initial expansion in output and upon 
the direction and magnitude of the terms of trade movement. The loss or gain of real 
income in the expanding country due to the latter may be approximated on the compensa­
tion principle [5^ 71-2], as being equivalent to the increase or decrease in the cost of 
obtaining the initial volume of imports due to the shift in the terms of trade. Thus, 
the total real income change in the domestic country is approximated:
dU * dp!X2 + dG 
or
dU = dpi xi 
dG dG P!
where xi = x2; and dU = the change in real income in the domestic country, i.e. the 
change in the cost of securing the initial volume of imports plus the increase in output 
valued at constant prices.
Substituting in equation (22.11) for from equation (15*11) we obtain:
(22.11)
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A U  _ _______  ~ V 2 3 _____________ , n
d-G ^23 + ^23 + ^23 " ^23
which, when rearranged, yields:
dU _ 1^3 + tl3 + ^23 + fe3 ~ V23 + 1 
dG 1 + ljJi3 + ^13 + ^23 + ^23
(l|ji3 = l|j23 and -\Jr23Äl+ ti3) •
This is the criterion for the change in the real income of the domestic (expanding) 
country.
(25.ll)
Let us consider the intriguing possibility that the effect of an expansion in 
output could reduce the expanding country's real income. From the assumption of stabi­
lity in the international market it follows that the denominator on the right-hand side 
must be negative. For real income to decrease, therefore, the numerator must be posi­
tive, which requires:
V23 > 1 + ^ 1 3  + ^13 + ^ 2 3  + ^23 
in absolute magnitude or, expanding V23 and rearra )ng±ng:
(l+ljlis+^ i 3)-[s2-S3(^~~~^-) ]+[ (C2-C2)-(C3-C3) ] > - 1JJ23 ••• (24.11)
From the stability conditions we know that the foreign coefficient of sensitivity is in­
herently negative and, therefore, that the right-hand side of (24.11) must be positive.
This means that if real income is to diminish as a result of growth at least one of the 
bracketed terms on the left-hand side must be positive. The reader can see for himself 
how unlikely it is that this condition would be fulfilled.
If in the above criterion, all terms which involve the non-traded commodity are 
set to zero, a two-commodity criterion is obtained which is identical to one derived by 
Johnson [17,76] except that our result expands his aggregate elasticity concepts:
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(1+ “ • Oll" ”^Sll-Ci)-Sp+(c2-C2) > - ^ 0 2 2+ xf^22 ••• (25.11)
The importance of the inclusion of the non-traded commodity needs no emphasis, though it 
is difficult to generalize about its effect. 
k . Solutions for Other Relative Price Changes
Instead of solving directly for the relative price changes dp3, dp3, etc., the 
solution for^^p*- = h is substituted into the appropriate equations in the set (i3.ll).
Only the case in which the increase in output is concentrated entirely in the domestic 
country (dGx equalling zero) is considered. In a similar fashion, solutions are ob­
tained for (dp3-dpi) and (dp^-dpi) which are changes in non-traded prices relative to the 
price of the domestic country's exportables. In these latter cases use is made of the
fact that 2 p £ _ 0 in order to simplify the results. Finally, a criterion is given
j j ij
for dp3-dp3.
The relevant criteria are:
lP3
dG p3
(CJ31 —S31 )H + [CsH-^Cs-Ss) ] ^ —  
“033 + S33
dp3-dp!„ 
dG Xl
“(cT3 2-S3£)H + [CsH+(C3-S3) ]
“033 + S33
p.Ip3 X! _ (a3i-S3i)H - C3H ^ x~^ 
dG p3 “033 + S33
dp3-dpi _ -(032-532)H-C3H ~PjX i 
dG -033 + S33
(26.11)
(27.11)
(28.11)
(29.11)
dp3-dp3 Xl O3I-S31 031-531 \-033+833/ V-033+S33/
C3 C3
■033+833 -033+833 H +
c3 - s3
-033+833
P1X1
P3X3 (50.11)
Few general conclusions emerge from these criteria. In the expanding country
(26.ll) indicates that if the terms of trade shift is favourable, the price of non-traded
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commodities will rise relative to the price of importables unless the increased supply 
of non-traded goods (due to the increase in output less the production substitution effect) 
exceeds considerably the increased consumption of them (due to both the rise in income as 
a result of the output increase, the improvement in the terms of trade, and to the price 
substitution effects in consumption). A fall in the terms of trade, on the other hand, 
would see the price substitution effects and the income effect of the terms of trade change 
reversed and C3 would need to exceed S3 considerably to prevent P3 falling relative to p2 . 
At the same time, it should be noted that to the extent that either of the own non-traded 
substitution elasticities were high or infinite, the indicated shift in the traded/non- 
traded price ratio would be small or zero. Likewise, if H = 0, the result would be deter­
mined entirely (except where non-traded elasticities were infinite) by whether c3 I S3.
In a similar though suitably modified fashion, we can analyse the effect of an 
increase in output upon the price ratio involving the non-traded and the exportable com­
modity in the domestic country. Even in the case of the foreign (and non-expanding) 
country it is not possible always to reach unambiguous conclusions. If the foreign coun­
try' s terms of trade should improve, px falling relative to p2, where p2 is the numeraire, 
price substitution effects would tend to depress the price of the non-traded commodity; 
to offset this there is the income effect of the favourable terms of trade movement which 
would increase the consumption of the non-traded good and tend to increase its price.
These considerations apply in reverse if the terns of trade movement is adverse for the 
foreign country. Only in the case of the foreign non-traded/importable price ratio is 
the result definite, the income and substitution effects reinforcing one another both
with respect to an improvement and a deterioration in the terms of trade, i.e. px falls 
/relative to P3 when the foreign terms of trade improve and vice versa.
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Finally, we consider the ratio of the prices of the non-traded commodities them­
selves and our conclusion is that there can he no general presumption as to the movement 
in this ratio. If, in ignorance, it is assumed that the quantity weighted substitution 
elasticities are the same in each country, the first term in our criterion disappears and 
we are left with the condition that p3 will rise relative to p3 if and only if
(C3 + C3)H + c3 > s3
The first expression contains income effects whose impact is determined by the terms of 
trade change: favouring a rise in p3 relative to p3 if the terms of trade change is fa­
vourable to the expanding country or a fall in p3 relative to p3 if the terms of trade 
movement is adverse. The other terms are our marginal propensities to consume and pro­
duce the non-traded good out of a given increase in output in the expanding country; p3 
will tend to rise (fall) the more c3 exceeds (is less than) s3.
The reader should note that in the analysis of the above criteria the possibi­
lity of complementarity in demand or of joint supply is excluded by assumption. In an 
earlier chapter it was argued that such conditions are considered abnormal in a four-com­
modity world.
Other criteria could be obtained by substitutions into the appropriate equa­
tions of (i3.ll) both for the case of an equal absolute increase in output in each country 
(dG = dG/) and for the case of divergent rates of growth. These additional criteria, 
however, would be of limited value as apart from the introduction of symmetrical ’effects' 
for the foreign country, the only new determinant would be, in the last case, a different 
growth rate in the foreign country. Both the basic analysis of the problem and the ambi­
guity of our conclusions would be the same.
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E. CONCLUSIONS
The main conclusions of the chapter are summarized below.
1. It is contended that the contradictory results of some earlier models can be attributed,
in the case of a uniform growth in the productivity of all industries, to different 
cost assumptions and, in the case of an increase of productivity which occurs entirely 
within the import-competing sector, to a failure to distinguish clearly between 
domestic production of importables and the domestic production of non-traded goods.
2. It is claimed that the presence of commodities which do not enter into international
trade necessitates a careful restatement of established results. In particular, it 
is important within the context of the model, to consider all of the relevant para­
meters, the answer in many cases being affected vitally by the substitution possibi­
lities which occur between the traded and non-traded commodities.
3* In some cases, a consideration of the traded/non-traded relationships may affect the 
direction of the shift in the terns of trade; in all cases the magnitude of the 
terms of trade movement will be affected, though it is not possible to generalize 
about this.
4. The addition of non-traded commodities enables us to consider the shifts in the non- 
traded/traded price ratios as well as in the terms of trade. The importance of this 
is that it focuses our attention on the role of the non-traded commodity in the equi­
librating process.
5- Finally, it is argued that the expression of the results in terms of conceivably meas­
urable parameters represents a step, if only a small one, toward the possibility of 
quantitative analysis.
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APPENDIX
In chapter thrde.it was suggested that our model is sufficiently general to include 
any number of non-traded commodities without affecting the qualitative nature of our con­
clusions .
For example, consider the problem of a tariff and the induced shift in the terms 
of trade of the taxing country. Rewriting the set of equations (18.5) to (21-5) so as 
to include n non-traded commodities we have:
K21 +X]_M2 k 23- • K0 2n 0 .. .0 M2(p2-l)-1 ’ dpi " -K22dp2
K31+X1M3 K33 • .K,3n 0 .. .0 M3(P2“1) d-Ps -K32dp2
K n+x.M nl i n K X-n3 • Knn 0 .. .0 Mn (p2-1) dpn = -Kn2dP2
K21-X1M2 0 ... 0 k 23 .. .K'2n 1 &P3 •
K31-X1M3 0 . . 0 K33 .. .k C3n 0 • •
• • • • • •
dpn
•
K/. -XiM' nl n 0 . . 0 K' • n3 . .K /nn 0 dx2 0
Let A be the diminished determinant of substitution effects rr
K22
K 0 ... Kn2 nn
where in this case r=l: and let A .. be the co-factor in A of the element K . ..rr, ij rr ij
Then, proceeding exactly as in the four-good case, the solution for the effect of
a tariff upon the terms of trade is:
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d-Pi = ____________________________
dp2 p A / n As rr ^ A(r rr.is
A ” Xl\M s+^ M i A rr, ss x 3 rr, ss
rr, ss
rA7rrl-(p2-l)( M s+E M. A rr,1S') I ^
3 rr; ssZ-L^rr, ss5T "  +^ {K+jMiO  C? \  J -Vrr, s
where, in this case, r=l, s=2, and i=3 to n.
This result is obtained by a Laplacian development from (n-1) rows or columns, after 
n
using the relationship Z p.K.. = 0 and the convention that all prices except p2 are unity
j=l J 1J
initially by an appropriate choice of quantity units. The proof that the numerator and
the denominator comprise only the terns shown is tedious but easy.
Since A is the discriminant of a negative definite form, the ratio A /Arr ° 7 rr' rr, ss
must be negative. Wow, it is easy to verify that for n=5> the terms A .^/A o > 0  
if all K_X), i.e. all goods are substitutes. However, it is desirable to obtain a general
proof concerning the positiveness of A . /Arr, is' rr, ss Furthermore, if our conclusion about 
the terms of trade movement is to hold for the n-commodity case, we must show also that
A . /A < 1 .rr,is rr,ss
Our proof that 0 < A . /A < 1  depends upon two theorems concerning determinants
* rr,is' rr,ss * °
The first, established by Mosak [24,49-51]> is stated but the reader is referred to the refer­
ence cited for the proof. An outline is given, however, of the proof of the second theorem 
which is due, so far as I am aware, to the ingenuity of T.W. Swan.
Theorem 1
If in a full determinant of substitution effects (A) the (n-l)^1 determinant (A ) 
is negative definite and if all off-diagonal elements are non-negative (all K >0), then 
every non-principal minor has the same sign as every principal minor of the same order.
Theorem 2
If in a full determinant of substitution effects (A) the columns and rows sum to
2b0.
zero (prices being unity initially), then A -A. . and A =A =A . +A where A' "  rs ij rr, ss ss;rr rr, is ss,ir rs
is the co-factor of K in A, and A . is the co-factor of K. in Ars 7 rr,is is rr
Proof. If A is the full determinant of substitution effects:
K . . .K_ 11 In
K _ . . .Knl nn
and A is the co-factor of K in A, then nn nn
Anl ” ( A K12 '•'Kln
K „ .. .K , n-1,2 n-l,n
From the theory of demand we know Z K  ^ = 0 (all prices unity),
K -(K , + K _ +
i=l
••• Kr,n-Prn \ r3_ r2
iii—i (-)n K12 • A Kn +Ki2+
Kn-1,2 - K - l , l +K,
Ll,n-1
.+Kn-l,n-l'
Adding columns to the last column
Ö1II1 1 K 12 .-KH
Kn-1,2* * _Kn-l,1
K11 •* . K n1, n-1
Kn-l,l K  n in-1,n-1
nn
By permuting columns A = Anr nn Similarly, by permuting rows and columns A_^= A .
Next, we see that for A, the determinants A ^  A^  ^
K „  ... K-, 33 3n
K . . . Kn3 nn
are
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and that the sum of the determinants
Al l , 3 2 +A22,31 K23K24 • • • K2n - K13K14 Kln
K43K1A ‘ " A n ••• A n
K ,  . .  .Kn3 nn K K , np n4 . . . Knn
= - (K-j^ + K ^ ) (Ki 4+K24  ^ * ’ ' OJ
M+Öi—l
W A
K43 h k . . . A n
Kn3 Knk
Knn
As Z K. = 0, lr 7 l
so that
K + K_ = -(K + K, +...+ K )lr 2r 3^ A-r nr
A +  A11,32 22,31
By permuting elements,
-(K33+
a 5
a 3+ - . . +Kn3)
,. .
_(K3n+ A n + ’ ■ •+Knn) 
A n
Kn3 Knn
= K33 K34 ••' K3n = A - A11,22 22,11
Kn3 Knk ■ . Knn
A = A A . + A
Now, it follows from theorems 1 and 2 that
0 <
Arr, is 
A < 1rr, ss
The terms of trade, therefore, will move favourably for the taxing country even in the 
n-commodity case providing there is no complementarity and as long as the tariff (P2 -I)
is not large.
The application of this general proof to other developments of the model is obvious.
One reservation should be noted, however. While the assumption that all K _  > 0 
is a reasonable one in a model characterised by a large degree of aggregation, this be­
comes less realistic an assumption as disaggregation becomes more general.
